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ABSTRACT
This thesis contains an analysis of the impact on shareholder wealth of domestic
and cross-border takeover bids for UK listed companies. The study covers the
calendar years from 1986 to 1991 inclusive. For the cross-border acquisitions, data
is available for an analysis of 143 targets, 71 bidders, and 55 matched pairs of targets
and bidders. For domestic acquisitions, data was available for 568 targets, 414
bidders and 356 pairs of targets and bidders. Three different event study
methodologies are applied; the capital asset pricing model, the market model, and the
index model.
UK target companies gained significantly from both domestic and cross-border
takeover bids. Over the period from eight months prior, to one month after, the month
of the bid announcement (t-8, t+1), cumulative abnormal returns exceeded +20.2% in
cross-border and +16.6% in domestic acquisitions.
Both domestic and overseas bidders underperformed during the five month period
following the bid announcement. However, over the whole analysis period (t-8, t+5),
UK bidders performed significantly better than overseas bidders.
Analysis of joint abnormal returns to pairs of targets and bidders reveals that both
cross-border and domestic acquisitions in the UK during the 1986-1991 period created
significant shareholder wealth. However, the gains to target shareholders exceed the
total gain, thus resulting in a transfer of wealth from bidders to targets.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Before progressing further, it is worth defining some of the key terminology applied
throughout this thesis. As argued by Brockington (1986), a merger is "the
amalgamation of two or more businesses which were separate" (p. 80), while a
takeover (also known as an acquisition) is "the acquisition of control of a company by
another company. This is usually brought about by a purchase of the majority of its
shares." (p. 115). While it is not uncommon to use the three terms synonymously
(Weinberger et a/. (1979), Schouller (1987) and OECD (1988)), other studies (e.g.,
Jensen and Ruback (1983) make a clear distinction). In this thesis, the terms
acquisitions and takeovers will be used interchangeably where one company acquires
control of another company (i.e., there is a clear buying and target company, as
defined below), and mergers to refer to situations where two companies combine (i.e.,
there is no clear buying and target company).
The buying company is also referred to as the bidder, the predator, the acquiror,
or the acquiring company. The selling company is alternatively known as the target,
the victim, or the acquiree.
A domestic acquisition is where the buying and selling companies are incorporated
in the same country, while a cross-border acquisition refers to a situation where the
buying and selling companies are incorporated in two different countries.
The definition of takeover bid (also known as takeover offer) adopted in this study
is the same as that used by Pringle: "A takeover bid is an offer to the holders of
securities carrying voting rights in a company (or convertible into such securities) to
acquire their securities for a consideration in cash or other securities for the purpose
of acquiring control of the company ..." (Pringle (1991), p. 38). The day the formal bid
(also known as the offer) is made, is the announcement day.
Abnormal return (AR) is a measure of the gains or losses to shareholders, during
a specific time period, attributable to the event (which in this study is taken to be the
announcement of the takeover bid). The abnormal return is also known as the
shareholder wealth effect, and is calculated as the difference between the actual return
on the share, and the return one would expect had no event taken place. This is
known as event study methodology, and involves the application of a test model such
as the capital asset pricing model, the market model, or the index model for estimating
the expected return. (These models are discussed in detail in Chapter 6). The test
model parameters (such as the market model a and /3) measure the historic
relationship between return on the share and return on the market index, and are
estimated during a parameter estimation period.
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are the aggregate cumulative abnormal
returns over a number of time periods, which together make up the event window (also
known as the test period). Each time period is referred to relative to the time of the
event (known as time period t2). Time periods prior to the event are indicated by a
minus sign, while time periods after the event are indicated by a plus sign3.
The cross-border effect is a measure of the difference in abnormal returns to
companies engaged in cross-border and domestic acquisitions. A positive (negative)
cross-border effect indicates that abnormal returns are higher (lower) in cross-border
than in domestic acquisitions.
2 In this study, based on monthly data, t refers to the calendar month in which the bid was announced. In
studies based on daily data (as discussed in the literature review), t refers to the day of the bid
announcement.
3 For example, as discussed in Chapter 6, the abnormal returns to target company shareholders are in this
study calculated for a time period from eight months prior to the month of the bid announcement to one
month after (event window = (t-8, t+1)), while the parameters are estimated using 60 monthly observation
for the time period from 68 to 9 months prior to the month of the bid announcement (parameter estimation
period = (t-68, t-9)).
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis contains a comparative analysis of domestic UK acquisitions and
cross-border acquisitions into the UK over the 1986 to 1991 period. The focus is on
the wealth effect for bidding and target company shareholders, as well as on their
combined wealth, from both cross-border and domestic takeover bids for UK listed
companies.
Fatemi and Furtado (1988) gave three reasons why one might expect the level of
abnormal returns to bidders and targets to be systematically different in cross-border
and domestic acquisitions;
"Transnational acquisitions would not be any different from domestic
acquisitions, and therefore would not have any differential wealth effects, if
(1) the market for corporate control were not segmented across national
boundaries,
(2) the capital markets were not internationally segmented, and
(3) there were no net benefits (disadvantages) associated with
international diversification.
However, differential wealth effects may exist if any of these conditions do
not hold." (Fatemi and Furtado (1988), p. 364).
While a substantial amount of research has analysed the wealth effect of domestic
acquisitions, the existing literature on cross-border acquisitions seem to be more
limited. However, several papers based on US data, such as Wansley et al. (1983),
Tessema (1985), Shaked eta!. (1991), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Cebenoyan, et
al. (1992), Swenson (1993), and Cheng and Chan (1995), have suggested that target
company shareholders gain more in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions. This
has become known as the target company 'cross-border effect'. Prior to this study,
no similar research appears to have been undertaken based on the UK market.
Indeed, it appears that only two previous studies, Conn and Connell (1990, 1993) and
Fells (1993), have looked specifically at cross-border acquisitions into the UK.
However, with regard to their analysis of acquisitions into the UK, both studies were
rather narrow in focus, as neither study analysed the effect of cross-border acquisitions
into the UK by companies based outside the US, nor did they analyse domestic
acquisitions for comparison purposes. Consequently, neither Conn and Connell (1990,
1993) nor Fells (1993) were able to comment on the presence or otherwise of a target
company cross-border effect in the UK. This study aims to fill this gap in the existing
literature.
In addition, this thesis contains an analysis of the abnormal returns to the
overseas and domestic bidding companies. In competitive takeover markets, one
would expect target company shareholders to capture most of any gain from
acquisitions, with the level of abnormal returns to bidding company shareholders being
close to zero (Marr et al. (1993)). However, if target company shareholders are found
to receive higher premiums in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions, can this be
attributed to the target companies being worth more to overseas bidders than to
domestic bidders, or do foreign bidders pay too much? By analysing the level of
abnormal returns to shareholders of both overseas and domestic bidding companies,
as well as the differences in their returns, this study will cast light on this issue.
An analysis of target and bidding company shareholders separately, will not
necessarily (unless both target and bidding company shareholders are found to either
gain or lose) give an indication of whether or not takeover bids overall create or
destroy shareholder wealth. Consequently, a further area of research undertaken in
this study is an analysis of the combined abnormal returns to pairs of target and
bidding company shareholders in both cross-border and domestic acquisitions.
The research centres around the takeover bids for UK listed companies which
were announced on or after 1 January 1986, and for which the bid outcome was
known on or prior to 31 December 1991 4. For this 6 year time period, a total of 966
such takeover bids were identified; 208 (21.5%) by foreign entities, 756 (78.3%) by
British institutions, and 2 (0.2%) joint bids between domestic and overseas companies.
The aim of this study is to analyse the returns to shareholders of both target and
bidding companies in all the cross-border and domestic acquisitions subject to certain
exceptions detailed in Chapter 6. However, due to data limitations (due to not all
companies being listed, or insufficient share return data being available for an analysis
of certain companies), such a complete census analysis is not possible. Data is
available for 143 UK target companies and 71 overseas bidding companies in cross-
border acquisitions into the UK. Data is available for both targets and bidders in 55
cross-border acquisitions. With regard to domestic UK acquisitions, sufficient data for
analysis is available for 568 target and 414 bidding companies. Data is available for
pairs of targets and bidders in 356 domestic acquisitions. A full listing of the takeover
bids and the companies involved are provided in Appendix A for cross-border
acquisitions, and Appendix B for domestic transactions (Appendices are located at the
end of the thesis).
This study thus contains an analysis of the impact of acquisition announcements
on the wealth of shareholders in 1,196 companies engaged in domestic and cross-
border acquisitions into the UK during the 1986-1991 period. It is appreciated that
acquisitions have implications far beyond the wealth of the shareholders of the
companies involved. However, an analysis of the impact of acquisitions on other
stakeholders, such as employees, managers, customers, suppliers and the wider
economy, is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Chapter 1 contains a brief discussion of the level of takeover activity in the UK,
with particular reference to the takeover boom of the late 1980s. During the time
4 As discussed in Chapter 6, a complete set of Acquisitions Monthly (which is the source applied for
information on the bid announcements), was not available prior to 1986, while the 1991 cutoff coincides with
the start of this research project. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, this six year period is also of
particular interest due to the high level of both domestic and cross-border takeover activity in the UK.
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period of analysis in this study (1986 to 1991), a significant feature of the UK takeover
market was the high (and increasing) level of cross-border acquisitions of UK
companies.
The main aims of this study are to establish whether target and bidding company
shareholders gain from domestic and cross-border takeover activity, and to ascertain
whether the level of abnormal returns are different in cross-border and domestic
acquisitions. However, prior to the empirical analysis, it is worth considering some of
the theoretical arguments put forward as to why the level of abnormal returns to target
and/or bidding company shareholders may be systematically different in national and
transnational acquisitions. A discussion of such factors is contained in Chapter 2. The
variables considered include product market imperfections, government intervention
and regulation, capital market imperfections, segmented takeover markets and
international risk diversification. These variables provide some of the possible
explanations for the cross-border effects observed in this study. It is worth stressing,
however, that while this thesis sets out to establish if cross-border effects exist in the
UK (and whether these effects persist after controlling for some of the key
characteristics of the bids), this thesis does not attempt to test any of the theories
regarding the causes of such cross-border effects empirically. Indeed, as discussed
in Chapter 2, these theories are generally not empirically verifiable, and while the
empirical results in this study may lend support (or otherwise) to some of these
theories, formal testing has not been possible.
Some of the key literature regarding the impact of domestic acquisitions, is
reviewed in Chapter 3. While the main focus of this thesis is on takeover activity in
the UK, a discussion of studies based on the US has also been included. The US is
not only the largest takeover market in the world, but it was also the single most
important country with regard to cross-border acquisitions into the UK during the 1986-
1991 period5. Consequently, an awareness of the impact of domestic acquisitions in
the US will aid the analysis of takeover activity in the UK during the 1980s. While
target company shareholders appears to gain significantly in both markets, there is
some evidence to suggest that the abnormal returns to US bidders are superior to
those observed for UK bidders. However, controversy surrounds the area of returns
to bidders, and as stressed in the chapter, comparisons are fraught with difficulties due
to the different methods applied by different authors.
The existing literature on the shareholder wealth effects associated with cross-
border acquisitions is reviewed in Chapter 4. The analysis to date tends to be heavily
skewed towards the US market, with 21 of the 34 previous studies identified focusing
exclusively on the US companies (targets, bidders, or both) involved in takeover
activity. Consequently, there appears to be only 13 previous studies of cross-border
acquisitions which have included data for companies based outside the US. While the
US is the largest takeover market in the world, another motive for restricting the
analysis to this market may have been the difficulties involved in obtaining return data
for companies based in other countries. The majority of studies suggest that, at least
for acquisitions in the US, target company shareholder returns are higher in cross-
border than in domestic acquisitions.
The hypotheses tested in the empirical section of this thesis, are discussed in
Chapter 5. The hypotheses relate to the timing, the level, and the differences in the
levels of abnormal returns to targets, bidders, and pairs of target and bidding
companies in cross-border and domestic acquisitions. It is further hypothesised that
the level of abnormal returns will be influenced by the characteristics of the bid, such
as the bid outcome, the existence of competition in the bid, the revision of bid terms,
the method of payment, the presence of pre-bid stakes in targets by bidders, the
relative size of the target and bidding companies, and the size of the company in
5	 Acquisitions into the UK by US bidders account for approximately 22% of the cross-border acquisitions
analysed in this study.
- 22 -
question.
Chapter 6 contains a discussion of the data sources and methodology applied in
the empirical part of the thesis. During the period of analysis, 208 cross-border and
756 domestic takeover bids for listed UK companies were announced. A few offers
were rejected from the analysis, due to their unusual characteristics. However, while
the aim was to analyse the impact of the bids on the wealth of both target and bidding
company shareholders in virtually all the domestic and cross-border bids, this proved
impossible due to data limitations. In particular, lack of data was a problem with
regard to the overseas bidding companies. However, by contacting various stock
exchanges and companies directly, data was obtained for 71 overseas bidders from
14 different countries. Data was also available for 143 UK target companies in cross-
border acquisitions. In order to ascertain whether takeovers overall create wealth,
data for both targets and bidders is required. In 55 of the cross-border acquisitions
was data available for matched pairs of bidders and targets. With regard to the
domestic acquisitions, data was available for 414 bidders, 568 targets and 356 pairs
of targets and bidders.
The analysis in this thesis is based on event study methodology. Three different
models are applied for establishing the level of abnormal returns to targets and
bidders, as well as for ascertaining the degree of difference in abnormal returns to
companies involved in cross-border and domestic acquisitions. These are the capital
asset pricing model, the market model, and the index model. (The cross-sectional
analysis as well as the analysis of joint abnormal returns to pairs of targets and
bidders is restricted to the index model abnormal returns). Parameters are estimated
using monthly data for a five year period from 68 to 9 months prior to the month of the
bid announcement (months t-68 to t-9, where t refers to the month of the bid
announcement), while abnormal returns have been calculated from t-8 to t+5 for
bidders and from t-8 to t+1 for targets and pairs of targets and bidders. The degree
of statistical significance of the abnormal return estimates are calculated using the t-
test for the capital asset pricing model and the index model, while the market model
returns are also tested using the Patel! Standardised Residuals test. Cross-border
effects have been tested using the t-test for differences in means.
Chapter 6 also contains a discussion of the methodological difficulties encountered
in this study. These problems include parameter estimation complications and 'thin'
trading, stock market size effects, establishing the level of bidding company returns,
and post-announcement 'drift' in abnormal returns to bidders.
The empirical results are discussed in the following three chapters. Chapter 7
contains an analysis of returns to target company shareholders. Target companies in
both cross-border and domestic acquisitions gained significantly from the bids. The
average abnormal return over the period from t-8 to t+1 exceeded +20% in cross-
border acquisitions and +16% in domestic acquisitions. While target company
shareholders gained more in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions, the target
company cross-border effect was generally not statistically significant. There were,
however, large variations in the level of returns to shareholders of different target
companies, with the level of abnormal returns being influenced not only by the
nationality of the bidder, but also by the characteristics of the bid. For example,
shareholders of UK target companies subject to cross-border takeover bids gained
significantly more in acquisitions by companies based outside the EC, while both sets
of target companies gained more where the bid included a full cash offer. The target
company cross-border effect appear to have been due to the higher proportion of
cross-border than domestic acquisitions involving a full cash alternative. Indeed, the
target company cross-border effect was no longer present once the method of
payment was controlled for.
The abnormal returns to shareholders of the bidding companies are analysed in
Chapter 8. Shareholders of overseas bidding companies lost as a result of their
companies' cross-border bids for UK listed companies, particularly during the months
following the bid announcement. The level of these losses were, however, highly
dependent on the test model applied. With the index modeI 6 , cumulative abnormal
returns (for the time period from t-8 to t+5) amounted to -5.34%. (The losses were
substantially larger, at -16.46%, using the market model). The negative abnormal
returns were particularly large for companies based in European countries who were
not members of the European Union.
The results for the domestic bidders are somewhat difficult to interpret, as the
models provide conflicting results. The index model suggests that domestic bidders
gained significantly prior to the bid, while encountering marginal abnormal losses after
the bid. (The market model indicates that large losses accrued to shareholders of UK
bidders). However, regardless of which model is applied, overseas bidding companies
are found to have performed significantly worse than domestic bidders. The negative
bidding company cross-border effect exceeds 11 percentage points. This cross-border
effect remains highly significant even when the different bid characteristics are taken
into account in the cross-sectional analysis. The generally poor performance of both
domestic and cross-border bidders over the period following the bid raise questions
regarding the merit of, and the motivation underlying, these transactions.
The joint abnormal returns to target and bidding company shareholders is
analysed in Chapter 9. Due to the generally much larger size of bidders than targets,
the abnormal return for each pair is weighted according to the relative market values
of the bidding and target companies. The results (using the index model for the period
from t-8 to t+1) reveals that both cross-border and domestic acquisitions created highly
significant shareholder wealth, with cumulative abnormal returns of +5.19% and
+8.08% in cross-border and domestic acquisitions, respectively. Thus, while target
company shareholders gained more in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions, this
6 As discussed in Chapter 6, the index model is believed to be the preferable model. Not only does this
model allow for the analysis of a larger sample than either the capital asset pricing model or the market
model (due to the less stringent data requirements), but also avoids some of the parameter estimation
problems encountered in this study (see section 6.5.1). As reported in Table 6.6, the average /3 value (using
either CAPM or the market model) is substantially below 1. This raises questions regarding the reliability
of these estimates. In addition, the average market model a for bidding companies were high, indicating
that the parameter estimation period, despite ending 9 months prior to the bid announcement, may not have
been a period of 'normal' returns.
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was more than offset by the negative abnormal returns to overseas bidders. The
negative overall cross-border effect was not, however, statistically significant.
A discussion of the key findings and the conclusions of the thesis are provided in
Chapter 10.
CHAPTER 1
CROSS-BORDER AND DOMESTIC TAKEOVER
ACTIVITY IN THE UK DURING THE 1980s
1.1.	 Summary 
The level of takeover activity in the UK rose rapidly during the latter half of the
1980s. Cross-border acquisitions into the UK contributed significantly to this takeover
boom, and in 1990 (when domestic takeover activity fell sharply), the value of
acquisitions of UK companies by foreign entities exceeded the value of domestic
transactions. (Business Briefing (1991a-1994b).
1.2.	 Introduction 
Cross-border takeover activity within Europe rose rapidly after the passing of the
Single European Act in 1985, as companies prepared themselves to operate on a pan-
European basis in a single market. Sir Leon Brittan, Vice-President of the European
Commission, stressed the importance of acquisitions for the success of the single
market:
"As we move towards the completion of the Community's internal market,
the future structure and competitiveness of European industry depend
largely on companies' plans for mergers, acquisitions and other lasting forms
of cooperation..." (as reprinted in Pringle (1991), p. 24).
Companies in the United Kingdom played an important part in the cross-border
takeover boom of the late 1980s, both as buyers of foreign companies, and as
recipients of bids from overseas companies. (Gray and McDermott (1988), Hippe
(1990), and Vernon (1993)).
1.3.	 Takeover activity in the UK
The level of takeover activity in the UK grew rapidly during the late 1980s. The
Figure 1.1
Total Value of Mergers and Acquisitions in the United Kingdom -
Domestic and Cross-Border 1969 - 1995*
* Data for 1995 restricted to first six months.
Expenditure on initial payments for acquisitions and mergers by industrial and commercial companies within
the UK compared to value of cross-border acquisitions and mergers in the UK by overseas companies. The
values include payment in complete acquisitions for both private and public UK companies. The values have
not been adjusted for inflation. Source: Cooke (1988), Business Briefing (1991a-1994b), and CSO (1995).
total value of acquisitions of companies in the UK rose from approximately £2.5 billion
in 1983 to a peak of just under £38 billion in 1989. As can be seen from Figure 1.1,
to a large extent this takeover boom was fuelled by cross-border acquisitions into the
UK. From 1988 onwards, cross-border takeovers have accounted for at least 20% of
the total value of takeovers in the UK. Indeed, in 1990, takeovers by foreign entities
accounted for 58% of the total value of acquisitions in the UK.
Several researchers (e.g., Crook (1995), Dewenter (1995b) and Simpson (1996))
have attempted to explain the volatile nature of takeover activity. Brealey and Myers
(1988) argued that periods of intense acquisition activity "...coincided with a period of
buoyant stock prices... [Peaks in takeover activity] must somehow be associated with
high stock prices" (p. 817) 7. Other factors which have been found to have an
importance, particularly on the level of cross-border takeover activity, include product
market imperfections, government regulation and regulatory policies, and capital
market imperfections. These factors are discussed in Chapter 2. However, it should
be noted that the focus of this thesis is on the wealth effects associated with domestic
and cross-border acquisitions, not on the motives underlying acquisitions or on the
cyclical nature of takeover activity.
1.4.	 Conclusion 
During the late 1980s, there was a major increase in the value of takeover activity
in the UK. A significant feature of this takeover boom, was the increasing importance
of cross-border acquisitions into the UK. Indeed, in 1990, the value of such cross-
border acquisitions exceeded the value of domestic UK takeovers. However, despite
the significant scale of cross-border acquisitions into the UK during the 1980s takeover
boom, little is known regarding the impact of these transactions on the wealth of the
shareholders of the companies involved. This study aims to fill this gap.
In the following chapter, some of the motives for cross-border acquisitions, and
some of the factors which may cause the impact on shareholder wealth to be
systematically different in domestic and cross-border acquisitions, are reviewed.
7 Analysis (based on data from Datastream and Business Briefing) of correlation coefficients between the
percentage annual change in the level of the FT All Share Index and the value of completed acquisitions
in the UK during the 1970 to 1993 period confirm that takeover activity is associated (although fairly weakly)
with the level of the stock market index (correlation coefficient between overall takeover activity in the UK
and the stock market index was +0.111). However, while a positive correlation coefficient was observed for
domestic acquisitions (+0.167), the value of cross-border acquisitions into the UK was negatively correlated
with the stock market index (-0.311). From this (admittedly limited) analysis, it thus appear that overseas
bidders became more active when UK share prices were falling. A full analysis of the causes for the
correlation (whether positive or negative) between the level of the stock market index and the level of
takeover activity is, however, beyond the scope of this research.
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CHAPTER 2
FACTORS WHICH MAY CAUSE WEALTH EFFECTS
TO BE SYSTEMATICALLY DIFFERENT IN CROSS-
BORDER AND DOMESTIC ACQUISITIONS.
2.1.	 Summary 
This chapter contains an overview of some of the complications involved in cross-
border acquisitions, and a discussion of factors suggested in the literature as being
driving forces motivating companies to acquire abroad. The areas of motives (which
potentially may help explain why cross-border and domestic acquisitions may be
associated with differential wealth effects) reviewed in this chapter are product market
imperfections, government intervention and regulatory policies (including issues
regarding market access and taxation), capital market imperfections (in particular,
factors regarding exchange rates and price/earnings ratios), segmented takeover
markets and international risk diversification. As indicated in the chapter, the motives
are generally not mutually exclusive, and empirical analysis is fraught with difficulties.
The existing 'evidence' is generally inconclusive, and the cause of cross-border effects
still remain a controversial issue.
2.2.	 Introduction 
As explained by Fells (1993), "in the domestic mergers and acquisitions literature,
firm-value maximization, managerial self-interest, and hubris have been well
established as motives for mergers and acquisitions". 8 (p. 3). These factors may also
act as motives in cross-border acquisitions. This chapter, however, will focus on the
8 For a discussion of managerial self-interest in acquisitions, see e.g., Jensen (1986a and 1986b),
Weidenbaum and Vogt (1987), Allen and Cebenoyan (1991), Firth (1980 and 1991), and Petry and Settle
(1991). Firth (1991), for example, found the management of bidding companies to gain significantly from
acquisitions, even when the transactions resulted in losses to bidding company shareholders. With the
separation of ownership and control, there is a danger of agency conflict (Berle and Means (1932)). Petry
and Settle (1991), however, argued that their results "...fail to manifest an agency problem". (p. 99). The
hubris hypothesis (that bidders pay too much due to overconfidence) was developed by Roll (1986). A
related theory is the 'winners curse' hypothesis, as discussed by Varaiya (1988).
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differences between domestic and cross-border acquisitions, with the aim of
establishing potential reasons as to why abnormal returns to target and/or bidding
company shareholders may be systematically different in domestic and cross-border
acquisitions. This is done by reviewing some of the difficulties associated with cross-
border acquisitions, as well as some of the main motives for cross-border acquisitions
suggested in the literature9.
2.3.	 Difficulties encountered in cross-border acquisitions 
There are several potential advantages of cross-border acquisitions, as discussed
in section 2.4. However, there are also numerous problems which are likely to make
cross-border acquisitions more time consuming and costly to execute than domestic
acquisitions.
Prior to launching a cross-border bid, it is important that not only the target
company be analysed in depth; the country in which the target is based also needs to
be studied in detail. With reference to international investment, Cooke (1988) argued
that when contemplating foreign direct investment (FDI) such as international
acquisitions,
"... a whole new range of decisions must be made which do not have a
domestic counterpart, including:
1. The raising of funds in one market for investment in another. ...
2. Additional complexities of exchange rate changes on the value of
assets.
9 The aim of this chapter is to establish some of the potential causes for differential wealth effects being
associated with cross-border and domestic acquisitions. Consequently, a full review of takeover motives
in general (which are common to both domestic and cross-border acquisitions) will not be discussed in this
chapter. See Steiner (1975), Goldberg (1983), Cooke (1986), Brealey and Myers (1991) and Pike and
Neale (1993) for a discussion of such motives, which include economies of scale, economies of scope
(synergies), exploitation of unused tax shield, acquisition of key resources, growth, elimination of
inefficiencies, as well as "...dubious reasons..." (Brealey and Myers (1988), p. 799) such as diversification,
inflate earnings per share, and lowering financing costs.
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3. The dangers that even if the project is successful, a foreign
government may not have sufficient foreign exchange to permit the
remittance of capital, dividends, interest, fees or royalties.
4. The complexities of assessing economic and political framework of the
host country and the probability of changes in that environment.
5. The danger of expropriation of assets by a foreign government.
6. Managing businesses which are a considerable distance from head
office. ...
7. Tax complications, including discrimination against cross-border
transactions. ...
8. The problems of assessing financial information on a global basis...
9. The problem of investing in a country which has substantial
government control over foreign investment. ...
10. Specific exchange control regulations constraining cross-border
transactions.
11. Problems generated by operating in an overseas country such as
language, customs and communications.
12. Legal barriers between countries which make it difficult to integrate an
overseas investment successfully.
13. A consideration of which capital markets to raise funds from.
14. A consideration of debt/equity ratios (thin capitalization) which may be
imposed by foreign governments." (Cooke (1988), pp. 5-6).
While not all of these factors may be of significance for acquisitions into a stable,
developed country such as the UK, most of them still need to be considered.
Brown and MacLachlan (1991) added the complexity caused by different
legislative regimes operated by different countries;
"The company buying in another country often faces unfamiliar acquisition
and tender rules that diametrically clash with the scheme in its homeland.
Satisfying two or more jurisdictions to complete a deal requires deft legal
strategy or accommodation from regulators case by case". (p. 57).
The complications of international acquisitions 10 , as outlined above, are likely to
make such transactions significantly more time consuming (and expensive) to plan and
implement than domestic acquisitions. Indeed, as argued by Feils (1993),
"a foreign firm will have larger transaction costs to combine the two firms
than a domestic firm given that a domestic firm has an inherent advantage
over a foreign firm due to its knowledge of the local language, culture, and
business environment. The agency costs of monitoring and bonding ... are
likely to be higher for multinational firms than for purely domestic firms given
the geographical and cultural distance between the acquiring and the target
firm". (p. 11).
In Chapter 4, it can be seen (e.g., Table 4.2) that the majority of studies (generally
focusing on the US) have found target companies to gain more when the bidder was
foreign compared to when the bidder was a domestic firm. However, if, as argued by
Cooke (1988), cross-border acquisitions are so complicated to carry out, why do they
take place at all, and indeed, why are foreign bidders prepared to offer such high
takeover premia for their target companies considering the high cost of mounting
international bids? Feils (1993) argued that "foreign acquiring firms, whose goal is the
maximization of firm value, must ... have some unique international advantages in
order to be able to offset the inherent advantages of the domestic firms". (p. 12). As
mentioned above, the acquisitions literature offers a vast range of plausible motives
for takeovers. This chapter, however, sets out to discuss the motives or 'unique
international advantages' associated with cross-border acquisitions.
10	 Coopers and Lybrand (1989) provides a detailed analysis of the specific problems relating to cross-border
acquisitions into the various EC countries.
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!2.4.	 Possible advantages derived from cross-border acquisitions 
A number of possible motives for cross-border acquisitions have been identified
in the literature. For example, Weston, Chung and Hoag (1990) discussed ten
different motives for international acquisitions. These are
1. Market growth,
2. Technology exploitation,
3. Product differentiation,
4. Government policy circumvention,
5. Exchange rate risk reduction,
6. Political and economic stability,
7. Cheaper labour costs and/or more efficient labour,
8. Following clients,
9. Business diversification, and
10. Seeking resources.
For a further discussion of motives for cross-border acquisitions, see e.g., Khoury
(1980), Ajami and Ricks (1981), Kish and Vasconcellos (1993), and Vasconcellos et
al. (1990).
While these motives are interesting (and some will be covered in the discussion
below), they do not generally on their own help explain why abnormal returns may be
systematically different in domestic and cross-border acquisitions. In the literature on
cross-border acquisitions, several explanations for cross-border effects have been
suggested, such as
imperfections or costs in product or factor markets,
government intervention and regulatory policies,
differences in capital markets,
differences in takeover markets, and
effects of international risk diversification (Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Harris
and Ravenscraft (1991)).
These factors are discussed below in sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.5.
2.4.1.	 Product market imperfections
A potential motive for cross-border acquisitions may be to enter markets perceived
to have a cost advantage due to cheaper raw materials, lower costs of production, and
cheaper and/or more efficient labour (Weston et al. (1990)). Calvet (1981) put forward
that "...foreign direct investment would flow from high-labor-cost countries to low-cost
countries in the pursuit of cost minimization". (p. 45). However, as argued by
Kindleberger (1969),
"...cheaper costs abroad than at home are not enough. What must be
explained is why production abroad is not undertaken by local
entrepreneurs, who have an inherent advantage over outside investors.
There must be a more than compensating advantage on the part of the
foreigner before direct investment will be called forth". (p. 13).
Rugman (1975) elaborated, and argued that,
"the advantage possessed by the multinational firm must be a true monopoly
advantage, that is, one which cannot be acquired by host country firms...
The multinational firm has the difficulty and expense of being far removed
from the local market... To summarize, if there were perfect competition in
the market for goods and factors there would be no direct investment." (p.
569).
A similar view was expressed by Hymer (1976), who argued that "if we wish to
explain direct investment, we must explain control". (p. 23). Foreign direct investment,
of which cross-border acquisitions is one form, tends to be motivated by the wish to
exploit a unique, firm specific asset or ability which can not easily be exploited without
direct investment (Hymer (1976), Weston eta!. (1990)). "If the market is imperfect, the
owner may not be able to appropriate fully the returns to the ability unless he controls
its use". (Hymer (1976), p. 26).
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"There may be other considerations: whether the patent or industrial secret
is adequately protected by the license, or whether at the expiration of the
agreement the licenser will find his secret gone; possibilities which it might
be illegal to protect against through agreement but which are safeguarded
through ownership". (Kindleberger (1969), p. 18).
If any of these issues are of serious concern, the company may wish to acquire abroad
rather than to licence the intangible asset to others. While cross-border acquisitions
may be undertaken in order to exploit product market imperfections, there is little
empirical evidence to suggest that this is a major factor.
Product diversification through cross-border acquisitions is uncommon (Caves
(1971) and Shore (1990)). According to Caves (1971), "...a firm would not invest
abroad while profitable opportunities remained for the exploitation of scale economies
in production or sales in the home market". (p. 12). Economies of scale are often cited
as a major motive for domestic acquisitions (Brealey and Myers (1991)). However,
despite cross-border acquisitions being mainly horizontal (Shore (1990)), "arguments
from economies of scale - a common justification for domestic mergers - are not
important motives for foreign direct investment". (Pringle (1991), p. 9). In addition,
research by Jacquemin et al. (1989) on cross-border acquisitions within the EC
revealed little evidence to suggest that these transactions resulted in greater
efficiencies or that economies of scale or monopoly powers were exploited.
It has not been possible in this thesis to test the degree to which product market
imperfections have acted as a motive for the cross-border acquisitions studied. Such
an analysis would require a very detailed analysis of each individual transaction in
order to establish what special advantages each overseas bidder possessed. Such
data was not available in this study, which is based on a large scale statistical
analysis. If cross-border acquisitions have been undertaken in order to exploit some
specific advantage, one would expect the overseas bidders to gain from their cross-
border acquisitions into the UK. However, while the presence of positive abnormal
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returns to bidders would be consistent with the predictions of the product market
hypothesis, the presence of such abnormal returns would not be sufficient to verify the
theory, as other factors may influence the level of abnormal returns.
2.4.2.	 Government intervention and regulatory policies
A further category of market inefficiencies of potential relevance to cross-border
acquisitions, relates to government intervention and regulatory policies. Pringle (1990)
argued that,
"the motives behind FDI are different from those usually said to justify
domestic mergers. ... FDI into industrial countries has always been
dominated by ... [one] motive, i.e. market access." (p. 9).
The need for market access would generally not be a sufficient motive to warrant
cross-border acquisitions if domestic markets were fully open to unrestricted import or
export. However, due to government intervention, foreign markets may not be fully
accessible without direct investment. A possible objective of international acquisitions,
may be to circumvent government policy. With regard to cross-border takeovers,
market access and taxation policies are probably the two most important areas
influenced by government policies (Weston et al. (1990)).
a) Market Access
International takeovers may be motivated by a need to operate locally to avoid
(perceived or real) trade barriers. This appears to have been an important issue in the
cross-border takeover activity in Europe during the late 1980s. During this period,
particularly non-EC European companies were actively acquiring companies within the
community before the introduction of the Single Market". At the time there appeared
to be a common fear of the EC turning into a 'Fortress Europe'.
11 As is discussed in Chapter 6, while US companies were the largest single group of bidders for UK listed
companies, a large number of cross-border acquisitions into the UK over the 1986-1991 period were also
made by companies based in e.g., Sweden and Switzerland.
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"Moves to create a well functioning internal market in Europe are, it is often
thought by outsiders, part of a hidden agenda that will inevitably lead to
policies creating a Fortress Europe. As internal barriers go down, so
external barriers may, it is feared, rise. The distinction between "us" and
"them" can lead to a situation in which "they" are excluded from "our"
markets." (Geroski and Vlassopoulos (1990), p. 23).
A similar view is expressed by Hannah (1990), who argued that,
"the pressures of 1992 will intensify both intra-European merger activity and
overseas interest in gaining a foothold inside 'Fortress Europe' or whatever
liberal regime emerges." (p. 161).
This may help explain the rapid increase in takeover activity, and particularly cross-
border takeovers, into the UK during the late 1980s (as depicted in Figure 1.1).
It is unclear what impact the need for market access will have on the relative
levels of abnormal returns in domestic and cross-border acquisitions. It may be
anticipated, however, that market access is so important to bidders based outside the
EC that they are prepared to pay higher takeover premiums for UK targets than are
domestic bidders (or cross-border bidders based inside the EC). If so, one would
expect target company abnormal returns to be higher in cross-border acquisitions by
non-EC bidders than in acquisitions by other bidders. Thus, there is a possibility that
the level of abnormal returns to UK target companies in cross-border acquisitions will
differ depending on whether the overseas bidder was located inside or outside the EC.
This issue is analysed in Chapter 7.
If market access is valuable (and is recognised as such by shareholders),
overseas bidding companies may still experience positive abnormal returns (or at least
equal or superior abnormal returns to those observed for local bidders), even if paying
a higher premium for their takeover targets. The abnormal returns to bidders is
analysed in Chapter 8.
b) Taxation
Tax issues are likely to be a factor in cross-border acquisitions. A full discussion
of the complex tax issues related to such transactions is outwith the scope of this
thesis12.
By operating in more than one country, profits may (as far as local tax legislation
permits) be transferred between countries in order to minimise total tax liability for the
group as a whole. This may give the international company a tax advantage.
With regard to the US market, Scholes and Wolfson (1990) argued that the tax
reforms of 1981 and 1986 were likely to have had a different impact on the fortunes
of domestic and cross-border bidders. It was argued that the 1981 Economic Tax
Recovery Act "...imposed many ... taxes that put foreign investors at a disadvantage".
(Servaes and Zenner (1990), p. 5). The 1986 Tax Reform Act redressed some of this
discrimination and, according to Scholes and Wolfson, reduced the bias against foreign
bidders.
As discussed further in chapter 4, researchers such as Servaes and Zenner
(1990), Manzon et al. (1994), Dewenter (1995a) and Doukas (1995a) found some
support for the tax argument 13. However, such findings were not uniform. For
example, Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and Markides and lttner (1994) did not find
changes in the US tax system to be of importance in their analysis.
Although the standard rate of corporation tax in the UK has been and still is fairly
high 14 , there are numerous legal ways of reducing the tax bill. Foreign bidding
companies may still find advantages in the UK tax system, as
12	 For a good and brief discussion of the tax implications of acquisitions in various countries, refer to Karls,
(1992).
13 Servaes and Zenner found US target companies in cross-border acquisitions to gain more when the US tax
system was favourable to foreign bidders (pre 1981 and post 1986). However, while the finding of a fall in
abnormal returns after 1981 and an increase after 1986 is consistent with the tax explanation, there is a
possibility that this time variation was not caused by the changing tax laws, but rather by some other, as
yet unspecified, variable related to time. Thus, while the level of abnormal returns appear to be correlated
to the US tax regime operated at the time, one should be careful in inferring causation.
14 The standard rate of corporation tax in the UK was reduced from 40% in 1985 to 35% in 1986. The rate
was further reduced to 34% in 1990 and to 33% in 1991, which is the rate still applicable today. (Farrington
(1995), p. 28).
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"... the UK has the largest network in the world of taxation agreements with
other countries. These agreements, among other things, reduce or eliminate
tax on dividend, royalty and other types of payment between countries."
(Blackstone, Franks and Thakrar (1986), p. 1).
In their report, Blackstone et al. (1986) argued that the UK could be used
successfully by foreign companies as a tax haven.
"The UK has been used as a tax haven ... for many years, in order to
shelter, completely free of tax, profits earned outside the UK. In this
respect, it is undoubtedly the finest "pure" tax haven in the world."
(Blackstone et al. (1986), p. 1).
Thus, it does not seem likely that the British tax system will deter foreign companies
from acquiring companies in the UK. However, little evidence seems to be available
suggesting the UK tax system attracts overseas bidders to the UK.
If overseas bidders have tax advantages (or disadvantages) relative to domestic
bidders, this may help explain why differential wealth effects may be encountered by
domestic and overseas bidders. It is less clear how such tax advantages or
disadvantages may affect the level of abnormal returns to target company
shareholders. While a tax advantage may give an overseas bidder a financial
advantage relative to local bidders, it is unclear if and why overseas bidders would
pass (part or all) of this tax advantage on to target company shareholders.
The impact of tax regimes on the relative level of abnormal returns to target and
bidding company shareholders from domestic and cross-border acquisitions thus
remains to be fully determined. This study contains an analysis of overseas bidding
companies based in 14 different countries, and UK target companies acquired by
companies based in 22 different overseas countries 15. An analysis of the impact of
taxation on the level of abnormal returns to targets and bidders in cross-border
15	 As discussed in Chapter 6, the difference in the number of countries covered in the analysis of cross-border
targets and cross-border bidders, is due to the different sample sizes, caused by data limitations.
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acquisitions into the UK would thus require a detailed analysis of the tax regimes in
these countries (including any changes during the 1986 to 1991 period), as well as a
study of any tax treaties between the UK and the overseas countries. Such an
analysis has not been pursued in this study, although this is an area which could
benefit from further research.
2.4.3.	 Capital market imperfections
The third category of motives for cross-border acquisitions is related to
imperfections and asymmetries in capital markets (Harris and Ravenscraft (1991)). In
particular, variations in exchange rates and differences in price/earnings rations, it is
alleged, provide some companies with cheaper capital than others, thus giving them
a financial advantage. This is discussed in the following paragraphs.
a) Exchange Rates
One explanation offered in the literature regarding the flow of cross-border
acquisitions and the different level of abnormal returns to companies involved in
domestic and cross-border acquisitions, relate to exchange rate fluctuations. As
discussed below, there are a number of problems associated with this explanation.
Caves (1988) found the level of cross-border investment into the US to decrease
when the dollar was strong relative to other currencies. Similarly, Rao (1988), the
Economist (1992f) and Swenson (1993) noted that the level of cross-border
acquisitions into the US was higher at "...times when the U.S. dollar was relatively
weak". (Swenson, p. 258). Morgan and Morgan (1991) argued that,
"when a currency fluctuates ... there are bound to be times at which it is
under-valued, and these will provide bargain-hunting opportunities for
overseas companies". (p. 66).
A problem with this argument is the inherent assumption that it is possible ex ante to
determine whether a currency is over- or under-valued, and whether the shift in
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exchange rates is transitory or permanent.
Froot and Stein (1991) developed a theory based on market inefficiencies to
explain the negative correlation they observed between the strength of the US dollar
and the value of cross-border investment into the US.
"...When there are informational asymmetries about an asset's payoffs, it will
be costly or impossible for entrepreneurs to finance the asset solely with
externally obtained funds. The more net wealth an entrepreneur can bring
to such an "information-intensive" investment, the lower will be his total cost
of capital... To the extent that foreigners hold more of their wealth in
nondollar-denominated form, a depreciation of the dollar increases the
relative wealth position of foreigners and hence lowers their relative cost of
capital. This allows them to bid more aggressively for assets." (p. 1194).
The second part of Froot and Stein's argument is fraught with problems. While
Froot and Stein found cross-border investments into the United States to rise when the
dollar exchange rate fell, American firms were still acquiring firms abroad, even if they
(according to Froot and Stein's theory) should then have been at a cost disadvantage.
As pointed out by Adler (1993), "...Froot and Stein could not find any association
between outward U.S. FDI and the exchange rate". (p. 251). Neither Rosengren
(1988) nor Healy and Palepu (1993) found the exchange rate to be successful at
explaining flows in cross-border acquisitions. Healy and Palepu concluded that
"...there are no serious informational imperfections across countries for equity
investment". (p. 248).
Leaving aside the arguments as to whether or not changes in the exchange rate
may help explain the number or total value of cross-border acquisitions, a further issue
which needs to be considered, is whether exchange rate fluctuations may have an
impact on the level of abnormal returns to target and/or bidding company shareholders
in cross-border acquisitions.
As discussed further in chapter 4, several papers such as Servaes and Zenner
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(1990), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Swenson (1993) and Kang (1993) found target
company shareholders to have gained more in cross-border acquisitions when the
currency of the predator's home country was 'strong' 16 relative to the target
company's currency, compared to when the reverse was the case. It should be noted,
however, that not all researchers have supported the currency argument. For
example, Cebenoyan et a!. (1992), Feils (1993), and Dewenter (1995a) did not find the
strength of the currency to have had a significant impact on the level of abnormal
returns.
Cakici eta!. (1991) argued that "while a devalued dollar might enable the foreign
buyer to acquire an American firm at a discount, the dollar cash flows subsequent to
the merger are correspondingly less valuable when converted back into the foreign
currency at the current exchange rate. Thus, a low foreign exchange value of the
dollar does not justify high prices for American target firms". (p. 45). A similar view
was expressed by McCulloch (1993, pp. 41-42). In addition, it is unclear why, as
indicated by the results of Servaes and Zenner (1990) and Harris and Ravenscraft
(1991), the bidder appears to pass on the apparent exchange rate benefit to target
company shareholders. If there is no discrimination against e.g., foreign bidders
acquiring in the US, foreign bidders should be able to acquire US companies by
paying takeover premiums similar to those offered by local bidders. Ceteris paribus,
it should thus not be necessary for foreign bidders to offer superior takeover
premiums. Consequently, the target company cross-border effect may not be directly
attributable to an exchange rate effect. The question of whether exchange rates have
an impact on the level of abnormal returns thus remains a controversial issue. This
may be an interesting area for future research, although even if abnormal returns and
16 Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) "...measure the strength of the buyer's home currency relative to the U.S.
dollar as the proportionate deviation from the average exchange rate for the sample period" (p. 832), while
Swenson (1993) applied a dummy variable approach whereby the currency was classified as strong when
the exchange rate was above the average exchange rate for the sample period. While such approaches
allow for an ex post classification of the strength of the currency, this approach relies on data unavailable
at the time of the acquisition. While it is possible with hindsight to determine the strength of the currency,
it is presumably significantly more difficult for bidding companies to determine, at the time of the bid, whether
the currency is strong or weak.
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exchange rates are found to be correlated, the cause of such a link may be difficult to
ascertain.
b) Price/Earnings Ratios
Another capital market factor which has in the literature been linked to cross-
border acquisitions, is the price/earnings (PE) ratio. Aliber (1970) argued that
differences in PE ratios (or in his terminology, capitalization ratios) may explain cross-
border acquisitions.
"Source-country firms capitalize the same stream of expected earnings at
a higher rate than host-country firms. This difference in capitalization rates
result because the market attached different capitalization rates to income
streams denominated in different currencies. Source-country firms are likely
to be those in countries where capitalization rates are high; host-country
firms are those in countries where capitalization rates are low." (Aliber
(1970), P. 28).
This argument fits in with Caves (1990), who, in addition to establish that the level
of cross-border takeover activity into the UK was inversely correlated with the strength
of the dollar, also found that more cross-border takeovers took place when the equity
security prices in the source country were high relative to the level of equity prices in
the US.
There are, however, problems with Aliber's theory. For example, Aliber's theory
does not help explain why, for example, American companies acquire British firms at
the same time as UK based firms are engaged in acquisitions in the US (Hamill
(1991a)). The logical conclusion from Aliber's theory, is that, ceteris paribus, cross-
border investments should only flow in one direction at the time. In addition, Aliber's
argument implicitly assumed that stock markets can consistently be fooled 17 . If
17 This is possibly a reflection of Aliber's work now being fairly dated. It is worth noting that Aliber's work is
based on observations prior to the main theoretical developments on the efficient markets hypothesis (see
e.g., Fama (1970)).
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earnings from a company in a low capitalisation ratio country would be capitalised at
the rate of the acquiring company's higher rate, the market would be inefficient. (The
same principle applies to domestic takeovers; earnings of the combined company
should be valued by the stock market on the basis of a weighted average PE ratio,
and not that of the acquiring company) 18 . It is unlikely that stock markets will
consistently make such mistakes. The extent to which differences in capitalisation
ratios provide some companies with 'cheap' capital, giving them a competitive
advantage in takeover markets, thus remains an open issue.
A further problem with Aliber's model may be that it relates to countries with
high/low average PE ratios, rather than to the PE ratios of companies within countries.
Thus, for example, while Japanese companies on average have high capitalisation
ratios, there are large variations in PE ratios between the various companies in the
Japanese market. An analysis of the impact of country-wide PE ratios on the level of
abnormal returns is therefore likely to be of limited value, and has not been undertaken
in this study.
2.4.4.	 Segmented takeover markets
Segmented takeover markets may also provide incentives for cross-border
acquisitions. Fatemi and Furtado (1988) argued that domestic and cross-border
acquisitions may produce different levels of abnormal returns if markets for corporate
control are segmented across national boundaries. Fatemi and Furtado argued that
"if the market for corporate control is not as competitive elsewhere as it is
in the home country, then the acquiring firm may be able to make foreign
acquisition bids at advantageous terms without having to worry that its low
bid will attract a competitive bidder". (p. 364).
Considering the significant scale of domestic and cross-border takeover activity
18	 The combined company may have different growth prospects than the weighted average of the two firms.
If so, PE ratios may justifiably differ from the weighted average.
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into the UK (Business Briefing (various issues), Cooke (1988)), it is unlikely that this
market is sufficiently 'segmented' to allow overseas bidders to acquire UK assets at
below their 'fair value'. In order for 'bargains' to be available to overseas bidders, the
UK takeover market would not only have to be inefficient, but the valuation of UK
companies would also have to be inefficient. There appears to be little evidence to
suggest that this is the case. Conn and Connell (1990) predicted that US companies
acquiring in the UK would perform better than UK companies acquiring in the US
(likewise, US targets would gain more than UK targets), as the British takeover market
was perceived by the authors to be less efficient than the American one 19. However,
such an assumption was only weakly supported by their evidence. While US bidders
did perform marginally better than the British ones (and US targets gained more than
the UK ones), both British and American bidders appear to have lost substantially from
the cross-border acquisitions. Indeed, contrary to what one would expect if their
predictions were valid, Conn and Connell found US bidders to have performed worse
in cross-border acquisitions into the supposedly less efficient UK market, than they did
in domestic US acquisitions 20. Thus, their study provides little empirical evidence to
support the argument that segmented takeover markets may explain the different
levels of abnormal returns in domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
This study analyses, as far as data allows, the difference in the level of abnormal
returns in cross-border acquisitions depending on the nationality of the bidder. This
analysis of national variations provides some insight into the segmented markets
hypothesis. The empirical analysis in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 highlights some interesting
national variations within the area of cross-border acquisitions into the UK. This study
may therefore provide some insight into the question of segmented takeover markets.
19	 As is discussed further in chapter 4, the assumption that the US takeover market is more efficient than the
UK one, is questionable.
20	 It should be noted, however, that Conn and Connell did not study domestic US acquisitions, but rather made
a general comparison to findings from other studies based on US data.
- 46 -
2.4.5	 International risk diversification
The final benefit of cross-border acquisitions assessed in this chapter, is that
associated with international risk diversification. Sudia (1992) summarised the
diversification argument by stating that,
"there is little or no disagreement over the positive effects of risk reduction
as a result of diversification... The debate continues, however, over whether
or not it is most advisable to diversify internationally using direct investment
through the diversification of a multinational corporation's real assets, or to
diversify indirectly by investing in internationally oriented mutual funds or by
personally investing in the equity of foreign firms". (p. 68).
If shareholders can diversify internationally cheaply and efficiently themselves21 (by
e.g., buying shares directly in overseas companies), the international risk diversification
provided through corporate cross-border acquisitions may not create shareholder
wealth. Markides and Ittner (1994) argued that,
"...the mere presence of benefits to international portfolio diversification does
not imply that international diversification at the corporate level is also
beneficial". (p. 345).
Similar views were expressed by Hymer (1976), Jacquillat and Solnik (1978), Brewer
(1981) and Fatenni (1984). Michel and Shaked (1986) went further, arguing that
"...domestic corporations appear to have a superior risk-adjusted performance". (p. 95).
However, Hughes et al. (1975), Hymer (1976), Hisey and Caves (1985) and
Markides and Ittner (1994) argued that, under certain circumstances, investors could
benefit from international corporate diversification through cross-border acquisitions.
Hymer argued that "the main reason why the firm may do it rather than leave it to
shareholders may be that it has more information". (pp. 40-41). If a company is better
informed than its investors, the company may be able to make better investment
21	 See e.g. Solnik (1974) and Davis (1991) for a discussion of the benefits available to investors from
diversifying internationally.
- 47 -
decisions than its shareholders. Markides and Ittner added that "...the multinational
corporation is performing a valuable service to investors in that it allows them to
diversify their portfolios indirectly. (p. 346). Thus, one would expect corporate
international diversification still to have the potential of being beneficial to
shareholders, in particular if the acquisition price is very favourable, or if shareholders
are unable to cheaply acquire shares abroad, which may be the case for e.g., small
investors. As there may be some benefits to shareholders of corporate international
diversification, one would expect, ceteris paribus, the stock market to react at least as
favourably to cross-border as to domestic bidders.
2.5.	 Conclusion 
Kang (1993) argued that,
"since the theory of FDI posits that imperfections in product markets, factor
markets, and capital markets give multinational firms a competitive
advantage over local firms in the host country [Kindleberger (1969), Caves
(1971), Hymer (1976), and Froot and Stein (1991)], cross-border
acquisitions are likely to create more wealth than domestic acquisitions.
Since targets tend to reap more of the benefits of the acquisitions, the
theory suggests the wealth gains to targets of ...[foreign] firms are larger
than those to targets ...[in domestic acquisitions]". (p. 348).
This chapter contains an evaluation of imperfections in international markets which
may act as a motive for cross-border acquisitions. These imperfections include
product market imperfections, government intervention and regulatory policies such as
market access and taxation, capital market imperfections regarding exchange rates
and price/earnings ratios, segmented takeover markets and international risk
diversification.
If product markets are inefficient, bidding companies may reap benefits (such as
cost savings) from operating abroad. However, testing such a hypothesis is fraught
with difficulties, as any positive abnormal return to cross-border bidders, if present, can
not be directly attributable to exploitation of product market inefficiencies.
Cross-border acquisitions may also be motivated by a need or a desire to
establish a presence within a restricted trading area. With regard to the UK, there is
thus a possibility that bidding companies based outside the EC are prepared to pay
higher prices for UK targets, or performing better themselves (due to the value of
market access) than either cross-border acquisitions within the EC or domestic UK
acquisitions. This is analysed in the empirical section of this thesis.
Different tax systems in different countries may have an impact on the level of
abnormal returns to targets and bidders, although the evidence so far is inconclusive.
The effect, if any, of exchange rate changes and varying price/earnings ratios on the
different level of abnormal returns in domestic and cross-border acquisitions, is open
to debate. As discussed in the chapter, both arguments rest on an assumption of
capital markets being inefficient and that these inefficiencies are readily identifiable and
exploitable by bidding companies. Such an assumption is questionable (Fama (1991)).
If takeover markets are segmented along national boundaries, overseas bidders
may be able to take advantage of inefficient markets by acquiring undervalued
companies. There is, however, little evidence to suggest that the UK takeover market
is inefficient, and this may be a relatively unimportant motive for cross-border
acquisitions into the UK.
Finally, cross-border acquisitions may be undertaken in order to achieve
international risk diversification. However, while there is little disagreement that
investors benefit from international investment (Solnik (1974) and Davis (1991)), more
controversy surrounds the issue of whether shareholders benefit from corporate
international diversification. Markides and Ittner (1994) argued that "...at least at a
theoretical level, it is possible that international acquisitions provide benefits to the
firm". (p. 346). The extent to which these benefits have been found to be present in
empirical studies, and if so, whether they tend to be reaped by the target or bidding
company shareholders, is discussed in the review of the existing literature on cross-
border acquisitions contained in chapter 4. The results from this study (as discussed
in chapters 7 to 9) also analyses whether the level of abnormal returns are
systematically different in cross-border and domestic acquisitions. However, as
evident from the above discussion, the various motives put forward for cross-border
acquisitions are not mutually exclusive. It is consequently not feasible in this study to
test which, if any, of these factors, are responsible for any cross-border effect that may
be present.
Prior to analysing the level of abnormal returns to target and bidding company
shareholders in cross-border and domestic acquisitions into the UK during the 1986
to 1991 period, existing literature on domestic and cross-border acquisitions will be
reviewed in order to establish the key findings, as well as to consider the
methodologies adopted in the existing literature. A discussion of domestic acquisitions
follows in Chapter 3, while the literature on cross-border acquisitions is discussed in
Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF KEY LITERATURE ON DOMESTIC
ACQUISITIONS IN THE UK AND US -
METHODOLOGIES AND FINDINGS
3.1.	 Summary 
In the existing literature, two main approaches have been adopted in the
evaluation of the financial merit of acquisitions, involving an application of either
accounting data (such as the level of profitability), or share return data (known as
event study) in the analysis. Singh (1971 and 1975), Meeks (1977), Ravenscraft and
Scherer (1987), Scherer (1988), Herman and Lowenstein (1988) and HoII and
Pickering (1988) all applied accounting data in their analysis of acquisitions. However,
the use of accounting data for analysing acquisitions has come under severe criticism
(Appleyard (1980), Pike and Neale (1993)), particularly (in the earlier studies such as
Singh (1971 and 1975) and Meeks (1977)) where due care has not been taken to
control for biases caused by e.g., varying accounting policies.
Event study methodology has become the dominant methodology for evaluating
the financial merit of acquisitions. This involves estimating the impact of the
acquisition on share returns. The most common event study method is the market
model, where expected returns are linked to the share's historic performance relative
to the stock market index, although other models (such as the index model, the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) and the adjusted /3 model) have been applied. (See
Chapter 6 for a fuller discussion of event study methodology). Care is required when
comparing results from different studies, not only due to the different markets and time
periods analysed, but also due to the different methods and event windows providing
different results. However, there is considerable evidence to suggest that target
company shareholders gain significantly (in the UK and the US) during the time period
leading up to and including the time of the bid announcement.
The findings of some key articles with regard to the abnormal returns to bidding
- 51 -
Table 3.1
Summary of Previous Findings Regarding Abnormal Returns to
Bidding Company Shareholders in Domestic Acquisitions in the
United Kingdom and the United States
United Kingdom
Author Time
period
Key results
Franks, Broyles
and Hecht (1977)
1955-1972 Gains during period up to and including bid
Firth (1979) 1972-1974 Large losses during bid period
Franks and
Harris (1989)
1955-1985 Large gains during period up to and including
bid
Gains or large losses during post-bid period
depending on model
Limmack (1991) 1977-1986 Marginal gains during period up to and
including bid
Losses or large losses during post-bid period
depending on model
United States
Author Time
period
Time period
Mandelker (1974) 1948-1967 Large gains during pre-completion period
Small losses during post-completion period
Jensen and
Ruback (1983)
(Various
studies
published late
1970s and
early 1980s)
Gains during bid period
Loderer and
Martin (1990)
1966-1984 Small gains during bid period
Franks, Harris
and Titman
(1991)
1975-1984 Small losses during bid period
Small gains during post-bid period.
Overall, small gains.
company shareholders, is contained in Table 3.1. As can be seen from this table, the
results are highly varied. Overall, the results seems to suggest that US bidders earn
small positive (or marginal negative) abnormal returns over the period of the bid, while
the results for UK bidders appear to be less favourable. The evidence from the UK
indicate that returns to bidding company shareholders were particularly poor over the
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period following the takeover bid.
3.2.	 Introduction 
This chapter contains a discussion of some key literature on domestic acquisitions
in the UK and the US. The aim of the chapter is not to provide a comprehensive
review, but rather to highlight some of the main findings with regard to the financial
merit of takeover activity, and to discuss the impact of the choice of methodology on
the results obtained. The empirical section in this thesis contains an analysis of
takeover activity (domestic and cross-border) in the UK. This chapter, however, also
contains a discussion of studies based on the US market, as the US is the single most
important country with regard to cross-border acquisitions into the UK. An
understanding of the US takeover market will therefore facilitate the interpretation of
the results with regard to cross-border acquisitions, as discussed in subsequent
chapters.
3.3.	 Analysis of the financial merit of domestic acquisitions based on 
accounting data 
Singh (1971) analysed UK mergers between 1948 and 1960, with particular
emphasis on what characterises takeover targets. Singh found takeover victims on
average to have had very poor short term profitability prior to being acquired.
However, a more significant feature of takeover targets, was their generally low market
value22. In 1975, Singh elaborated and argued that,
"... the take-over mechanism may well be doubly inefficient: first, it cannot
be relied upon to force firms to maximise (or even improve) profitability, as
it selects large rather than just profitable companies for survival, and
secondly, it may well reduce post-amalgamation profitability." (p. 512).
22	 Analysis by Harris et al. (1982) has established that US targets too tend to be significantly smaller than
nonacquired firms.
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Meeks (1977) used accounting information on UK takeovers taking place between
1964 and 1972 to analyse the impact of acquisitions on profitability, and like Singh
(1971 and 1975) also commented on the characteristics of target companies. In his
analysis, Meeks made adjustments for two factors which could distort the measured
impact of the acquisitions on profitability. Firstly, he corrected for general industry-
wide changes by "... expressing conventional profitability as a proportion of the current
year's profitability of the industry in aggregate." (p. 15). Secondly, Meeks adjusted his
numbers for a further problem caused by the application of alternative accounting
policies23 . Takeover targets were found to be smaller, but perform no worse than the
average for the industry as a whole. Acquirors, on the other hand, tended to be much
larger and performed far better than the industry average.
"...These conclusions bear out Singh's (1971 and 1975) findings on the pre-
merger characteristics of merging companies: in particular the takeover
mechanism does not appear to have singled out the unprofitable as victims;
and small size rather than low profitability appears to have been the
characteristic which attracted the 'discipline' of takeover." (Meeks (1977), p.
21).
Turning to the analysis of pre- and post-acquisition profitability, Meeks concluded
that although profitability increased slightly in the year of the acquisition,
"every year after the merger reveals a decline in profitability; in three years
this decline is significantly different from zero at the 1% level; and in each
post-merger year the majority of companies experience a decline." (p. 25).
Thus, despite the widespread popularity of acquisitions, on average they turned
out to be 'disappointing marriages'. Meeks noted, however, that "... acquirers with
relatively successful pre-merger record will typically be less unsuccessful at
subsequently improving or maintaining profitability after merger." (p. 46).
23 If the acquiror records the acquired assets at its purchase price rather than what they were valued at in the
books of the acquiree (i.e., if the merged company applies acquisition rather than merger accounting
procedures), net assets will be inflated, and profitability deflated compared to the pre-bid situation.
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3.4.	 Criticism of the application of accounting data in the analysis of
acquisitions 
Appleyard (1980) warned about the many hazards involved in evaluating the
success or otherwise of acquisitions using accounting data. Although Meeks (1977)
made two adjustments in his analysis, several additional factors may have biased his
results. Applying accounting rate of return measures have several weaknesses.
"In the empirical literature the conventional definition of the accounting rate
of return (ARR) is net profit before interest expenses and tax ... divided by
(depreciated) net assets. It is clear that this definition does not capture any
financial benefits since the numerator is determined prior to interest and tax,
and the denominator does not distinguish sources of financing. Therefore,
to the extent that financial considerations are the motivation for a merger the
rate of return fails to signal any benefits when indeed they exist."
(Appleyard, p. 542).
Appleyard also noted that if the acquiring company applied acquisition (rather than
merger) accounting, only the proportion of the target company's profits earned after
the acquisition would be included in the joint accounts. However, all assets would be
added to the balance sheet, thus reducing reported profitability in the year of the
acquisition24.
An alternative approach while still applying accounting data in the evaluation of
acquisitions, is to analyse changes in earnings per share (EPS), rather than overall
changes in profitability. However, such a procedure is not seen as appropriate in the
evaluation of acquisitions. EPS can be increased by acquiring companies with low
earnings per share (PE) ratios (Brealey and Myers (1988)). In an efficient market
(Fama (1991)), such a procedure would lead to a fall in the PE ratio of the acquiror,
thus leaving shareholders in the acquiring company no better off, assuming no
24 It should be noted that such an explanation can not account for Meeks (1977) finding that post-acquisition
profitability tended to be superior in the year of the acquisition, but then deteriorated for several years after
the business combination had taken place. However, if the two companies applied different accounting
procedures prior to the acquisition, the group accounts may have exhibited a fall in the reported profitability
lasting for several years while the accounting procedures of the two companies were harmonised.
- 55 -
efficiency gains were made (Brealey and Myers (1988)). Like the accounting rate of
returns (ARR), EPS may also be influenced by changes in accounting or financial
policy. There is thus a danger in relying on changes in reported EPS to assess the
financial gain from acquisitions. Pike and Neale (1993) elaborated on the limitations
of applying accounting data to evaluate acquisitions, and summarised the problems
as,
"1.	 Different accounting conventions used by different firms, e.g. treatment
of extraordinary items, often makes comparisons misleading.
2. Post-acquisition measures of profitability may be distorted due to the
application of acquisition accounting procedures...
3. To assess properly the impact of the takeover really requires an
extended analysis... Many acquisitions are undertaken for 'strategic'
purposes, the benefits of which may only show through after several
accounting periods perhaps following lengthy and costly
reorganizations....
4. Accounting studies are not capable of assessing what the performance
of the expanded group would have been in the absence of the merger
and are thus unable to assess what improvement in performance (if
any) was due to factors beyond the merger per se. This problem
increases with the time period used for the post-merger integration.
5. This approach does not allow for risk...". (p. 535).
There are thus several problems in applying accounting data in the analysis of
acquisitions. Hughes (1990) suggested,
"the difficulties of estimating the changes in accounting profitability and real
effects in terms of resource use have led some investigators to emphasize
the virtues of using stock price movements as a better guide to the
performance impact of mergers". (p. 89)25.
Due to the problems of using accounting information to evaluate the financial
impact of acquisitions, most researchers have turned to an analysis of share price
changes as an evaluation tool. Some papers do, however, still rely on accounting
data, such as those by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Scherer (1988), Herman and
Lowenstein (1988), and HoII and Pickering (1988)). While tending to be more
sophisticated than the earlier papers in their adjustments for potential accounting
biases, these studies still suffer from some of the limitations associated with the
application of accounting data in the evaluation of acquisitions, such as the problem
of incorporating risk, and the difficulties in capturing the effect of the acquisition in the
accounts 26. Due to the limitations of accounting data in the evaluation of
acquisitions 27 , this study is based on an analysis of share return data.
3.5.	 Analysis of domestic acquisitions based on share return data 
"...The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis [states] that share prices fully and
instantaneously reflect all new information..." (Franks eta!. 1977). Consequently, on
the announcement of an unexpected event (such as a takeover bid), the share price
should move up or down depending on whether the bid is perceived by the stock
market to be advantageous or disadvantageous to the company's shareholders. Share
returns (changes in share prices plus dividend yield) over and above what one would
have expected (expected returns) had no acquisition been announced, can be
attributed to the 'event'. This abnormal return can be taken to be the stock market's
assessment of the net benefit or disadvantage of the proposed acquisition.
Event study methodology was originally developed by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and
25	 Hughes added, however, that applying share price data "...is not without its own important limitations". (p.
89). The problems of share price data is discussed more fully in Chapter 6.
26	 A few recent papers such as e.g., Higson and Elliott (1992) in the UK and Healey eta!. (1992) and Cornett
and Tehranian (1992) in the US, have combined analysis of accounting and share price data.
27	 The problems associated with accounting data would be particularly severe in a study of cross-border
acquisitions, due to the different accounting regulations and conventions applicable to the different markets.
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Roll (1969), who analysed the effect of stock splits. The methodology has since been
applied to the analysis of other firm-specific events, such as takeover bids.
Event study methodology (as applied in this study) is discussed in Chapter 6.
Before progressing further, however, it is worth noting that different studies have
applied different variations of event study methodology. The main methodological
differences between papers relate to:
* the model applied for estimating "normal" or expected returns (such as the
market model, the adjusted 13 model, the capital asset pricing model, and the
index model),
* the time period over which normal returns have been estimated (known as
the parameter estimation period) 28 , and
* the time period over which (cumulative) abnormal returns have been
calculated (known as the event window)29.
Differences in the level of gains or losses to shareholders (abnormal returns) observed
in the various studies may thus, at least partly, be due to methodological differences
as well as to differences between different takeover markets or variations over time.
Consequently, great care is needed when comparing results from different studies.
3.5.1.	 Empirical evidence from the United States
The first application of event-study methodology to the analysis of acquisitions,
was undertaken by Mandelker (1974). Mandelker used the market mode1 39 to
28 While most studies (including this one) have taken a period prior to the bid announcement to be a 'normal'
period over which to estimate the expected returns, some studies (such as Mandelker (1974) and Conn and
Connell (1990) have applied the after-bid period as well. As will be discussed further below, studies also
vary greatly with regard to the length of the parameter estimation period.
29 While some studies such as Doukas and Traylos (1988) concentrate their analysis on the individual bid
announcement day, others, such as Limmack (1991) analyse the abnormal returns over a period of several
years. (In this study, as explained in Chapter 6, ten and fourteen month event windows are applied for
target and bidding companies, respectively).
30	 Mandelker estimated the market model parameters (a and /3) using observations from both before and after
the bid period.
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analyse share price movements stemming from acquisition completions 31 taking place
in the United States between 1948 and 1967. Mandelker estimated that over the
period from 40 to 7 months prior to the bid completion 32, target company
shareholders had, on average, encountered insignificant negative abnormal returns.
However, over the seven month period prior to the completion of the acquisition, target
company shareholders, on average, gained approximately 14%. With regard to the
bidding companies, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the 40 months prior to
the completion of the acquisition amounted to +5.1%. However, during the following
40 months, CAR fell by 1.7%.
Mandelker concluded that the overall impact of acquisitions on the acquiring
companies shareholders was small, but positive. However, as Mandelker estimated
CAR over a very long interval, it could be argued that it is possible that not all the
abnormal share price performance during this period was due to the acquisitions.
Mandelker argued that the "...results suggest that the informational impact of a
forthcoming merger is spread over approximately thirty months before the event". (p.
312). However, even if the stock market may anticipate acquisitions several months
prior to the formal announcement 33 , it is unlikely that the market can anticipate such
transactions as long as 3 years prior to the completion of the acquisitions. Thus, while
positive pre-acquisition CARs for the acquirors show that these companies, on
31 Subsequent studies have tended to use the bid announcement as the 'event'. Using the completion date
as the event date has certain limitations, as highlighted by Jensen and Ruback (1983), the expected price
effect will occur on or before the first public announcement of a takeover. Therefore, because the
announcement date occurs at random times prior to the effective date, using the latter as the event date
makes it difficult to identify changes in security prices that are due to the takeover event itself." (p. 10).
32	 Mandelker observed that bid announcements on average took place some 8 weeks prior to the completion
of the acquisitions.
33 The length of time prior to the bid announcement at which target companies shares starts rising varies from
study to study, but usually at least 3 months, as was found for example in the study by Franks et a!. (1977)
and Parkinson and Dobbins (1993). Gupta and Misra (1989) argued that "...price run-ups preceding
takeover announcements occur in the presence of publicly available information". (p. 231). The pre-bid
abnormal returns to targets thus seems to be driven by bid speculation rather than by insider dealing. While
the share price of the target companies on average rise significantly prior to bid announcements, Pound and
Zeckhauser (1990) argued that the stock market was not very accurate in its predictions of takeover targets.
In an analysis of 42 takeover rumours published in the newspapers, only 18 of the predicted targets received
a takeover bid within 1 year of the published bid speculation.
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average, performed abnormally well prior to the acquisition, one should be careful in
interpreting this as a gain due to the acquisition. It may, therefore, be argued that the
effect of the acquisition on acquiring company shareholders was somewhat lower than
the +3.4% reported by Mandelker.
One of the most influential studies of US mergers and acquisitions 34 is Jensen
and Ruback (1983). This review paper contained an analysis of the results obtained
in 13 previous American studies on the wealth effects of corporate acquisitions.
Jensen and Ruback's results (with regard to acquisitions 35) are summarised in Table
3.2. Their results suggest that bidders in successful tender offers experienced
significant abnormal returns. Even if some of these gains seems to have been lost
during the year following the acquisition, the majority of acquiring companies appear
to have gained from successful tender offers. However, in failed tender offers, bidders
usually lost.
Target company shareholders gained significantly from tender offers, regardless
of whether the offer succeeded or failed. In unsuccessful bids the target companies'
shares continued to perform well, even 12 months after the bid. Jensen and Ruback
noted that,
"in unsuccessful tender offers the target's stock price remains substantially
above its pre-offer level, unless a subsequent bid does not occur in the two
years following the initial offer. If such a subsequent bid does not occur, the
34 As did Franks and Harris (1989), Jensen and Ruback made a distinction between mergers and tender offers.
This thesis focuses on acquisitions (which incorporate tender offers). The importance of dividing acquisitions
into two groups may have less to do with the legal form of the transaction (i.e., mergers versus acquisitions),
than with the different methods of payment (acquisitions are generally cash financed, while mergers involve
an exchange of shares) and/or the different degrees of opposition to the bid (mergers have to be agreed
by target company management, while acquisitions can be hostile). Thus, while the distinction between
mergers and acquisitions made by Jensen and Ruback may be important, the difference in results between
mergers and acquisitions (both targets and bidders appears to have performed worse in mergers than in
acquisitions) may be associated with other effects than with the legal form of the transaction. In this thesis,
for example, the cross-sectional analyses (contained in Chapters 7, 8, and 9), analyses, amongst other
variables, the impact of the method of payment and whether or not the bid was competitive or revised, on
the level of abnormal returns.
35	 This study focuses on acquisitions rather than mergers, and Jensen and Ruback's results with regard to
mergers will not be reviewed here.
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Table 3.2
Percent Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) in US Tender
Offers
Adopted from Jensen and Ruback (1983), pp. 11-13 and 21.
The announcement effect was calculated over time intervals ranging from (t-5, t days) to (t-40, t+20
days), where t is bid announcement day).
As explained by Dodd and Ruback (1977) (from which Jensen and Ruback obtained these results)
some of the target companies were delisted after the bid announcement (e.g., at t+12, the sample size
was reduced to 74). Each month's abnormal return was calculated as the equally weighted mean of
the abnormal returns to companies listed during that event month.
BIDDING FIRMS TARGET FIRMS
Successful
%
Unsuccessful
%
Successful
%
Unsuccessful
%
TENDER OFFERS
Announcement
effects * + 3.8 - 1.1 + 29.1 + 35.2
Number of studies (6) (5) (6) (5)
Total sample size (478) (236) (653) (283)
Range of mean CAR in
different studies
[+2.3; +6.7] [-3.0; +0.6] [+16.8; +34.1] [+16.3; + 47.3]
Month after
through twelve
months after bid
announcement - 1.3 -5.7 + 8.0$ + 1.5
Studies (1) (2) (1) (2)
Sampled (124) (142) (133) (148)
Range of CAR * [-7.9; -1.6] * [-3.3; +3.0]
target's stock price reverts to its pre-offer level." (pp. 8-9).
It thus appears that the stock market anticipated further bids if the original tender offer
failed.
Overall, when combining the results for target and bidding company shareholders,
tender offers appear to have created significant shareholder wealth, at least based on
the short-term stock market reaction. There are, however, difficulties in establishing
precisely whether the transactions were value creating or not, due to the uncertainty
regarding (particularly the post-bid) abnormal returns to bidders. As the bidding
companies were on average substantially larger than the target companies, small
losses to bidders may, in value terms, have offset most of the gains to the target
company shareholders.
Loderer and Martin (1990) undertook a large study of the impact on bidding
company shareholders from domestic US acquisitions, covering 5,172 acquisitions
during the 1966-1984 period. Applying the market model (with parameters estimated
over days t-300 to t-101), Loderer and Martin found the mean abnormal returns for the
six day period from t-5 to t to be +0.7%. However, while the mean abnormal return
was positive, the authors found shareholders in only 52% of the bidding companies to
have gained from the acquisitions. Converting the percentage abnormal returns into
value terms, the median dollar announcement effect was found to be $0.3 million.
However, due to some large losses, the mean was in fact negative, at -$2.7 million.
Thus, while acquisitions on average led to very marginal positive abnormal returns to
bidding company shareholders, there were large variations in results, with
shareholders of some companies losing significantly.
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) analysed 399 US acquisitions taking place
between 1975 and 1984. They applied the market model, with parameters estimated
over days t-240 to t-41. Looking first at the bid announcement effect (CAR over days
t-5 to t+5), Franks et al. found target company shareholders to have gained +28.04%,
while bidders lost -1.02%. The overall joint abnormal returns to target and bidding
company shareholders (weighted according to market values) were +3.9 percent.
The main focus of the Franks eta!. (1991) paper was, however, on the post-bid
performance of the bidding companies. The study included an analysis of abnormal
returns to bidding company shareholders over a 3 year period following the
acquisitions. Applying different variations of the market model for estimating abnormal
returns produced quite different estimates of bidder performance after the acquisitions.
This led the authors to argue that the negative post-acquisition performance of bidders
"... are likely due to benchmark errors rather than nnispricing at the time of the
takeover." (p. 81)36 . Franks eta!. (1991) argued that the error was caused by a size
effect, as smaller firms outperformed "...larger ones by 1.62% per month". (p. 90)37.
Consequently, Franks eta!. argued that abnormal returns should be calculated relative
to a portfolio of companies with similar size (and dividend yield) as the company being
analysed 38 . When measuring abnormal return compared to 8 such control portfolios,
Franks et a!. (1991) found bidders performed slightly better than the companies in their
benchmark portfolio after the acquisition, and concluded that bidding company
shareholders overall gained marginally from the acquisitions. This somewhat differ
from the findings by Mandelker (1974) of negative post-bid returns, and gives a
substantially different picture than the evidence for the UK by e.g., Limmack (1991) (as
discussed below), who found bidding company shareholders to lose significantly during
the post-bid period.
From the studies reviewed, the empirical evidence with regard to acquisitions in
the US suggest that, on average, bidding company shareholders gain, or do at least
not lose substantially, as a result of domestic takeover activity. In the following
section, studies of domestic acquisitions in the UK, such as Franks et al. (1977), Firth
(1976, 1979, 1980), Franks and Harris (1989) and Limmack (1990, 1991) are
discussed. While the majority of evidence from the US suggest that bidding company
shareholder gain, the evidence from the UK is less uniform.
36 Previous research (such as Franks and Harris (1989) and Limmack (1991)) has indicated that abnormal
returns to bidding company shareholders are negative for extended time periods following the bid
announcement. This has become known as post announcement 'drift, and is discussed in more detail in
section 6.5.4. Controversy surrounds the cause of such drift. While Franks et al. (1991) argued that the
drift was due to model misspecification, this has been disputed by e.g., Bernard and Thomas (1989),
Agrawal et a/. (1992), Ball et a/. (1993) and Brown and Pope (1995).
37 Franks et al. applied both a value-weighted index (where each company is weighted according to its market
capitalisation) and an equally-weighted stock market index in their analysis. Franks et a/., however,
discarded both of these indices, in favour of size-matched control portfolios.
38	 The size effect is discussed in more detail in section 6.4.2. In this study, rather than applying size-matched
control portfolios, the size effect is controlled for in the cross-sectional analysis.
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3.5.2.	 Empirical evidence from the United Kingdom
Franks, Broyles, and Hecht (1977) analysed abnormal returns to shareholders
from successful acquisitions of companies in the UK Breweries and Distilleries sector
during the 1955 to 1972 period. Applying the market model, Franks eta!. (1977) found
target company shareholders, on average, to experience cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR) of +22.3% during the period from 4 months prior to the bid announcement, to
two months after the bid month. The comparable abnormal returns to bidding
company shareholders was +3.5%. The gains to the bidders were not, however,
sustained over the period after the acquisition was completed.
Firth (1976) applied the market model in an analysis of abnormal returns to target
company shareholders from 214 UK bids announced during 1973 and 1974.39  Firth
estimated the market model parameters on "... the last 57 four-weekly recordings ..."
(p. 79) prior to the bid announcement. One weakness with this approach of using data
right up to the bid, is that there is a possibility of the alpha and beta estimates being
affected by bid rumours reaching the market prior to the formal announcement°.
Firth found the shares of target companies, on average, to move in line with the
stock market index up until approximately 30 days prior to the announcement of the
bid. During the period from day t-30 to day t-1, mean cumulative abnormal return to
target company shareholders amounted to +9.7%. On the day of the announcement,
the abnormal returns rose by a further 22.1%. By the end of day 30 after the
announcement of the bid, cumulative abnormal returns (t-30, t+30) to target company
shareholders amounted to +36.9%.
Cross-sectional analysis revealed that competitive bids and bid revision had a
major impact on the level of abnormal returns to target company shareholders,
39 Firth's sample included all takeovers of publicly quoted companies in the UK announced during these two
years, with the exception of bids where the bidder held a pre-bid stake in the target of 30 percent or more,
or where the bid was for preference shares. (pp. 27-28). The effect of pre-bid stakes is discussed in section
6.4.3, and is analysed in the cross-sectional analysis of Chapters 7, 8 and 9.
40	 The problems of parameter estimation and bid leakage, are discussed in section 6.4.1.
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"the first counterbid premium averaged 19.7 per cent and the first revised
bid averaged 18.0 per cent. This signifies that bidders often pitch their initial
bids some way below what they are willing to pay." (p. 114).
Firth also found target returns to be higher in cash than in equity offers. As discussed
in section 5.3.4, similar observations have been made by e.g., Halpern (1973), Franks
eta!. (1988), Echbo and Langohr (1989), Peterson and Peterson (1991) and Kaplan
and Weisbach (1992). Due to the apparent significant impact of bid revision, the
number of bidders and the method of payment on the level of abnormal returns, these
variables are included in the cross-sectional analysis in this thesis.
In a later paper, Firth (1979) expanded the analysis to cover both target and
bidding company shareholders in 224 domestic UK acquisitions during the period from
1972 to 1974. While again applying the market model, the parameter estimation
period was changed to using data for the 5 year period from 72 to 13 months prior to
the day of the bid announcement. This overcomes some of the problems of the
previous study associated with estimating the parameters on data too close to the time
of the bid announcement.
During the period from 48 to 13 months prior to the offer announcement, target
company shareholders encountered small negative abnormal returns of -1.5%. This
poor pre-bid performance of UK targets is consistent with the findings of e.g., Singh
(1975) and Meeks (1977). For the time period from the month before to the month
after the day of the bid announcement, Firth estimated mean cumulative abnormal
returns to target company shareholders to be +34.9%, similar to that observed in his
1976 paper.
Turning to the bidding companies, Firth found these to have lost significantly
around the time of the bid.
"On the day of the announcement there was a highly negative residual and
79% of acquirers suffered risk-adjusted declines in share prices. In the
following month there was another highly significant decline in share prices.
... Subsequent to month +1 the recordings settled down to their market
model relationship..." (p. 321)41.
During the interval from one month prior to, to one month after the bid announcement
date, average abnormal losses to acquiring companies amounted to -6% 42. In the
cross-sectional analysis, Firth noted that bidding companies offering equity rather than
cash tended to perform better than other bidders (as judged by their share returns)
during the pre-bid period, but to display larger negative abnormal returns during the
period following the bid announcement. Firth thus argued that bidding companies
appear to offer equity when their share price is at a peak.
While target company shareholders gained and bidding company shareholders
lost, determining whether acquisitions overall (to targets and bidders combined)
created or destroyed wealth is seen to be problematic. To overcome these difficulties,
Firth converted the percentage gains and losses into pounds Sterling values, so that
the differences in size could be taken into account, allowing analysis of overall wealth
changes, as shown in Table 3.3.
As can be seen from this table, Firth estimated acquisitions to be highly beneficial
for target company shareholders. However, their gains were more than offset by
losses to the bidding companies, with almost 80 percent of bidders losing. Thus, UK
acquisitions during the 1972 to 1974 period resulted in a significant transfer of wealth
from bidders to targets, with a small net overall loss of wealth. In conclusion, Firth
argued that,
"the results of the study showed that on average there were no gains
associated with takeovers and indeed there was a very small loss (possibly
due to expenses involved with the takeover process). Furthermore this no
gain - no loss position was being maintained 24 months after the bid
41	 Thus, unlike Franks et al. (1991), Franks and Harris (1989) and Linnmack (1991), Firth did not find the
market model abnormal returns to bidders to indicate post announcement 'drift'.
42	 In a subsequent paper (covering the time period from 1969 to 1975), Firth (1980) argued that the larger the
gains to target company shareholders, the larger the losses to bidding company shareholders.
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Table 3.3
Distribution of Abnormal Returns in UK Acquisitions
1972 - 1974
Adapted from Firth (1979), p. 324.
Mean Abnormal
Returns
(£ Million)
Percent of Companies
Experiencing Abnormal
Losses
Target Companies +655.6 0.9%
Bidding Companies -664.7 79.9%
Total (Targets and
Bidders Combined)
-9.1 53.1%
announcement..." (p. 326).
This finding is in stark contrast to the findings of the UK study by Franks et a/. (1977)
and to the US studies by Mandelker (1974) and Jensen and Ruback (1983). The
differences in results may be due to different markets being studied, different
methodologies applied, and different time periods studied43.
In probably the most comprehensive study of acquisitions in the UK, Franks and
Harris (1989) analysed more than 1,800 UK acquisitions taking place between 1955
and 1985. Target company shareholders were found to have gained approximately
29.7% over the six month period from month t-4 to t+1.
Cross-sectional analysis indicated that the level of abnormal returns to target
company shareholders "...appear higher when the target is small in relation to the
bidder." (p. 236). In addition, target company shareholders obtained higher abnormal
returns if there was more than one bidder, or if the terms of the bids were revised.
43 The 1972-1974 period analysed by Firth in his 1979 paper was a time of generally declining share prices
as a result of the first 'oil price shock'. There may thus be a problem of the analysis being based on a short,
and rather unusual, time period. However, as Firth applied the market model, he did adjust for general
market movements. In addition, in a subsequent paper based on UK acquisitions during the 1969 to 1975
period, Firth (1980) estimated that acquisitions in the UK resulted, on average, in a net overall loss to target
and bidding company shareholders of £36.6m per acquisition. The overall wealth effect of cross-border and
domestic acquisitions in the UK during the 1986 to 1991 period, is analysed in Chapter 9 of this thesis.
Total gain to target company shareholders was almost the same whether the bid was
competitive or revised.
In contrast to Firth (1976, 1979 and 1980), but in support of Franks eta!. (1977),
Franks and Harris (1989) found bidding company shareholders to have gained from
domestic acquisitions. During the six month period from month t-4 to t+1, mean index
model CAR to domestic bidders amounted to +7.9%. Bidders involved in competitive
bids were seen to have performed only slightly worse than other bidders. Thus, higher
abnormal returns to target company shareholders in multiple bidder situations appears
to "... reflect larger gains to the merging process..." rather than overpayment. (Franks
and Harris (1989), p. 240).
As mentioned above, Firth excluded from his analysis all acquisitions where the
acquiror held a pre-bid stake in the target of 30% or more.
"This procedure was adopted because the full takeover process is restricted
when the offeror has a large pre-acquisition share stake (Firth (1980), p.
239).
However, when Franks and Harris (1989) analysed the difference in abnormal return
dependent on the pre-bid stake in the victim, they concluded that target company
shareholders received a higher premium where the bidding company held a pre-bid
stake of at least 30% compared to where the bidder held no shares in the target prior
to the bid. The impact of toehold stakes on target and bidding company shareholders'
abnormal returns, is analysed in Chapter 7, 8 and 9 of this thesis.
The positive impact of the bid on the shares of bidding companies appear to have
been only temporary. During the two years following an acquisition, average abnormal
losses of 13 percent (when applying the market model) were encountered by the
bidding companies. The performance of the bidder subsequent to the acquisition was,
44 Due to the apparent importance of these variables, the effect of the relative size of the target and bidding
companies, whether the bid was competitive or not and whether the offers are revised or not, is analysed
in the cross-sectional analysis in this study.
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however, highly dependent on the parameters applied 45 . Franks and Harris pointed
out that,
"... bidding firms (premerger) were outperforming the market by almost 1%
per month. A failure to repeat this performance after the merger would
show abnormal losses of over 20% over a 24-month period." (p. 245).
The reported poor post-acquisition performance may thus have been due to the fact
that the bid was made after a period of exceptionally good performance, rather than
the bid itself having caused the abnormal losses. While the two-year abnormal return
was -13% compared to the market model, positive abnormal returns over the same
time interval of +4.8% and +4.5% were obtained when applying the index model and
the capital asset pricing model, respectively. Franks and Harris thus concluded that,
"the postmerger performance of bidders depends on the benchmark returns
against which bidders are evaluated." (p. 247).
Limmack (1991) analysed the abnormal returns to shareholders of 552 target and
529 bidding companies engaged in domestic acquisitions in the UK during the 1977
to 1986 period. In a previous paper (where he applied the index model), Limmack
(1990) argued that,
"while it is generally preferable to select models such as the Market Model
which control for the risk of individual securities, such models also suffer
from a potential lack of accuracy in parameter estimation." (p. 8).
Consequently, in his 1991 paper, Limmack applied three different test models. These
were
1.	 The ordinary market mode146,
45	 As discussed in Chapter 8 and in section 6.4.4, a similar 'post-announcement drift' is observed for bidding
companies in this study.
46 The Financial Times All Share Index (value-weighted) was used as a proxy for the 'market' in the calculation
of Rm. Limmack also estimated abnormal return using an equally weighted index, thus in effect he applied
six rather than three different control benchmarks. The market model parameters were estimated over the
period 67 to 7 months prior to the bid announcement.
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2. A model based on the application of adjusted betas47 , and
3. The index model.
With regard to bidding company shareholders, Limmack observed positive
abnormal returns in the month prior to the bid announcement (with all three control
methods), whether the bid eventually was successful or failed. However, while
Limmack found bidders on average to have performed well prior to the acquisitions,
they tended to lose from the acquisitions. During the period from bid announcement
through to the outcome day, bidders lost, regardless of bid outcome. During the 24
months following the announcement of bid outcome, bidders in both completed and
abandoned offers experienced "... a downward drift in returns over the whole period."
(p. 248). However, as with Franks and Harris (1989), Limmack found the level of
negative abnormal returns during the post-bid period to be highly dependent on the
model used. The CAR for months t+1 to t+24 amounted to -4.67% with the adjusted
/3 model, -14.96% with the market model and -7.43% with the index model. These
results clearly indicate the importance of model specification, and highlight the
potential limitations of basing studies on a single model.
In the cross-sectional analysis, Limmack found bidding company shareholders in
failed bids to have experienced significantly lower abnormal returns than shareholders
of bidding companies in completed acquisitions. Consistent with a stock market size
effect (as discussed in section 6.5.2), Limmack found small bidders to perform better
than larger ones. In his 1990 paper, Limmack also found shareholders of experienced
bidders to gain slightly more than first time buyers (although the difference in return
was not found to be statistically significant) 48 . As argued by Lubatkin (1983), studies
which exclude frequent bidders from the analysis "...may apply ... for only a restricted
47	 Limmack applied adjusted betas calculated by the London Business School Risk Measurement Service
(edited by Dimson and March).
48 It is worth noting, however, that Loderer and Martin (1990) found (US) bidders to perform significantly better
following the announcement of their first bid than they did for subsequent bids. This may link in to Schipper
and Thompson's (1983) argument that the first acquisition may be part of an announcement of an acquisition
programme. If so, there is a potential danger of subsequent bids being anticipated by the market. This
possibility is discussed further in Chapter 6.
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sample of acquiring firms characterised as being infrequently merging". (p. 222).
There is thus a danger in excluding frequent acquirors from the analysis, a procedure
common with the application of the market model or the capital asset pricing model.
Turning to the performance of takeover targets, Limmack argued that,
"significantly positive abnormal returns are obtained by target companies
over a period beginning two to three months prior to formal announcement
of the bid. ... completed bids were anticipated earlier than abandoned bids."
(pp. 246-247).
During the period from three months prior to the bid, to just after the formal
announcement of the offer, target company shareholders gained approximately +24%.
In the period from bid announcement through to the announcement of the outcome,
shareholders of targets in successful takeovers gained a further +6.2%, taking their
total wealth gain from the acquisitions to over +30%. Shares of targets in
unsuccessful offers, fell -3.3% during the same period.
For targets in failed takeover attempts, small companies maintained most of their
premium during the 2 years following the bid. However, shares in large targets fell
back to its pre-bid level. This seems to imply that the smaller surviving targets were
thought to be more likely to receive another takeover bid than were the larger
companies.
Limmack concluded that,
"the results ... suggest that, at worst, acquisitions are not value reducing
activities and acquisitions should not be opposed simply on those grounds.
Bidder company shareholders do appear, however, to suffer wealth losses
with too high a price paid for the benefits obtained from the acquisition
which appears to involve a transfer of wealth to target company
shareholders..." (p. 250).
Limmack thus found acquisitions overall to marginally create shareholder wealth,
although the gains to target company shareholders exceeded the total wealth creation.
This finding for acquisitions in the UK contradicts the findings of Firth (who found a net
overall loss in wealth), but is supported by Franks eta!. (1977).
3.6.	 Conclusion 
This chapter contains a review of key literature on domestic acquisitions within the
UK and US. Two main approaches have been adopted in the finance literature to
evaluate the financial merit of acquisitions. One approach is to apply accounting data
for an analysis of change in e.g., profitability from the period before to the period after
the acquisition. Accounting data has been applied in the analysis of acquisitions by
Singh (1971 and 1975), Meeks (1977), Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Scherer
(1988), Herman and Lowenstein (1988) and Holl and Pickering (1988). Singh (1971
and 1975) and Meeks (1977) established that target companies in the UK tended to
be small, but not necessarily poorly performing companies. Meeks further established
that acquisitions reduced the level of profitability of the companies involved.
Acquisitions, on average, thus proved to be 'disappointing marriages'. However, such
analysis of acquisitions based on accounting data is subject to limitations. Appleyard
(1980) and Pike and Neale (1993) discussed these problems, which are predominately
associated with different companies adopting different accounting policies.
An alternative approach is to use share return data. Event study methodology,
while also having potential limitations, has become the dominant mode for analysing
acquisitions. This generally involves an analysis of the impact of takeover bids on
share returns. (Event study methodology is discussed further in Chapter 6).
The existing empirical evidence suggest that target company shareholders,
regardless of time period and market, gain significantly from their companies being
acquired. There is also some evidence to suggest that the share price of target
companies start rising as much as three months prior to the formal bid announcement
(Franks et al. (1977) and Franks and Harris (1989)). There is thus a danger of market
model parameters being biased if estimated too close to the bid announcement".
There is also a possibility of short event windows not capturing the full wealth effect
of the acquisition.
The existing evidence with regard to the returns to bidding company shareholders
(as summarised in Table 3.1) is less uniform. The evidence from the United States
(such as Mandelker (1974), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Loderer and Martin (1990)
and Franks et al. (1991)) indicate that bidders generally gain, or do at least not lose
significantly. The evidence from the UK tends to be less positive with regard to the
returns to bidding company shareholders. Franks et al. (1977) and Franks and Harris
(1989) found UK bidders to gain, at least during the bid period. However, Firth (1976,
1979 and 1980) observed large losses to bidders. In addition, large post-bid negative
abnormal returns (at least with the market model) were observed by Franks and Harris
(1989) and Limmack (1990 and 1991).
The results indicate that not only the time period and the market (e.g. UK versus
US) being analysed, but also the methodology applied, may have a major impact on
the level of the estimated abnormal returns. In particular, the market model returns
for bidding company shareholders tend to be lower (particularly for long event
windows) than the level of abnormal return estimates obtained using other models,
such as the index model, the capital asset pricing model, or the adjusted /I model
(Franks and Harris (1989) and Limmack (1991)). The market model is based on the
assumption that the relationship between the return on the market and the return on
the share during the parameter estimation period will be a good predictor of the
expected relationship between the two variables during the event period. Most market
model parameters have been estimated during a time period prior to the bid
announcement. If this is a period of unusually good share price performance for
49	 As the parameters are intended to provide an estimate of 'expected returns', they should be estimated
during a time period unrelated to the takeover bid.
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bidding companies, the market model constant term (a) may be inflated. The
implication is that the share is expected to continue to earn a rate of return in excess
of what is consistent with its level of systematic risk. Consequently, due to the high
expectations, the market model was found to produce lower abnormal return estimates
than either of the other models for both Franks and Harris (1989) and Limmack (1991).
This highlight the potential limitation of relying exclusively on the results obtained using
only one test model.
Using long event windows result in more severe parameter estimation problems
than shorter windows (as any error will be multiplied for each time period during the
event window, and the forecasting of expected return becomes more difficult the longer
in the future one is attempting to predict). However, as target company shares have
been found to rise several months prior to the formal bid announcement (e.g., Franks
et al. (1977)) as well as abnormal returns to bidding company shareholders extending
to several months after the period of the bid announcement, longer event windows
have a better possibility of capturing the full impact of the event.
In addition to commenting on the average level of abnormal returns, several of the
authors applied cross-sectional analysis to establish the impact of bid characteristics
on the level of abnormal returns. The main explanatory variables were found to be
whether the bid succeeded or failed (outcome), the number of bidders (competitive),
whether the bid was revised or not (revised), whether the bid offered cash or equity
(pay), whether or not the bidding company held shares in the target company prior to
launching the bid (stake), the relative size of the target and bidding companies (relative
size), the size of the company in question (size) and the level of takeover experience
of the bidding company (experience) 50 . The main findings are summarised in Table
3.4. All of these explanatory variables (with the exception of bid experience, for which
50 Jensen and Ruback (1983) found bidder returns to be lower in mergers than in tender offers (acquisitions),
while both Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Franks and Harris (1989) found target company shareholders
to gain more in acquisitions than in mergers. This study contains an analysis of takeover bids, and pure
mergers (where there is no clear distinction between the bidder and the target) are excluded from the
analysis.
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no reliable data was available) have been analysed in the cross-sectional analysis in
this study, contained in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.
Chapter 4 contains a discussion of the literature regarding the level of abnormal
returns associated with cross-border acquisitions and a discussion of the extent to
which the level of abnormal returns have been found to be different in domestic and
cross-border acquisitions.
CHAPTER 4
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON CROSS-BORDER
ACQUISITIONS
4.1.	 Summary 
This chapter contains a review of existing literature on the impact on shareholder
wealth from cross-border acquisitions. The discussion focuses on two key questions:
a) Do target and bidding company shareholders gain or lose from cross-border
acquisitions?
b) Are the levels of abnormal returns in cross-border and domestic acquisitions
systematically different?
Table 4.1 contains a summary of the findings in the previous literature with regard to
the returns to bidding company shareholders. As indicated in Table 4.1, some
contradictions were observed with regard to whether bidding company shareholders
gained or lost from cross-border acquisitions. The vast majority of articles relate to
acquisitions into or out of the US. It appears that only three studies (Morck and Yeung
(1992), Markides and lttner (1994), and Doukas (1995b)) have observed significant
gains to US bidders from cross-border acquisitions. The other studies on US bidders
either found insignificant gains, or more often, losses. Bidders from other countries,
however, appears to have generally performed worse than their US counterparts,
although this is disputed by the evidence of Cakici et al. (1996). Studies of bidders
from various countries into the US have generally observed losses. However, bidders
from Japan seems to have been an exception. In two, admittedly fairly small studies,
(Pettway et al. (1993), and Kang (1993)), Japanese bidders were found to gain
significantly from acquisitions into the US. British bidders were found (by Conn and
Connell (1990) and Feils (1993)) to have performed substantially worse than US
bidders.
The evidence with regard to target companies is generally less controversial, as
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all studies find large, generally highly significant, abnormal returns to target companies
in cross-border acquisitions. There is, however, some disagreement as to whether
shareholders gain more or less from cross-border than from domestic acquisitions.
As is indicated in Table 4.2, most studies found target company shareholders to
have received a higher premium in cross-border than in domestic takeovers (a positive
target company 'cross-border effect'). Negative cross-border effects were found by
Biswas (1990) and inferred by Cakici et al. (1991). However, as discussed below,
there are some methodological limitations in these studies, which limits the weight
which should be placed on these results. It thus appears that shareholders generally
gain more when the bidding company is based abroad.
4.2.	 Introduction 
As was indicated in the introduction to this thesis, Fatemi and Furtado (1988, p.
364) argued that shareholder wealth effects would not be systematically different in
domestic and cross-border acquisitions unless at least one of three conditions is not
met:
"(1) the market for corporate control were not segmented across national
boundaries,
(2) the capital markets were not internationally segmented, and
(3) there were no net benefits (disadvantages) associated with international
diversification".
In this chapter, literature studying the wealth effects of cross-border acquisitions is
reviewed. In particular, the extent to which cross-border and domestic takeovers have
been found to differ in the literature is discussed.
4.3.	 Review of previous studies of cross-border acquisitions 
Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983) analysed the level of abnormal returns to
shareholders of US target companies in 39 cross-border and 164 domestic acquisitions
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between 1970 and 1978. Applying the market modeI 51 , cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) were estimated over the 41 day period from t-40 to t to be +38.64% in cross-
border and +28% in domestic acquisitions. The 10.64 percentage points difference
(target company 'cross-border effect') was found to be statistically significant.
However, such an overall comparison of average CAR for cross-border and
domestic takeover targets may be subject to limitations. Referring to Elgers and Clark
(1980) and Gordon and Yagil (1981), Wansley et al. argued that acquisition type
(horizontal, vertical or conglomerate), as well as the method of payment (cash,
securities, or a mixture), may have an impact on the level of abnormal returns in
acquisitions. Controlling for method of payment may be of particular importance when
comparing national and international acquisitions, as the cross-border bids were almost
exclusively cash financed, while US bidders were slightly more inclined to offer
securities than cash.
The vast majority of the acquisitions were of a conglomerate nature. Wansley et
al. thus decided to restrict their analysis to the sub-group of cash financed
conglomerate mergers, to evaluate whether there was a real "cross-border effect", or
whether the difference in average CAR in cross-border and domestic acquisitions were
attributable to the differences in the method of payment and the degree of relatedness
for the two groups of bidders.
For the cash financed conglomerate acquisitions, foreign bidders were still found
to pay a superior premium to domestic US bidders. However, the difference (4
percentage points) was no longer statistically significant. Wansley et al. therefore
concluded that,
51 Wansley et a/. applied the market model based on 200 daily observations ending 41 trading days prior to
the bid announcement. There is a danger that this estimation period ends too close to the announcement
of the takeover, so that share prices have already started to rise. However, in the paper the authors stated
that "different estimation periods are tried and in no case are the results of this paper altered." (p. 651).
Thus, for these takeovers, it appears that the markets reaction started less than forty days prior to the bid
announcement. This is slightly at odds with the findings for the UK by Limmack (1991) that "significantly
positive abnormal are obtained by target companies over a period starting two to three months prior to the
bid." (p. 246).
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"no significant differences exist in the premiums paid for USA companies by
foreign and domestic acquirers in conglomerate mergers when cash is the
method of finance." (p. 654).
In his Ph.D. thesis, Tessema (1985) analysed cross-border acquisitions in the US
market. "The shareholder returns of both U.S. firms acquiring foreign firms and those
acquired by foreign firms are compared with the shareholder returns of U.S. firms
involved in purely domestic mergers". (p. 1).
Tessema applied the market model with parameters estimated over days t-90 to
t-11 52 . Cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for a 21 day period from t-10
to t+10. The study contained an analysis of acquisitions 53 taking place between 1974
and 1985, and consisted of 840 US companies acquiring other US firms and 227 US
companies acquiring abroad, as well as 227 US target companies in domestic
acquisitions and 107 US targets in cross-border transactions.
Over the total analysis period (1974-1983), insignificant positive abnormal returns
were observed for both domestic and cross-border bidders. However, it was further
established that companies acquiring abroad significantly outperformed domestic
bidders during the 1974-1978 period, while the reverse was true during the 1979-1983
period, when cross-border bidders significantly underperformed domestic bidders.
In the cross-sectional analysis, Tessema noted that bidding companies, on
average, performed significantly better in cash transactions than when the merger
involved an exchange of shares.
The study also included an analysis of the abnormal returns to US target
companies in domestic and cross-border acquisitions. The mean CAR (t-10, t+10) was
+9.3% in domestic and +13.7% in cross-border acquisitions. The positive target
52	 As with Wansley et a/., there is a danger of the market model parameters estimated over a period so close
to the bid announcement being influenced by a pre-bid rise in the target company share price.
53	 The study was not restricted to full takeovers, but included "...acquisitions involving a minimum of 10 percent
and/or $10 million equity transfer". (p. 5).
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company cross-border effect was not, however, statistically significant. As was
observed for the bidding companies, target company shareholders (particularly in
cross-border acquisitions) obtained higher abnormal returns in cash than in equity
transactions.
Tessema expressed some reservations with regard to the event window applied
in his study.
"The test period of -10 days to +10 days in which we expected to see the
impact of international mergers and acquisitions on share prices may not be
adequate since benefits from international acquisitions may be realised at
a much later date. Therefore, we suggest a longer analysis period". (p.
126).
This recommendation has been taken into account in this study, where the event
window (for bidding company shareholders) include a five month period following the
month of the bid announcement.
Fatemi and Furtado (1988) analysed the abnormal gains and losses incurred by
shareholders of 117 US corporations buying companies abroad. Their sample
comprised "... all firms reported as having made a foreign acquisition between January
1974 and December 1979..." for which share price data and the date of the offer
announcement were available. (p. 366). Their study was restricted to successful
acquisitions.
The authors applied the market model, with parameters estimated using 150 daily
observations from day t-210 to day t-61. Abnormal returns were calculated for each
of the 11 days from t-5 to t+5, as well as the cumulative abnormal return for the
periods (t-60, t-2) and (t+1, t+60).
In order to establish whether movements in a company's shares were attributable
to the takeover announcement itself or to any other firm specific event unrelated to the
acquisition taking place at the same time, Fatemi and Furtado analysed the release
of significant news about the bidders during a period from twenty days prior to, to three
days subsequent to the day of the cross-border bid announcement. On this basis,
they split the sample into four groups:
(1) "Clean"	 No news about the company in question released
during the 24 day period,
(2) "Neutral"
(3) "Favorable"
(4) "Not favorable"
News released, but were not thought to have had
any impact on share prices,
News thought to have had a positive impact on
share prices,
News expected to have had a negative impact on
share prices.
During the 60 day period prior to the announcement of the cross-border bid (t-60,
t-2), shareholders of US bidding companies on average experienced significant
negative abnormal returns of -4.6%. However, Fatemi and Furtado argued that "... the
negative preannouncement wealth effects detected for the entire sample can be
attributed to the contamination effect of other events." (p. 368). In other words, the
share price performance for the group of firms about which "not favorable" news
emerged, pulled down the average pre-bid announcement performance for the whole
sample. For the "clean" group, there were no significant pre-bid movements in the
share prices. The analysis of the impact of information unrelated to the takeover
announcement is interesting, although there are several complications involved in
following such a procedure. Most importantly, there is a problem in defining what
news is expected to have a "positive", "neutral" or "negative" impact on a company's
share price. In efficient markets (Fama (1991)), share prices should react to
unexpected new information, not to information already anticipated. Thus, if a
company for example reports a loss of Ex, it is difficult to establish whether this will be
perceived by investors as good or bad news, without knowing what was expected. If
a larger loss was anticipated, the report of a loss of Ex may indeed be "positive" news.
Consequently, as a lot of uncertainty relates to what market expectations are, no
attempt has been made in this thesis to control for the effect of news release.
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Fatemi and Furtado hypothesized that the benefits of international diversification
(if any) would be larger for the first venture abroad than for subsequent expansion of
overseas activities 54 . Of the companies in their sample, for only two were the authors
able to ascertain with certainty that the companies had no prior international
involvement. Ninety-three companies did already operate abroad, while for the
remaining twenty-two companies the authors had no information regarding foreign
operations. The companies were split into two, according to whether they operated
abroad prior to the cross-border acquisition (93 companies) or did not operate
abroad/no information was available (24 companies). The authors compared the mean
abnormal returns to companies in the two groups, and concluded that,
"... there is weak evidence suggesting that the foreign acquisitions are
associated with positive wealth effects when they are the means for the
initial entry into a foreign market." (p. 372).
However, for only two companies were the authors certain that the cross-border
bidding companies did not operate abroad prior to the acquisition. For the remaining
22 companies in this category, the authors had insufficient information. If any of these
companies did operate abroad prior to the bid, the difference in abnormal returns
between the two groups may have been attributable to some other (unknown) effect
rather than the benefit of "... initial entry into a foreign market" (p. 372).
Fatemi and Furtado analysed whether the abnormal returns to US bidders varied
according to the nationality of the takeover target. As discussed in section 2.4.4 and
as argued by Conn and Connell (1990) (discussed below), there is a possibility of
shareholders of cross-border bidding companies to gain the most where the local
54 This is contrary to the predictions of Hymer (1976) and Servaes and Zenner (1994). Hymer argued that
"national firms have the general advantage of better information about their country: its economy, its
language, its laws, and its politics. To a foreigner the cost of acquiring this information may be considerable.
But note that this is a fixed cost; once incurred by establishing a foreign operation, it need not be incurred
again". (p. 34). Servaes and Zenner similarly suggested that "an acquisition may be more beneficial if the
acquiring firm has prior experience in the U.S. market, since this presence may reduce the transactions
costs of acquiring the assets and integrating them into the acquirer's operations" (p. 49), although Servaes
and Zenner acknowledged that "initial investments in a country may allow a company to gain more of the
benefits of foreign direct investment". (p. 49).
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market for corporate control is underdeveloped and uncompetitive. Of the countries
analysed, US bidders appeared to be performing worst (both pre- and post-acquisition)
when acquiring Canadian companies. However, Fatemi and Furtado concluded that
"The results ... indicate that no particular country or region can be
characterized as one in which target firms are consistently mispriced." (p.
375).
Thus, Fatemi and Furtado (1988) found no support for the inefficient capital markets
hypothesis.
Doukas and Tray los (1988) studied the gains and losses to shareholders of US
bidding companies engaged in international acquisitions between 1975 and 1983.55
In total, Doukas and Tray los studied 301 cross-border acquisitions made by 202
different US companies. They based their analysis on the market model, with
parameters estimated on daily observations for the period from t-136 to t-16 (where
t is the bid announcement day) 56. On the day of the bid announcement, shareholders
of US bidding companies on average gained +0.08%, which was statistically
insignificant. However, as pointed out by Doukas and Tra y los, these acquisitions were
"...a heterogenous group..." (p. 1167). Consequently, they spit their sample into the
following three groups (pp. 1164-1165):
(1) "MNCs [multi-national corporations] not operating in the target firm's country"
(99 acquisitions),
(2) "MNCs operating in the target firm's country", (175 acquisitions), and
(3) "Domestic firms going abroad for the first time" (13 acquisitions).
55 As did Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Doukas and Traylos controlled for news release unrelated to the
acquisition being analysed by excluding from the analysis companies involved in "...concurrent major
corporate events (i.e., other takeover activities, divestitures, common stock repurchases, exchange offers,
new offerings of securities, and announcements of new contracts) for the fifteen-day period prior to the
announcement day (t=0)..." (p. 1164).
56 Although the problem is likely to be more pronounced for analysis of target companies than of bidders,
estimating the market model on data so close to the announcement may lead to biased market model
parameters if the stock market foresees the takeover.
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The performance of the bidding companies varied significantly between the different
groups. Companies already operating abroad, but not yet in the market of the target
company gained on average +0.31% on the bid announcement day (significant at the
95% level). Companies not previously operating abroad gained more than the
previous group of MNC bidders not operating in the country. However, due to the
small sample size, the +0.74% gain was not statistically significant. Bidding
companies already operating in the country of the victim lost slightly on the day the
takeover was announced (-0.08%, which was statistically insignificant).
There appears to have been some gains, although small, to shareholders of
companies who bought companies in countries where they did not already operate.
Doukas and Traylos discovered that this gain was larger when the country of origin of
the target country was a less developed country compared to when the acquisition was
into another developed country 57 . Doukas and Tra ylos (as did Fatemi and Furtado
(1988)) thus argued that there were some benefits to bidding company shareholders
from acquisitions into new markets. Their findings thus lend some support to the
international diversification theory.
In a subsequent paper, Doukas (1995b) analysed the abnormal returns to
shareholders of US bidders from cross-border acquisitions, extending the analysis from
Doukas and Travlos (1988) to cover the 1975-1989 period. The total sample consisted
of 463 completed takeovers, undertaken by 234 U.S. companies. Doukas applied the
market model, with parameters estimated over days t-220, t-21. The main focus of
Doukas' analysis, was on the importance of Tobin's q ratio, which is a measure of a
57 A possible explanation for the additional gain of entering less developed countries may be that the
competition here is smaller than in developed countries. The acquiring company may therefore be able to
(ab)use market power to gain high returns.
Doukas and Travlos also found the shares of bidding companies to perform better when the acquisition
was into a new industry as well as into a new market. A discussion of the merits of conglomerate versus
horizontal or vertical mergers, is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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company's market to replacement value 58 . Doukas found that,
"the two-day announcement period cumulative abnormal returns for firms
with average q ratios greater than unity (i.e., value-maximizing firms 1581 ) is
0.41%..., statistically significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, bidder
returns are negative and statistically insignificant at any conventional level
for overinvested firms (i.e., firms with average q ratios less than unity). The
difference is significant at the 1% level". (pp. 1290-1291).
In support of Doukas and Tra ylos (1988), Doukas (1995b) confirmed that US bidders
performed better when entering into new markets. Two of the other variables which
were found to be of importance were the exchange rate (US bidders did better when
the dollar was strong relative to the currency of the country of the target company) and
the effect of taxation, with US bidders performing particularly well when entering into
less developed countries with tax rates lower than US rate of corporation tax.
However, as the US corporate tax rate was reduced in the 1986 Tax Act, the gains
from acquiring companies in low tax jurisdictions diminished after this date.
In a short paper, Mathur, Chhachhi and Sundaram (1989) discussed successful
cross-border acquisitions into the United States between the first quarter of 1986 and
the first quarter of 1988. Mathur et al. imposed further restrictions on the companies
to be included in their sample:
a.	 "The stock of the U.S. target firm should be listed and its daily price
data should be available; and
58	 Lang et a/. (1991) defined Tobin's q as "...the ratio of the market value of the firm's assets to their
replacement cost...". (p. 316).
59 It is worth noting that Doukas did not analyse or offer any evidence in support of the hypothesis that Tobin's
q can be used as a measure of the degree to which the company's management is competent and value
maximising. This issue is covered in more detail towards the end of this chapter when discussing the article
by Eun, Kolodny, and Scheraga (1995).
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[b] The non-U.S. bidder firm's stock should be traded in the host country
and its daily price should be available in either Financial Times ... or
The Wall Street Journal." (p. 24).
Due to these restrictions, their sample was limited to 18 large acquisitions. Mathur
et a/. applied the market model with parameters estimated using 100 daily
observations for the period up to 15 days prior to the bid announcement 60 .
Cumulative abnormal returns were estimated over the period from 15 days prior to 15
days after the announcement. During the two-day period from t-1 to t, target company
shareholders gained +25.9%, while over the whole 31 day event window from t-15 to
t+15, the cumulative abnormal returns reached +27.7%.
On the announcement day, bidders gained insignificantly. However, over the 31
day analysis period, shareholders of the foreign bidding companies, on average, lost
approximately -3% on average (statistically insignificant).
With regard to comparisons with the abnormal return from domestic transactions,
Mathur et al. argued that,
II
... comparisons should be kept in perspective because the domestic
mergers and mergers involving non-U.S. firms are not strictly comparable.
The second class of mergers are exposed to a variety of other factors [such
as exchange and political risk], to which the first category is not." (p. 26).
Although it is acknowledged that the abnormal return from cross-border and domestic
acquisitions are influenced by different factors, the view that these abnormal returns
are not comparable is not supported. Regardless of the additional risk and
complications involved in evaluating and undertaking cross-border acquisitions,
analysis of cross-border effects provide a valid measure of the different merit of
domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
60	 As discussed previously, parameters estimated over a period close to the bid announcement may be biased
if the bid is predicted.
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In a subsequent paper, Mathur, Rangan, Chhachhi and Sundaram (1994) again
analysed the impact on shareholders of foreign companies which made acquisitions
into the US during the 1984 to 1988 period. Their sample of 77 acquisitions included
23 acquisitions of publicly listed companies, 24 of private companies, and 30 of
subsidiaries of US companies61.
Mathur eta!. (1994) applied the same market model methodology as in the 1989
paper. The overseas bidding companies on average lost a significant -0.26% over the
three day period t-1, t+1. In addition, Mathur et al. noticed that "...the returns to the
foreign bidders in the present study continue to become more negative over time. This
result may indicate that more information about the acquisition is revealed to the
capital markets after the initial acquisition announcement is made". (p. 115). Over the
period from t+2 to t+15 days, the overseas bidders on average lost an additional
-1.62%. Over the total test period from t-15 to t+15, the mean CAR was -2.72%.
While their analysis covered three distinct groups of US targets (listed companies,
private, and units), Mathur et al. argued that "...bidder abnormal returns are not
affected by ownership structure". (p. 115).
In their cross-sectional analysis, one of their main findings was the importance of
exchange rates. Mathur et a/. discovered that "...a 10% decline in the value of the
dollar relative to foreign currency will increase abnormal returns by 0.53% for a bidder
from that country". (pp. 113-114).
Conn and Connell (1990) studied mergers between companies in the United
Kingdom and the United States taking place between 1971 and 1980. The study
contained an analysis of the returns to shareholders of 32 UK and 35 US bidding
companies and 22 UK and 24 US target companies. Their sample was restricted to
listed companies "... which had no other merger activity + 3 years around the
international merger and no other significant firm-specific event.. .[during the same 6
61	 In this study (see Chapter 6) only acquisitions of publicly listed companies are included in the analysis.
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year period]." (p. 692).
These cross-border mergers were mainly nonconglomerate, "... financed with cash
rather than stock ..., and involved mostly manufacturing firms..." (p. 692). Few
companies have shares listed in the country of the target firm, which may explain the
predominance of cash financing in cross-border acquisitions.
Conn and Connell used the market model in their analysis. However, they applied
an international market model (IMM) as well as the more traditional domestic market
model (DMM) 62. The DMM and the IMM were defined as follows:
DMM:	 R = a, + 11,DRDt +
IMM:	 R
	 ADRot fliiRit eit
where the subscript D was used for domestic and I for international observations for
security i during time period t. (Note that the a, and fl,D estimates are not the same in
the domestic and the international market models).
"... R it is the international index calculated as the weighted average of the
domestic and stock indices of the nine major European trading partners of
the US or Britain ... weights were determined based on average export and
import value of trade during 1970 - 80 of each of those countries with US or
Britain." (p. 694)63.
62 Conn and Connell adjusted the domestic and international market model estimates for thinness of trading
by applying a trade-to-trade procedure developed by Dimson and Marsh (1983). The adjusted estimates
were denoted DMM' and 1MM':
DMM':	 RA/d1 = aks[dit
 RioRDNdit eit
I M M':	 Ri,/,/d„ = aNdi, AD RD,Wc1,,	 eit
"... where Rd is the continuously compounded return on security i during period t which is the period between
two recorded trades in security i, R 0, and R,, are the continuously compounded return on [domestic and
international] markets over precisely the same calendar time period t, d i, is the length (in days) of period t,
and a, is now redefined as a continuously compounded return per day during estimation period p. Note that
the observations are weighted to allow for the different period lengths to ensure that the beta estimates are
efficient as well as unbiased." (Dimson and Marsh (1983), p. 756. Notation has been slightly altered).
Franks et a/. (1977) also applied a trade-to-trade procedure in adjusting their estimates. Note that
the adjustment method applied by Franks et a/. and Conn and Connell requires exact information on the
number of days prior to the end of the month the last transaction took place.
63 The trading partners referred to were Belgium, France, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Switzerland, and West Germany and the UK or the US (depending on whether a UK or a US company was
analysed).
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The weights were thus not based on world market capitalisation.
For both UK and US targets and bidders, the international and the domestic
market models gave very similar results. Conn and Connell argued that "... there is
no compelling reason to incur the extra research costs associated with the more
complex IMM." (p. 708). The results from Conn and Connell's paper, as discussed
next, thus refer to the DMM' modelTM.
For the target companies, the market model parameters were estimated using
monthly data for months t-36 to t-7. Conn and Connell found that US targets earned
significant positive abnormal returns quite a long time prior to the bid. During the
period from 9 to 2 months before the announcement, the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) averaged as much as +12%. According to the authors, "this is a larger pre-
announcement price movement than reported by any other US study...[of domestic
takeovers]." (p. 697). At the end of the bid announcement month, CAR had risen to
almost +40%. This is higher than the average for US domestic acquisitions as found
in the American papers reviewed by Jensen and Ruback (1983). However, not all of
these papers covered the same time period or applied the same methodology
(including a long 'event window').
UK targets gained significantly less from cross-border acquisitions between UK
and US companies than did shareholders of US targets. The CAR from month t-9
through to the end of month zero was approximately +18%, compared to almost +40%
for the US targets. As was shown in the previous chapter, UK targets in domestic
transactions generally received higher premiums than they did in these cross-border
transactions with US bidders. However, a direct comparison is difficult, due to the
different methodologies applied. Conn and Connell (1990) did not include domestic
acquisitions in their analysis, which would have facilitated such a comparison.
As with the US target company shareholders, part of the gain to UK targets
64	 As explained further in Chapter 6, domestic models are applied in this study, where the return on the market
is taken to be the return on the stock market index in the company's domestic market.
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accrued long before the bid announcement, with approximately 8 percentage points
out of 20, or 2/5 of the total CAR to UK targets accruing prior to the announcement of
the offer.
Conn and Connell noticed the problems in deciding which period should be
assumed to be 'normal' and therefore used for estimating the market model
parameters (a and /3). For bidding companies, they therefore estimated the
parameters over three different periods:
(1) From 36 to 7 months prior to the bid announcement,
(2) From 7 to 36 months after the bid announcement, and
(3) Combining the previous two, thus covering the periods (t-36, t-7) and (t+7,
t+36) where t is the month of the first bid announcement.
For both US and UK acquirors, their estimated abnormal performance were highly
dependent upon the time period applied for the parameter estimation.
"In general, CAR based on pre merger returns are smaller than CAR based
on post merger returns, and hence, CAR based on pooled returns fall
between the values found using pre or post returns." (p. 699).
US bidders performed very well prior to making the cross-border bids for UK target
companies. During the period from 12 to 8 months prior to the bid announcement
(t-12, t-8) bidders earned abnormal returns of +5% or +9% depending on whether the
pre- or post-merger benchmark was applied 65 . During the two month bid period (t-1,
t), the pre- and post-merger models provided conflicting results. At the end of month
t, CAR (from t-12 to t) applying the domestic market model were approximately
- 2.5% with pre merger data,
+ 3.4% using pooled data, and
+ 10.4% with post merger data.
Most other studies of the US market for corporate control have applied pre merger
65 When applying the pre-bid parameters, there is a problem of this time period (from t-12 to t-8) being part
of the parameter estimation period, which extends from t-36 to t-7. As the parameter estimation period is
generally assumed to be a period of 'normal' returns, it is highly unusual to have overlapping parameter
estimation period and event window.
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data in the market model (except for Mandelker (1974) who applied pooled data).
Other studies of US acquisitions have generally not found such large average losses
to bidders in the few months prior to the bid announcement. Conn and Connell
therefore argued that,
"... controlling for models used, international mergers by US firms are
viewed more sceptically by the securities market than are domestic US
mergers at the time of first public announcement." (p. 702).
However, Conn and Connell did not study domestic acquisitions, which would allow
for a more direct comparison between domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
During the six month period following the bid announcement, bidder performance
once again differed substantially between pre and post merger estimates of a and /3.
Over the period from t+1 to t+6, bidders lost so that CAR fell to -10.2% with pre
merger parameters, but maintained their performance at a positive CAR of +7.9% with
parameters estimated over the period following the merger.
Conn and Connell estimated that a decline in a (from positive to negative)
accounted for 85% of the difference in abnormal return estimates using pre or post
acquisition observations in the market model. The fall in alpha estimates may partly
have been attributable to the unusually good performance of bidders during the period
prior to the bid which inflated the pre-acquisition alpha and beta values. This
unusually good performance was not maintained after the acquisition, and the
estimated alpha values fell.
"the change in alpha is a signal that the market models (DMM and IMM)
may be misspecified. It is commonly observed that security returns are
correlated with firm size, and since merger instantaneously creates a larger
firm, the absence of a firm size variable may create a shift in the intercept
term." (p. 703).
The issue of stock market size effects is discussed further in section 6.5.2.
As for the US bidders, the level of abnormal returns to shareholders of UK bidders
varied widely depending on the period applied in estimating the market model
parameters. During the year prior to the bid, shareholders of UK bidders did not
perform exceptionally well, unlike their US counterparts. While CAR at t-8 (calculated
from t-12) was +5% or +9% for US bidders (using pre and post merger based models),
the corresponding figures for UK acquirors were -2% and +3.2%.
In the following months before the bid announcement, UK bidders continued to
perform worse than the US firms. At time t, CAR (t-12, t) for UK bidders with pre,
pooled, and post acquisition a and 13 were as follows (US figures also given for
comparison):
UK US
Pre -7.9% -2.5%
Pooled +2.0% +3.4%
Post +9.5% +10.4%
According to Conn and Connell, differences in the markets for corporate control
in the UK and US may account for the differences in abnormal returns to targets and
bidders in the two countries. The authors wrote,
"... there are a number of security regulations and antitrust laws in the US
(e.g. Williams Act, Premerger Notification Act, and state merger laws) that
facilitate the flow of information regarding mergers and hence encourage
competitive bids." (p. 691).
Conn and Connell also argued that,
"a priori, returns to foreign bidders should be relatively high if the market for
corporate control is relatively inefficient in the UK ... similarly, returns to UK
acquired firms should be less than those observed for US acquired firms..."
(p. 691).
However, while Conn and Connell found US bidders to perform better than their UK
counterparts, they did not perform particularly well after their acquisitions in the UK.
It may therefore be that their hypothesis of superior return from acquisitions in less
efficient takeover markets is incorrect. Another possibility may be that the UK takeover
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market is not less efficient than the US takeover market 66 . Some of the findings are
difficult to reconcile with Conn and Connell's hypothesis. Firstly, their theory does not
help explaining why the UK target company shareholders in cross-border acquisitions
by US bidders received a lower abnormal return than that found in other studies of UK
targets in domestic offers 67 . In addition, US bidders in cross-border acquisitions
appears to have performed worse than US acquirors in domestic transactions. If the
UK market was inefficient, it would be expected that US acquirors gained more from
takeovers in the UK than at home.
In a subsequent paper, Connell and Conn (1993) elaborated on the
methodological issues raised in their 1990 paper. The large difference in CAR to
bidding company shareholders depending on whether the market model parameters
were estimated during a time period prior to or after the acquisition, were
predominately (80%) attributable to a change in a rather than a change in /3 (20%) (p.
47). Connell and Conn gave a number of "possible explanations for the decline in
alpha...:
1) influence of above average returns in the year preceding the merger...;
2) instantaneous increase in firm size due to merger and a resultant
change in trading frequency"; and
66 In the UK, takeovers have since 1968 been regulated by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. The
City Code (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 1990) imposes a number of restrictions on predators
which, it could be argued, enhance rather than restrict efficiency in the takeover market. For example, full
takeover bids have to be made when a 30% threshold is reached. There are also stringent information
requirements. In the United States, takeover defences, such as greenmail, poison pills, and supernnajority
clauses, are common features. Such activities are either illegal or severely restricted in the UK. Manne
(1965) argued that enforcing full bids hamper the efficiency of the takeover market. However, it may be the
case that fair (or equal) treatment of shareholders is likely to increase the faith in the stockmarket, and
increase the willingness of investors to risk their capital. The assumption that the US market for corporate
control is less efficient than the US is therefore open to discussion.
67	 It should be borne in mind, though, the difficulties of comparing abnormal return estimates between different
studies due to the slightly different methodologies applied and time periods analysed.
68 The issue of thin trading is discussed further in section 6.5.1. If a share is less frequently traded than the
index, an error in the market model parameter estimation may occur, whereby the /3 is biased downwards
and the a estimate is inflated (see Fowler and Rorke, 1983). However, Connell and Conn found that a
change in /3 had relatively little impact on the change in CAR. In addition, Connell and Conn corrected for
nonsynchroneous trading. Thin trading is therefore unlikely to be the sole explanation for the change in the
a value over the takeover period.
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3) asymmetric incidence of mergers over the business cycle with the
result that the efficient frontier of the sample is not randomly changing
but subject to consistent downward shifts". (p. 63).
Uncertainty therefore remains as to why the alpha values for the bidding companies
generally changed so dramatically over the bid period. Connell and Conn concluded
that,
"the evidence on the wealth change for shareholders of acquiring firms
remains ambiguous due to the sensitivity of the market model parameters
to the event related period chosen to represent equilibrium...". (p. 64).
Servaes and Zenner (1990) analysed "...the returns to buyers and sellers in
foreign acquisitions in the U.S." (p. 1). They were particularly interested in establishing
what impact the passage of two pieces of tax legislation, the 1981 Economic Recovery
Tax Act (1981 ERTA) and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986 TRA), had on the return
to targets and bidders in domestic and cross-border acquisitions. "... 1981 ERTA
imposed many of the implicit taxes that put foreign investors at a disadvantage." (p.
5). Scholes and Wolfson (1990) argued that the 1986 Tax Reform Act would benefit
foreign acquirers more than domestic ones (p. S141)69.
Servaes and Zenner studied the level of abnormal returns to target and bidding
company shareholders in a total of 112 cross-border 7° and 831 domestic acquisitions
of US target companies that took place between 1979 and 1988. They applied the
market model, based on parameters estimated using 200 daily observations starting
250 days prior to the announcement of the takeover 71 . Over a two-day interval (t-1,
69	 For a fuller discussion of these tax legislations, please refer to Servaes and Zenner (1990) pp. 4-5 and
Scholes and Wolfson (1990) pp. S141-S143.
70	 Servaes and Zenner also analysed 325 cross-border acquisitions of units and 342 acquisitions of partial
ownership interests. The findings for these types of acquisitions will not be reviewed in this thesis.
71 As was discussed in Chapter 3 (see for example the discussion of Franks, Broyles and Hecht (1977)) and
in this chapter under the analysis of Mathur, Chhachhi and Sundaram (1989) and Conn and Connell (1990),
the share price of the target company often start rising several months prior to the formal announcement
of the offer, as the stock market anticipate a takeover to take place. Using market model parameters
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t), targets in cross border bids gained on average +13.5%. Over the longer event-
window from 20 days prior to the announcement, to "... the resolution of the takeover
or the delisting date, whichever comes first" (p. 8), the gain was +26.7% 72 . However,
while the average for the whole period was 26.7%, the gain to US targets varied
substantially over time.
"In the period 1979-1980, target returns are 38.0%. In the 1981-1986
period, following the 1981 ERTA, target returns drop to 15.2%... After 1986,
returns increase to 41.6%." (pp. 10-11).
These changes were highly significant. Servaes and Zenner concluded that the US
tax reforms of 1981 and 1986 appears to have had a "... significant impact on the
returns of domestic firms subject to foreign acquisitions." (p. 11).
In addition to tax laws, exchange rates were found to have an important impact
on the return to US targets. It appears that foreign bidders were willing to pay a higher
dollar premium when their local currency was strong in relation to the dollar. In
addition to analyse the variation in takeover premiums in cross-border takeovers,
Servaes and Zenner also studied how these premia compared to that of domestic
takeovers. During the 1979-1980 period, US targets received a 7 percentage point
higher premium in cross-border than in domestic takeovers. 73 (This was not,
however, statistically significant). While the premiums paid by foreigners fell
dramatically after the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act was passed (by 17.8
estimated on a period so close to the announcement (ending less than 2% months prior to bid) may lead
to an inflated a estimate and thus a downward bias in estimated abnormal return.
Servaes and Zenner analysed abnormal returns over two event windows, the longer of which was "...
constructed to capture all the announcements relevant to the acquisition and to capture any price run-ups
due to leakage." (p. 8). This event-window started 20 days prior to the offer announcement. Due to the
findings in previous studies of takeover rumours resulting in an increase in the share price of the target
company as much as three months prior to the announcement, it is not clear that an analysis period starting
20 trading days (= 1 month) prior to the announcement is sufficient to "... capture all the announcements
relevant to the acquisition and to capture any price run-ups due to leakage" (p. 8).
72	 The difference in abnormal return from the short to the long event-window clearly shows the importance of
a long period for capturing the whole takeover effect.
73 In order to capture true "cross-border-effects" (i.e., difference in abnormal return in cross-border and
domestic takeovers), Servaes and Zenner controlled (in the multi-variate regression analysis) for whether
the bids were hostile, cash financed and whether more than one company bid for the same target.
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percentage points, significant at the 10% level), the premium paid by domestic bidders
on average rose by 0.4 percentage points. As a consequence, during this period
returns to US target company shareholders were, on average, 10.5 percentage points
higher in domestic than in cross-border acquisitions. After the passage of the 1986
Tax Reform Act, the relationship again changed, with US targets experiencing an
abnormal return 5.9 percentage point higher when the bidder was foreign compared
to when another US corporation bid for the US target.
Servaes and Zenner also studied the abnormal return to the 70 foreign bidders
that had their shares74 listed in the US. The return for these bidders during the two-
day event-window was -0.15%, which was not statistically significant. However, as did
Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Servaes and Zenner found Canadian bidders to perform
worse than bidders from other countries.
"When we subdivide our sample in Canadian and non-Canadian firms, the
returns for non-Canadian firms are positive and marginally significant, while
the returns for Canadian firms are significantly negative." (p. 22).75
Servaes and Zenner published a similar paper in 1994. For the US target
companies, the cross-sectional analysis was extended to include an analysis of the
target company's q ratio. The regressions revealed that target company "...returns are
higher when cash is the form of payment, when the acquisition is hostile, and when
the target firm has a low q ratio". (p. 52).
In the 1990 paper, Servaes and Zenner analysed the returns to 70 foreign
companies which made acquisitions into the US over the 1979-1988 period. In the
1994 paper, this sample was increased, by extending the analysis to the 1989-1991
74 The authors analysed the return to foreign bidders that had "... shares or American Depository Receipts
(ADRs) traded on the NYSE, the Amex or over the counter..." (pp. 2-3). Some of these bidders were not
necessarily engaged in full takeovers, but in acquisitions of units or partial interests.
75 Servaes and Zenner admit that they have no satisfactory explanation for such a difference, but argue that
one explanation may be that "... the U.S. and Canadian economies are closely intertwined and that
Canadian firms may be less likely to realize many benefits of FDI [foreign direct investment] from investing
in the U.S." (p. 22).
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period (note that no such increase in the time frame was made for the US target
companies). This increased the sample to 123 foreign bidders. However, only 27 of
these were involved in complete takeovers, while the remaining 96 bought units or
acquired partial interests in US companies. As reported in the 1990 paper, the mean
two-day (t-1, t) CAR was -0.15% over the 1978-1988 period. For the enlarged sample,
this rose to +0.05%, indicating that foreign bidders on average performed marginally
better in the 1989-1991 period than they did between 1978 and 1988. For the
subsample of 27 completed mergers, the mean CAR was +0.44%. None of these
estimates were, however, statistically significant.
In her Ph.D. thesis, Biswas (1990) analysed cross-border acquisitions between
financial companies that took place between 1977 and 1987. For this time period, 496
cross-border acquisitions were identified. However, her analysis is based on 125
bidding firmsm and 81 target firms 77 for which (sufficient) share price data were
available. For comparison, 159 bidding and 74 target companies in domestic m bank
takeovers were also analysed.
Biswas analysed the effect on shareholder wealth applying the market model. The
a and /3 parameters were estimated on 71 daily observations, from t-90 to t-20, where
t denotes the bid announcement day. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) was
then estimated for the 11 days from t-5 to t+5. As discussed above, such a short
event window may not capture the full impact of the acquisition. In addition,
parameters estimated over such a short period so close to the bid announcement may
be influenced by bid speculation. Biswas partly acknowledged these problems, and
76	 The nationality of the 125 bidding firms were: Australia (2), Canada (17), Hong Kong (7), Ireland (1), Italy
(1), Japan (10), Netherlands (2), Singapore (1), Spain (3), Switzerland (6), UK (18), and US (57).
77	 The 81 target companies were based in the following countries: Australia (1), Canada (4), France (1), Hong
Kong (4), Italy (1), Netherlands (1), Spain (1), Switzerland (4), UK (11), US (48), and West Germany (5).
78 Biswas did not state what she included in this category of 'domestic' takeovers, such as whether this was
restricted to domestic US acquisitions, or whether domestic takeovers in other countries were included as
well.
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argued that the data,
"... suggests some evidence of a leakage, and that markets are efficient
enough for the reaction to be completed by day 0." (p. 76).
In her paper, Biswas argued that,
II
... relative to a domestic acquisition announcement, there is a higher
probability of leakages in an international acquisition announcement." (p.
76).
Unfortunately, Biswas did not apply a sufficiently long pre-bid event window to allow
for an analysis of this proposition. (This is, however, analysed in this thesis, as
discussed in Chapter 7).
The abnormal return to bidding company shareholders differed significantly
according to whether the takeover was international or domestic. In cross-border
deals, the performance of bidding companies was on average neutral. In domestic
acquisitions, however, predators on average lost a significant -0.9% over the 11 day
interval.
"Based on these results, a bidding firm is better off participating in an
international than in a domestic acquisition." (p. 78).
Target company shareholders gained significantly in both cross-border and
domestic bank mergers. The 6 day CAR (over the period ending with (and including)
the bid announcement day) was rather low, at +8.04% in international takeovers and
+14.03% for targets in domestic takeovers. Despite the seemingly large additional
gain to targets in domestic acquisitions, the negative target company cross-border
effect was not statistically significant. Biswas concluded that,
"... from a target firm's point of view, it does not matter significantly if the
bidder is from its own country or from a foreign country. It stands to gain
from positive abnormal returns in either case." (p. 81).
Method of payment was found to have a much larger impact on the level of
abnormal return to target company shareholders than the nationality of the bidding
company. On average, the CAR was found to reach +14% for cash bids, and only
+3.9% for non-cash financed financial takeovers. This finding clearly highlights the
importance of controlling for method of payment in estimating the gain or loss to
shareholders from takeover activity.
Cakici, Hessel, and Tandon (1991) analysed the level of abnormal returns to target
company shareholders from cross-border acquisitions into the US over the 1982-1987
period. For their sample of 94 complete acquisitions 79, the average CAR (using the
market model with CAR estimated over a short 12-day period from t-10 to t+1) was
+22%. Cakici et al. argued that this was "...not much higher than in domestic
mergers". (p. 30). However, Cakici et al. did not analyse any domestic acquisitions,
and the comparison refers to results obtained in other studies, not all of which applied
similar methodologies or covered the same time period. These comparisons to
domestic studies should thus be interpreted with care.
Cakici et al. also established that the average CAR to US targets in cross-border
acquisitions varied over time and with the nationality of the bidder. Firstly, they noticed
that the average CAR (at 27%) was higher during the 1982-1984 (strong dollar) period
than during the 1985-1987 (weak dollar) period (when mean CAR was 19.4%).
Finally, the paper identified some interesting national variations, "...with the Japanese
paying the highest for mergers, followed by the Canadians, then the British and finally
the Germans". (p. 57).
While the 1991 paper analysed the abnormal returns to US target companies from
cross-border acquisitions, in a subsequent paper, Cakici, Hessel, and Tandon (1996)
extended their research to an analysis of cross-border bidding companies. This paper
79	 Cakici et al. also analysed 149 cross-border acquisitions of parts or units of US firms. For such transactions
the average CAR to target company shareholders was +2.56%.
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focuses on the abnormal returns to 195 foreign companies' which made cross-
border acquisitions into the US during the 1983-1992 period. For comparison
purposes, the authors also analysed the abnormal returns to 112 US companies which
brought companies abroad during the same 10 year period.
Using the market model (with parameters estimated over days t-140 to t-21),
cumulative abnormal returns were estimated for three different event windows, ranging
from a 21 day window to a two day window. Their results are reported in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3.
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) to Successful Foreign
Bidders Into and Out of the US 1983 - 1992.
Source: Adapted from Cakici, Hessel, and Tandon (1996), p. 316.
Event window
(days relative to bid announcement)
Foreign Acquisitions
of US Firms
(N=195)
US Acquisitions of
Foreign Firms
(N=112)
t-10, t+10 1.96 -0.25
t-10, t+1 1.05* -0.04
t, t+1 0.63* -0.36
*	 Statistically significant at the 99% level.
The results indicate that positive and significant abnormal return were earned by
foreign bidders who acquired into the US. These results contradict the findings of
Conn and Connell (1990) with regard to UK acquisitions into the US, as reported
above81 . It is also interesting to note that Cakici et al. (1996) found US cross-border
80 As is discussed further in Chapter 6, there is often difficulties involved in obtaining data for foreign
companies. In order to obtain the sample of 195 cross-border bidding companies, Cakici et a/. (1996),
"...started with a sample of over 600 foreign corporate acquisitions in the U.S. but given the difficulty of
obtaining data for foreign companies' share prices and the inability to identify exact announcement date in
some cases, our sample is reduced...". (p. 314).
81 As discussed further below, most studies of cross-border acquisitions into the US have estimated the
abnormal returns to the bidding companies to be either insignificant or (in the case of UK bidders)
significantly negative. The only other studies to obtain significant gains to bidders from cross-border
acquisitions into the US, are Pettway et a/ (1993) and Kang (1993). It is interesting to note that both of
these papers were restricted to Japanese acquisitions of US firms. The evidence does not, however,
indicate clear national differences. In the Cakici et a/ (1996) paper, both the 85 UK and the 24 Japanese
(as well as the 12 Australian) bidders were found to obtain significant, positive, abnormal returns.
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bidders to perform worse than other cross-border bidders, again a finding inconsistent
with Conn and Connell (1990) (and Feils (1993), as discussed below).
In the cross-sectional analysis, Cakici et al. (1996) found cross-border bidders not
to gain from competitive bids. Variables which were analysed, but found not to be of
importance, were: the relative size of target and bidding companies; the strength of the
currency (contradicting their previous research as well as e.g., Servaes and Zenner
(1990) and Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), as discussed above); and the degree of
previous international exposure (possibly contradicting Fatemi and Furtado (1988) and
Doukas and Travlos (1988), although Cakici eta!. (1996) looked at international sales
rather than international operations, as measured in the previous papers).
Cakici et al. (1996) found bidder abnormal returns to fall after 1986, and argued
that this may be an indication of a tax effect (following the 1986 Tax Reform Act).
However, as acknowledged by the authors (and discussed more fully by Scholes and
Wolfson (1990)), one would have expected cross-border bidders into the US to have
performed better after the 1986 Act.
Cakici eta!. (1996) concluded their cross-sectional analysis by acknowledging that
the R2 of all regressions were very small. Thus, "while we have strong evidence of
significant positive bidder gains when foreign firms acquire U.S. firms, the evidence
supporting determinants of the bidder premia is weak". (p. 20).
Shaked, Michel and McClain (1991) analysed the difference in takeover gains to
US targets in cross-border and domestic acquisitions. Shaked et al. included in their
analysis all takeovers of US listed companies (with assets in excess of $100 million)
taking place between 1975 and 1983. One more restriction was imposed, in that,
"none of the firms were target firms in another takeover attempt within one
calendar year surrounding the announcement date." (p. 436).
Imposing these restrictions, Shaked et a/. got a fairly small sample, comprising
29 cross-border acquisitions, and
84 domestic acquisitions.
Shaked eta!. applied the market model based on 60 monthly observations for the
period (t-72, t-13). Abnormal returns 82 were calculated for a 71 day interval,
spanning 35 trading days (approximately 2 months) on either side of the bid
announcement day.
During the two months prior to the bid announcement, the level of abnormal return
to targets in cross-border and domestic acquisitions were similar (CAR for the period
(t-35, t-2) was +15.7% in cross-border and +15.1% in domestic acquisitions).
However, during the next few days (covering the bid announcement) cross-border
targets gained significantly more than the targets of domestic bidders.
Eight days after the announcement, CAR had risen to +38.2% in cross-border and
+34.3% in domestic acquisitions. Subsequent to this, abnormal returns in both foreign
and domestic acquisitions flattened out, so that by the end of the investigation period
(35 days after the announcement), there was a difference of 5.75 percentage points
in the total wealth gain in cross-border and domestic acquisitions (CAR of +40.2% and
+34.5% respectively).
Shaked et al. obtained an even clearer difference in CAR between cross-border
and domestic acquisitions when the observations were split according to the industry
sector of the US target, as
"... segregating the overall sample by industry clearly suggests a higher, and
much steeper build-up of cumulative abnormal returns to targets of foreign
acquirers." (p. 443).
The most extreme industry was the mining and metals sector. The 6 targets of
overseas bidders had by the end of day t+35 gained +66.2%, while the targets in
domestic takeovers in the same industry sector gained only an average of +17.6%
over the same period. In no other industries were the differences so large. However,
82	 Shaked et a/. estimated abnormal returns both with the a and 11 estimated by the market model, and with
a set equal to zero. All reported estimates are calculated with a m 0.
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in all sectors did cross-border acquisitions lead to larger gains to target company
shareholders than did domestic acquisitions.
Due to the small sample size, the industry data did not easily lend itself to rigorous
statistical analysis. However,
"though the sample size for each of the industries is limited, the fact that the
same patterns are observed, suggests an actual difference between foreign
and domestic acquirers." (p. 443).
Shaked et al. did not control for differences in bid characteristics (such as different
proportion of bids being multiple, revised, cash financed, e.g.) in their analysis of the
cross-border effect. They did note, however, that the cross-border effect could not
have been due to a difference in the proportion of bids being hostile (assuming hostile
bids led to a higher bid premium being paid), as slightly more domestic (19.5%) than
foreign takeovers (17.2%) were hostile.
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) carried out a more extensive analysis of the
differences between cross-border and domestic acquisitions of US companies,
studying 1,273 publicly traded US firms acquired between 1970 and 1987, of which
159 (12.5%) were acquired by foreign companies. United Kingdom (followed by
Canada) was the single most important foreign source country, accounting for a total
of 60 acquisitions of listed US companies during the period 1970 - 1987.
Harris and Ravenscraft applied the market model with parameters estimated using
daily observations for the period (t-240, t-21) 83 in the analysis of abnormal return to
US targets and calculated cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over two different event
windows, (t-3, t+1) and (t-20, t+4), for three different announcement dates: "...
(1) the first offer for the target by any bidder,
(2) the first offer for the target by the ultimate acquirer, and
83 Once again, the market model parameters were estimated close to the announcement data, which may have
resulted in an overestimated a. The level of abnormal return to targets may therefore be underestimated.
However, as the estimation period is the same for cross-border and domestic takeovers, the conclusion
regarding the difference in abnormal returns (target company cross-border effect) should be unaltered.
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(3) the final offer by the ultimate acquirer." (p. 831).
They also calculated CAR for event windows covering all three announcement dates.
In the majority of cases (approximately 2/3), these three announcement dates were the
same.
In order to test whether any 'cross-border effect' existed, Harris and Ravenscraft
chose to control for differences in method of payment, and whether or not the bid was
competitive. In addition, they also tested whether the difference in takeover premiums
to targets of overseas and domestic bidders changed over time or differed according
to which industry sectors the target companies operated in.
Harris and Ravenscraft found target company shareholders to have gained
significantly more in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions, with the CAR for the
period from t-20 to t+4 days amounting to +39.8% in cross-border and +26.3% in
domestic acquisitions. The difference in abnormal returns, although reduced from 13.5
to 10.2 percentage points, remained highly significant when additional variables, such
as whether the bids were cash financed or not, and whether multiple bidding
occurred" were added. The cross-border wealth effect was thus very large (and
larger than that found by Shaked et al. (1991))85.
Abnormal returns to targets in takeovers varied significantly over time (average
target gains fell after 1980). However, the "cross-border effect" was still significantly
84 Harris and Ravenscraft argued that targets have been found to gain more in cash bids than in share offers.
88% of cross-border acquisitions into the US were cash financed. Only 4% were financed solely by equity.
The comparable figures for domestic US takeovers were 49% and 28% respectively. Slightly fewer cross-
border takeovers involved multiple bids than were the case for domestic acquisitions (30% versus. 33%).
85 Harris and Ravenscraft studied the difference in abnormal return to targets in domestic and international
bids. As mentioned above, they did not analyse return to bidders. Their analysis was therefore rather
restricted. Harris and Ravenscraft appreciated that,
"a full resolution of how the wealth gain is distributed between bidder and target in cross-border
takeovers requires stock data from a number of countries." (p. 829).
Despite this, Harris and Ravenscraft went on to argue that,
"... our estimate yields a lower bound on the total gain [from cross-border mergers], unless the
bidding foreign firm incurs a loss in share value. Declines in bidder share value have been
observed, but Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988) show they are largely confined to stock
acquisitions. Most cross-border takeovers employ cash." (p. 829).
In this statement, the assumption "...unless the bidding foreign firm incurs a loss in share value" is
rather crucial. Statements regarding the overall wealth effect from cross-border acquisitions, without
analysing the returns to both parties to the transaction, is of limited merit. (For example, Conn and Connell
found bidders in cross-border acquisitions to lose from these transactions).
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positive (at 7.9 percentage points) when time was added as an additional explanatory
variable in regression analysis. Thus, Harris and Ravenscraft concluded that,
"our data demonstrate a strong cross-border effect, suggesting that foreign
buyers consistently pay substantially higher premiums for U.S. firms than do
U.S. buyers." (p. 837).
Harris and Ravenscraft analysed the foreign bids further in an attempt at
discovering what may have caused the difference in target wealth gains from cross-
border and domestic acquirers. The authors discovered that takeover targets who had
allocated a large proportion of their turnover on research and development (R&D)
received higher bid premiums than did firms with little R&D involvement. However, the
R&D effect appeared to be the same in cross-border and domestic acquisitions. On
the other hand,
"given that cross-border takeovers occur more often in R&D intensive
industries than do U.S. takeovers, these results provide support for a special
role of R&D in FDI [Foreign Direct Investment]." (p. 839).
The R&D effect may thus account for some of the difference in average bid premiums
offered by foreign and domestic acquirers.
As was argued by Servaes and Zenner, tax laws may affect domestic and foreign
acquirers differently. Harris and Ravenscraft classified (US) Acts according to whether
they were thought to favour foreign or domestic acquirers. They then analysed what
impact the introduction of these Acts had on the size of the cross-border effect, and
concluded (in contradiction to Servaes and Zenner) that,
"in sum, our results provide no support for increased tax incentives for
takeover being linked to higher target gains." (p. 839).
There does thus appear to be disagreement as to whether differences in tax treatment
explain the difference in abnormal return to targets in cross-border and domestic
acquisitions.
Harris and Ravenscraft analysed whether there were any national differences
(within the cross-border group) in bid premia offered. However, the country dummies
were only significant at the 83% level of significance. There was thus only weak
evidence for any difference in target bid premium dependent on the nationality of the
bidder.
As did Servaes and Zenner, Franks and Harris did find target gains to be,
"...significantly higher when the buyer's currency is strong relative to the
dollar. ...[The data] suggests that a 10 percent ... appreciation of a currency
is accompanied by a 2.7 point ... increase in target gains." (p. 841).
Foreign bidders were thus particularly generous when their own currency was strong.
When the exchange rate coefficient was added to the analysis of target wealth gains
in cross-border takeovers, the R&D-effect lost its significance. The authors did not
offer a full explanation as to why foreign bidders paid a higher premium for their
targets than did US bidders. Harris and Ravenscraft summarised their article by
stating that,
"... target wealth gains are significantly higher in cross-border takeovers than
in domestic acquisitions. This cross-border effect persists, having controlled
for industry effects, variation in gains over time, the medium of exchange,
and competition in bidding. Foreign companies pay around 10 percentage
points (about 50 percent) more than domestic firms in non cash bids." (p.
842).
In his DBA thesis, Sudia (1992) looked at the impact of takeover regulation on the
level of abnormal returns to US bidders from acquisitions abroad. The legislative
changes analysed were "...the Williams Act of 1968, the related 1970 amendments,
state anti-takeover legislation, the 1982 Edgar versus Mite Supreme Court Decision,
the 1986 CTS Dynamics Corporation of America Supreme Court Decision, and major
U.S. target countries takeover laws". (p. 1).
Sudia gathered data on 323 US bidding companies which acquired foreign firms
during the 1967 to 1989 period. Sudia applied the market model to calculate abnormal
returns, with parameters estimated over days t-210 to t-31. CAR was calculated over
days t-30 to t+30. Sudia found that the average CAR to US bidders engaged in cross-
border acquisitions changed over time. The mean CAR was -0.16% during the 1967-
1968 period, +1.24% for the 1968-1982 period, -2.03% for the 1983-1987 period, and
-0.95% for the 1988-1989 period. The changes in the levels of CAR were as Sudia
predicted following the regulatory changes. However, none of the CAR estimates (nor
the changes from period to period) were statistically significant.
Splitting the sample according to the nationality of the target companies, Sudia
established that US bidders, on average, gained marginally (CAR=0.58%) when
acquiring Canadian companies, while acquisitions into other markets resulted in
insignificant losses.
Cebenoyan, Papaioannou and Travlos (1992) analysed the abnormal returns to
target company shareholders in 134 domestic and 73 cross-border acquisitions of US
companies over the 1978-1987 period. They applied the market model (with
parameters estimated over days t-136 to t-16 86), and the majority of the analysis was
based on a two day event window (days t-1, t). For the whole time period, the
average CAR in domestic acquisitions was found to be +16.5%, while cross-border
acquisitions resulted in a (statistically significant) additional +6.3 percentage points.
In the cross-sectional analysis, Cebenoyan et al. controlled for: the method of
payment; changes in the US tax system (following the 1981 and 1986 tax reforms); the
strength of the foreign currency relative to the dollar; the industry sector of the target
firm; the level of foreign acquisitions in the target industry; the number of bidders; and
whether the bidder was domestic or foreign.
One of the main findings of the study, was that "...the wealth gains realized from
86	 Parameter estimation periods close to the bid announcement may lead to biased parameters if the bid is
anticipated.
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foreign bids, relative to those realized from domestic bids, increase with foreign
takeover activity in the respective industry of the target. This positive effect persists
even after we account for various control variables". (p. 67). Foreign bidders thus
appears to have been prepared to pay a higher premium for US targets if there
already was a significant volume of cross-border acquisitions in the industry.
Another interesting finding of their study, was that the strength of the currency,
while significant when analysed in isolation, was "...no longer significant in the
presence of ... additional factors". (p. 66).
The final major finding of the Cebenoyan et al. study, was that while there was a
positive cross-border effect for the 1978-1987 period, this was not the case for the
1981-1987 sub-period. During this time period, the cross-border effect was generally
negative, and significantly so in some regressions. "...these findings suggest that the
general conclusion of previous studies, that cross-border takeovers produce superior
wealth gains for U.S. target shareholders, might not hold for takeovers in the 1980s".
(p. 66).
Morck and Yeung (1992) analysed the abnormal returns to shareholders of 322
US companies engaged in cross-border acquisitions over the 1978 to 1988 period.
The authors employed a very short event window:
"In the analysis..., we employ a one day event window. Our results do not
change qualitatively if the window is widened to three days; however,
significance levels fall. Our results become insignificant if a five day window
centred on the event date is used". (p. 45).
This limitation should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
The average abnormal returns to the US bidders was +0.29% (significant at the
90% level) on the day of the bid announcement. The authors did not analyse domestic
US acquisitions, but rather made a general reference to other studies as follows: "The
stock market appears to view international acquisitions as good news on average - an
apparently better news than domestic acquisitions". (p. 49).
It was further established that companies with high R&D spending performed
better than other bidders. R&D was taken as a proxy for intangible assets, which
made Morck and Yeung argue that,
"overall, the results ... are consistent with the internalization theory. That is,
a firm's stock price rises upon its announcement of a bid for a foreign target
if the bidder appears to possess intangible assets". (p. 53.
On the other hand,
"...in the absence of intangible assets, international expansion is at best a
wash-out and may even be viewed by investors as a liability". (p. 54).
Morck and Yeung also discovered that size was negatively related to the level of
abnormal returns. Cross-border acquisitions thus appears to have had a greater
impact on small than on large bidders. The stock market also reacted more favourably
to acquisitions announced by companies in which insiders held a significant proportion
of the bidding company's shares. This may indicate that managerial ownership have
alleviated some of the concerns about the acquisitions having been undertaken in
pursuit of managerial objectives, rather than in an attempt to maximise shareholder
wealth.
Finally, Morck and Yeung argued that "...stock financing is not significantly related
to abnormal returns. This contradicts with a negative effect found for domestic
acquisitions". (p. 51). This may be due to the generally small number of cross-border
acquisitions where cash is not offered.
In her Ph.D. thesis, Feils (1993) focused on cross-border acquisitions between the
UK and the US, although she also included some German acquisitions. Her sample
(representing full acquisitions over the 1980 to 1990 period) was as follows:
*	 50 US targets and 41 UK bidders in cross-border acquisitions into the US,
*	 42 US bidders and 7 UK targets in cross-border acquisitions into the UK,
.	 9 US targets acquired by German bidders, and
.	 10 US bidders acquiring in Germany.
For comparison purposes, Feils also analysed the abnormal returns to 130 targets and
bidders in domestic US acquisitions.
Feils applied the market model with parameters estimated over a very short time
period, from day -65 to day -11 87 . Abnormal returns were calculated over days (t-1,
t) and (t-5, t+5), using both a domestic and an international market index'. "The
results are generally robust to the choice of the returns definition and the market
index". (p. 7). Consequently, in the following discussion, reference will be made to the
results obtained using the narrow event window (t-1, t) using the international market
index.
Looking at the target companies in cross-border acquisitions, Fells found UK
targets to gain significantly less than US targets. The average two-day CAR to US
companies acquired by UK firms was +25.52%, while UK targets on average gained
+16.33% when acquired by US corporations. These results are consistent with those
of Conn and Connell, although they found the difference in abnormal returns to US
and UK targets to be even larger.
Looking more specifically at the US target companies, it was established that,
while they on average gained +25.75% in cross-border acquisitions, they gained
marginally more, +25.90% in domestic acquisitions 89 . "Overall, the results show no
significant difference between the cumulative abnormal returns to the U.S. target firms
in domestic and international acquisitions". (p. 104).
Turning to the bidding companies, Feils established that all categories of bidders
87 As previously mentioned, there is a potential danger in estimating market model parameters, especially for
target companies, so close to the bid announcement, as the parameters may be contaminated if the bid is
anticipated by the market.
88	 The international market index was calculated as the value-weighted average of the indices in Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, UK and US.
89	 US targets gained the most in the small number of German acquisitions. There is thus some indication that
the size of any cross-border effect may be influenced by the nationality of the foreign bidder.
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on average lost from their transactions. "The losses to U.S. acquiring firms in
domestic acquisitions are significant". (p. 108). Similar (although not significant) losses
were encountered by US bidders in cross-border acquisitions. British bidders lost
marginally more than the US bidders from cross-border acquisitions. Again, these
findings are consistent with Conn and Connell (1990) who established that UK bidders
generally performed worse than US bidders in cross-border acquisitions.
Where sufficient data was available, Feils also calculated the average combined
(value-weighted) CAR for the matched pairs of bidding and target companies. She
established that, due to the large gains to the US targets, acquisitions by UK
companies of US targets on average resulted in a net wealth gain of +5.19%. On the
other hand, cross-border acquisitions by US companies into the UK on average
resulted in an overall loss of -2.81%. The largest overall gains were, however,
observed in domestic US acquisitions, which on average resulted in an overall
increase in shareholder wealth of +5.69%.
Feils also analysed the impact on the level of abnormal returns caused by various
bid characteristics. She concluded that,
"no significant differences in gains from domestic and international
acquisitions are found after considering the impact of the number of bidders,
form of payment, level of hostility, the relatedness of the businesses of the
acquiring and target firms, and their relative size. The gains to the
combined firms are larger in multiple bidder acquisitions and positively
related to the relative size of the target and the acquiring firms.
Deviations from the average exchange rate and the relatedness of the
businesses have no explanatory power...". (p. iv).
In her Ph.D. thesis, Song (1993) analysed cross-border acquisitions into the US
over the 1981-1990 period. The analysis is restricted to 118 transactions for which
data was available for both the US target company and for the foreign acquiring
company. Song applied the market model, with a and /3 being estimated over days
t-70 to t-11, where t refers to the day of the bid announcement90 .
The overseas bidding companies, on average, observed a negative 2-day (t-1, t)
CAR of -0.72% (significant at 5% level), and -0.41% over a 21-day period (t-10, t+10).
Further, Song found that the "acquirer's CAR is significantly higher if the firm already
has an establishment in the U.S.". (p. 166). These results contradict those of Fatemi
and Furtado (1988) and Doukas and Travlos (1988), who argued that US bidders
performed better when entering new markets.
Target companies, on average, earned large, and highly significant, positive
abnormal returns. Over the 2-day window the CAR was +24.78%, and +36.34% over
the 21-day window. The large difference in CAR between the two event windows
highlight the importance of extended event windows for capturing the whole wealth
effect. Indeed, as acknowledged by Song, even her 'long' event window (from t-10 to
t+10 days) may be too short for capturing the full impact of the acquisitions.
Song further looked at the value changes for paired bidding and target companies.
The change in shareholder wealth was calculated over the period from 10 days prior
to the initial announcement to 10 days after the successful bid. The average CAR was
6.30% of the combined values of the bidding and target companies. Target companies
gained more if the bid was competitive, but bidding companies did not perform worse
in competitive bids. Consequently, the combined gain was significantly higher in
multiple-bidder transactions than in single-bidder transactions.
Swenson (1993) analysed the abnormal returns to US targets in 477 domestic and
226 cross-border acquisitions over the 1974-1990 period. Swenson applied the market
model (with parameters estimated over days t-250 to t-21 days), and calculated the
90 Estimating the market model parameters over a period so close to the bid announcement may cause
problems if the bid is anticipated. Indeed, Song observed that for the target companies, significant positive
abnormal returns were observed as early as t-10. "Hence abnormal returns measured over event periods
beginning 10 days before the initial announcement seem to understate the true return to target shareholders
in a takeover". (Song (1993) p. 135).
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CAR over days t-20 to t+5.
Swenson acknowledged two potential limitations of her methodology. Firstly, she
recognised the potential for information leakage prior to the official announcement of
the bid and argued that,
"as long as investors believe that their firm could become a takeover target,
a fraction of potential takeover gains will be capitalized in the current stock
price. ... If there is any anticipation that a firm may be acquired, the
observed effect of the takeover announcement will be less than the
economic value of the event itself'. (pp. 270-271).
Thus, measuring the CAR from 20 days prior to the day of the bid announcement may
be insufficient to capture the whole effect of the bid.
In addition, Swenson acknowledged the limitation of restricting the analysis to
target companies. "Since the division of gains is not likely to be divided between the
bidder and target in a systematic fashion, target shareholder gains are an imperfect
measure of total value created by the acquisition". (p. 271).
On a descriptive level, Swenson established that foreign bidders generally: had
a larger pre-bid stake in the target; faced competitors less often; and acquired targets
with higher PE ratios, than did domestic acquirers.
On an overall basis, "...the premium paid in foreign transactions [40.9%] exceed
the premium paid by domestic purchasers [30.1%] by 10.9 percent". (p. 268).
Swenson also looked at the effect of bid characteristics. US target companies on
average gained an extra +9.2 percentage points in competitive as compared to single
bidder transactions. However, even after controlling for this and other variables (such
as whether or not the bid was challenged by regulatory authorities, the method of
payment, and whether the target company was a manufacturer or not), the cross-
border effect still amounted to +9.3 percentage points. However, this additional
premium received with foreign bidders was not constant over time. "...it is apparent
that the foreign premium was highest in the 1970s, fell in the early 1980s, but
increased again in the late 1980s. These results cast doubt on the overpayment
hypothesis". (p. 270).
Swenson argued that the variation in the level of the cross-border effect could, at
least in part, be attributed to the varying strength of the dollar. "The results show that
target shareholder wealth gains in foreign acquisitions are much larger in weak-dollar
years. In fact, there are no additional wealth gains for target shareholders in foreign
acquisitions during strong-dollar years". (pp. 273-274).
There are some complications in assessing why the strength of the currency
should have an impact on the level of target company abnormal returns.
Firstly, it may be difficult to determine when a currency is 'strong'. Swenson
defined the dollar as strong when the real effective exchange rate was above the
average exchange rate for the 1974-1990 period. While it may be possible, with
hindsight, to use this approach for determining the strength of the currency, it is
probably difficult for bidders, at the time of the takeover, to determine whether the
currency is strong or weak.
Secondly, a fall in the dollar should not create bargains to foreign bidders, as it
"...reduces the value of the expected foreign currency profit stream at the same time
that the foreign currency price of the U.S. target falls". (p. 272). Foreign bidders
should thus only be at a competitive advantage relative to domestic bidders when the
dollar is temporarily weak. In reality, it may be difficult to assess whether the apparent
weakness of the currency is transitory or permanent.
Finally, Swenson did not discuss why the foreign bidders paid a higher premium
when the dollar was weak. While the strength of their home currency may have given
foreign bidders a competitive advantage over domestic bidders (if one accepts the
above argument), it is less than clear as to why the foreign bidders passed on this
advantage to the target companies in the form of an additional takeover premium.
Consequently, while Swenson identified an interesting correlation between the size
of the cross-border effect and the strength of the currency, questions still remains as
to why such a relationship appears to be present.
A final aspect considered by Swenson, was whether or not the overseas bidder
had prior experience in the US market. While Fatemi and Furtado (1988) and Doukas
and Traylos (1988) found US bidders to perform better when entering new markets,
Swenson found that "...when foreign bidders were distinguished according to their
presence in the U.S. market, no differences in target shareholder wealth gains were
found". (p. 279). Thus, while the degree of prior international experience may be of
some importance to the bidding companies, it does not appear to be of importance to
the US target companies.
Marr, Mohta and Spivey (1993) analysed the wealth effects to target company
shareholders from 90 cross-border acquisitions into the US over the 1975 to 1987
period. For comparison purposes they also analysed 87 target companies in domestic
US acquisitions. These domestic acquisitions were, for an unexplained reason, drawn
from a shorter period (1979 - 1987). This is unfortunate, as a direct comparison of
results may not be valid as the two samples do not cover exactly the same time
period.
Marr et al. did not analyse the gains or losses to the foreign bidding companies,
but argued that this was not a major limitation of their research.
"Unfortunately, data on foreign firm's wealth effects are not readily available.
The empirical evidence from previous studies show that the gains to bidders
are negligible... Furthermore ... study of tender offers ... find that target
shareholders capture most of the gains from tender offers. Therefore, the
wealth effects to target shareholders should be a good measure of the
premium from a takeover". (pp. 290-291).
As is shown in the empirical section of this thesis, such an assumption may not be
valid.
Marr et al. applied the market model (estimated over the period from 210 to 60
days prior to the bid announcement). Abnormal returns were calculated over the
interval from 60 days prior to, to 20 days after the day of the bid announcement. Their
results are given in Table 4.4. As can be seen, "the wealth effects on the
announcement of a takeover is significantly higher for foreign takeover than for
takeovers by domestic firms". (p. 285). There was thus clear evidence of a positive
cross-border effect. Marr et al. also found that "...foreign bidders pay a slightly higher
premium for targets whose operations are related to their own". (p. 293).
Table 4.4.
Cumulative Abnormal Returns to US Firms Taken Over By
Foreign Bidders Versus US Firms Taken Over By Domestic
Bidders - 1975-1987.
Source: Adapted from Marr, Mohta and Spivey (1993).
Percentage Cumulative Abnormal Returns
(CAR) over Test Period
Sample
size
t-60, t t-1, t t+1, t+20 t-60, t+20
Cross-border
targets
90 39.01% 11.82% 6.04% 45.05%
Domestic US
Targets
87 34.02% 6.27% 0.24% 34.26%
Z-score of
difference in CAR 
1.27 2.44 2.75 2.33
Marr et al. also looked at the characteristics of companies taken over by foreign
firms as compared to (a sample of 363) companies not taken over. The main findings
of the authors was that "...foreign firms take over US firms whose operations are
related to their own and US firms with low market-to-book values". (p. 293).
Pettway, Sicherman, and Spiess (1993) analysed acquisitions of US companies
by Japanese firms. The time period covered was October 1981 to September 1991,
although the majority of transactions took place during 1988 and 1989. Their sample
of complete mergers was relatively small, consisting of 10 US targets and 16
Japanese bidders91.
Abnormal returns were calculated using the market model with parameters
estimated over days t-201 to t-22. For the US targets, while the two-day abnormal
returns was +37.00%, the CAR over the total event window (t-21 to t+20 days) was
substantially higher, at +57.62%, significant at the 99% leve1 92 . These abnormal
return estimates are very high, and higher than what has generally been found in
domestic US studies, although Pettway et al. did not include an analysis of domestic
takeovers.
Another interesting finding in the Pettway et al. study, was the substantial gains
observed for the bidding companies. Over the 42 day event window, Japanese
bidders gained +6.91%, significant at the 85% level.
Pettway et al. carried out cross-sectional analysis in an attempt to explain the
cumulative abnormal returns to US targets and Japanese bidders. They found that
"wealth gains to Japanese buyers in mergers are higher when the medium of
exchange is all cash and larger when the firm diversifies. The gains to U.S. sellers are
less positive when the buyer is large relative to the seller...". (p. 92). However, none
of these variations were statistically significant. Indeed, as Pettway et al.
acknowledged, "...the cross-sectional models employed ... do not have much
explanatory power". (p. 89).
91 Pettway et a/. also analysed 37 Japanese bidders and 30 US targets in unit transactions (whereby a part,
rather than the whole US company, was acquired). A review of such transactions is outwith the scope of
this thesis. It may be worth noting, however, (particularly in light of Kang (1993) discussed below) that both
bidders and targets gained significantly less in such transactions than in complete mergers. In the unit
transactions, mean CAR was -1.24% for Japanese bidders, and +13.25% for US targets.
92 The large difference in the total event widow CAR and the two-day abnormal return highlights the danger
of analysing takeover effects over short event windows, as applied in e.g., Doukas and Traylos (1988) and
Biswas (1990).
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As did Pettway eta!., Kang (1993) studied acquisitions into the US by Japanese
companies. His sample, for the 1975-1988 period, consisted of 119 Japanese bidders
and 102 US targets. However, for only 30 Japanese bidders and 21 US targets did
these transactions involve complete mergers (the remaining transactions included
partial sales (less than 50%), and acquisitions of subsidiaries). Rather disappointingly,
Kang did not provide separate results for the various categories of transactions.
For comparison purposes, Kang also studied 119 bidders and 102 targets in
domestic US acquisitions. These companies were matched to the companies engaged
in cross-border acquisitions. The matching criteria included whether or not it was a
full merger.
Kang applied the market model (estimated over days t-200 to t-21), and calculated
CAR over a number of different event windows. His overall conclusions were similar
to those reached by Pettway et at. (1993) that "Japanese mergers and acquisitions in
the U.S. create statistically significant gains for both Japanese bidders and U.S.
targets". (p. 345).
The three-day CAR (t-1, t+1) for Japanese bidders amounted to +0.51%,
significant at the 90% level. US bidders in domestic transactions, on the other hand,
lost an insignificant -0.10%. The difference in performance was significant at the 95%
level.
Over the three-day event period, US targets gained +9.42% in cross-border
transactions and +7.01% in domestic deals, thus indicating a positive cross-border
effect. However, when calculating abnormal returns over a longer event window (t-20,
t+20), the situation reversed, with target companies receiving a marginally higher CAR
in domestic than in cross-border takeovers (+13.71% versus +12.41%). (All the target
CAR estimates are significant at the 99% level). Kang concluded that "...shareholders
of U.S. targets of Japanese bidders do not earn higher abnormal returns than those
of targets in the control sample". (p. 367).
Kang carried out further analysis for a subsample of "...68 matched nonfinancial
bidder and target pairs". (p. 349). His main findings were: "...returns to Japanese
bidders and the portfolio of Japanese bidders and U.S. targets increase with the
bidder's leverage, the bidder's ties to financial institutions through borrowings, and the
depreciation of the dollar in relation to the Japanese yen". (p. 345).
Manzon, Sharp, and Traylos published a paper in 1994 based on the same data
as used by Doukas and Tra ylos (1988). In this paper, however, the aim was to look
specifically at "...the effect of tax factors on the equity values of U.S. multinational
corporations making foreign acquisitions". (p. 1893). The sample is restricted to 103
acquisitions made by 76 US firms for which data was available on the amount of
foreign income and foreign tax, as well as the total value of the takeover.
Manzon et at. argued that "abnormal stock returns are found to be related to a tax
variable that captures differences in the international tax status of acquiring firms but
not related to a naive tax variable that captures differences between tax rates in target
countries and the United States". (p. 1893). More specifically, "an acquisition that
enhances a firms' ability to repatriate funds to the United States results in a favorable
market reaction, while one that is likely to result in income that will trigger additional
U.S. taxes upon repatriation results in an unfavorable market reaction". (p. 1903).
Markides and Ittner (1994) analysed the gains and losses to 276 US companies
which acquired companies abroad during the 1975-1988 period. The study applied
the market model, with parameters estimated over days t-270 to t-90. Abnormal
returns were calculated over a very narrow event window (days t-1, t), although
Markides and Inner argued that "...our results do not change significantly when a
broader window is used". (p. 350).
Overall, Markides and Ittner found the US bidders to have gained from the
transactions: the two-day CAR was +0.32%, significant at the 90% level. However,
this average masked an important distinction between acquisitions of firms within or
outwith the bidders line of business: "...the two-day abnormal return for related
acquisitions is .55%... By contrast, the corresponding abnormal return for unrelated
acquisitions is -.87%...". (p. 355). Both values were statistically significant.
In the cross-sectional analysis, several other variables were found to be
significant. Markides and Ittner established that US bidders performed better when
their industry (and that of the target) was highly concentrated and had a high
advertising intensity. Somewhat contradictory to the findings of Fatemi and Furtado
(1988) and Doukas and Tra ylos (1988), it was also found that bidders gained more if
they already had international experience. Large bidders (as measured by turnover)
and bidders acquiring large targets (in relation to their own size) performed better than
other bidders. Finally, bidders gained more when the dollar was strong relative to the
currency of the target company. Contrary to their expectations, the R&D intensity and
the tax system were not found to have a significant impact on the abnormal returns to
US bidders engaged in cross-border acquisitions.
Lin, Madura and Picou (1994) analysed the abnormal returns to US bidders from
cross-border acquisitions announced during 1980 to 1989. Using the market model
with parameters estimated over days t-220 to t-21, their sample consisted of 119
successful takeover bids. However, rather surprisingly, no average abnormal return
is reported for this sample. Rather, their analysis is split into two distinct sections;
firstly, the abnormal returns associated with acquisitions into specific countries, and
secondly, the impact of the Single European Act for acquisitions into the EEC.
Looking firstly at national variations, it is established that the acquisition of 18
German companies resulted in a mean pre-bid (t-20 to t-2 days) CAR of +2.39%, while
the two-day event period CAR (t-1, t) was +1.27%, significant at the 95% level. The
paper also reported results for acquisitions of 44 UK and 27 Canadian companies.
However, this section of the paper suffers from numerous errors, which complicates
interpretation of the results93.
With regard to the acquisitions into the UK, these were associated with a large
(but statistically insignificant) negative pre-bid CAR of -1.87%. However, confusion
also surrounds the bid announcement abnormal returns94.
Turning to the analysis of the Single European Act, the authors split the 92
acquisitions for EEC companies into those announced prior to 1 January 1986 and
those announced after. They established that, while the average event-period CAR
was insignificantly positive for bids prior to 1986, they were significantly negative (at
-0.86%, significant at the 90% level) for bids announced between 1986 and 1989.
However, once two more variables were included in the analysis, the method of
payment and whether or not the acquirer had prior experience in the country of the
target, none of the explanatory variables were found to be significant.
Dewenter (1995a) analysed the abnormal returns to US targets in cross-border
and domestic acquisitions over the 1975-1989 period. The analysis was restricted to
the chemical industry (81 domestic and 35 cross-border acquisitions), and the retail
sector (213 domestic and 55 cross-border transactions). While such a categorisation
(based on SIC codes) may have some merit, there are potential problems in
classifying companies into discrete industries, particularly for diversified companies.
Dewenter applied the market model (with parameters estimated over days t-270
to t-21), and calculated cumulative abnormal returns over days t-20 to t+10. The mean
CAR for the US targets in the chemicals industry was +23.5% with domestic bidders
93 Firstly, the pre-bid event period is reported in their table 2 to extend from t-30, rather than from t-20, as
reported in the text. This is presumably simply a typographical error. Secondly, there appear to be errors
regarding the signs of the abnormal returns and the associated t-statistics. For example, for acquisitions
into Canada, the average pre-bid CAR is reported as a negative -0.54%, but with a positive t-statistic of
+0.29. Presumably both numbers should have the same sign, and it is unclear whether the abnormal return
was really positive or negative. What is clear, however, is that acquisitions of Canadian companies were
associated with an average two-day CAR of -0.25%, statistically insignificant.
94 The AR for t-1 is reported as a positive 0.5%, but with a negative t-statistic of -1.70, significant at the 90%
level. As the t=0 CAR was +0.05% and the two-day CAR -0.45%, it appears that the t-1 AR was negative,
rather than positive as reported. However, not only the table, but also the text suggests that the t-1
abnormal return was positive: "Acquisitions of U.K. companies are associated with significant positive
abnormal returns on day -1". (pp. 68-69).
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and +21.3% with foreign bidders. There was thus an insignificant negative cross-
border effect of 2.2 percentage points. In the retail sector, however, the cross-border
effect was positive, although still insignificant, with cross-border acquisitions resulting
in a CAR of +22.2%, while domestic acquisitions were associated with a +20.6% CAR.
Dewenter concluded that "a comparison of unconditional mean takeover premia levels
indicates that for these two industries, shareholder wealth gains are not statistically
higher when the buyer is foreign". (p. 430).
In a further analysis of her results, Dewenter (1995a) tested whether target
company returns were influenced by changes in the US tax laws during the period of
study. She concluded that "...the results confirm prior work that shows the U.S. tax
regime changes in the 1980s provide no explanatory power for the difference between
domestic and foreign takeover premia levels". (p. 439). These findings may appear
to contradict those of Servaes and Zenner (1990), discussed above, who studied the
impact of the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act and the 1986 Tax Reform Act on the
abnormal returns to US targets in cross-border acquisitions. They concluded that
these tax changes appeared to have had a "...significant impact on the returns of
domestic firms subject to foreign acquisitions". (Servaes and Zenner, 1990, p. 11). It
should be remembered, however, that Servaes and Zenner did not analyse domestic
acquisitions, and could thus not comment on the impact of these changes on the size
of any cross-border effect.
While Dewenter did not find the US tax system to be of importance, in her cross-
sectional analysis she did establish that certain cross-border effects were present,
once various bid characteristics were controlled for. "Foreign investors do appear to
pay more in hostile transactions, and less with rival bidders...". (p. 439). It was also
suggested that foreign bidders pay less than domestic bidders in equity financed
transactions, although this was difficult to test statistically, due to the small number of
share financed cross-border acquisitions. Thus, while Dewenter failed to establish the
presence of a significant cross-border effect at the overall level, she found that "...the
sensitivity of takeover premia to standard transaction characteristics does appear to
vary with buyer nationality". (p. 439).
In a different paper, Dewenter (1995b) analysed the effect of exchange rates on
the flow of FDI into the US. The paper, however, also included an analysis of the CAR
to 603 US companies acquired in cross-border acquisitions 95. The average 31-day
(t-20, t+10) CAR amounted to +22.8%, similar to that observed for the chemical and
retail sectors, as discussed in the 1995a paper. Cross-sectional analysis revealed that
target company abnormal returns were significantly higher in full (as compared to
partial) acquisitions, in hostile (versus friendly) bids, and where there was no equity
element to the offer. Target company shareholders also gained marginally more in
competitive bids, although this variable was not statistically significant.
Eun, Kolodny, and Scheraga (1995) analysed the gains and losses to both bidding
and target company shareholders in cross-border acquisitions into the US over the
1979-1990 period. Abnormal returns were calculated using the mean-adjusted return
technique. This model, which assumes that the mean historical share return is a good
prediction of future share return, is rather unusual, as it fails to allow for general
movement in the stock market index.
For a sample of 213 US targets, Eun et al. calculated the mean cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) over the period from 5 days prior to the first offer to 5 days
after the last, successful, offer, to be +37.02%. The average CAR for the 117 foreign
bidders, was -1.2%. However, this average masked large national variations, with
Japanese bidders on average gaining a significant +3.62%, while British bidders on
average lost a significant -4.28%.
95 The sample of 603 US targets included the 90 analysed in the 1995a paper. The 1995b paper applied the
same event study methodology, but did not include a comparison to US target companies in domestic US
acquisitions.
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Eun et al. also analysed the combined wealth effects for bidders and targets for
a total of 103 transactions for which data was available. They found that "the
combined average wealth gain is $68.18 million...". However, once again there were
large national variations. Indeed, in value terms, British bidders lost more than US
targets gained, leading to an average combined wealth reduction of -$28.36 million.
On the other hand, Japanese acquisitions on average resulted in a joint gain of
+$398.49 million. The overall loss established for UK acquisitions into the US is
contrary to the findings of Feils (1993), who established that such acquisitions on
average resulted in an overall increase in wealth of +5.19%.
Eun et al. found that bidding companies performed better if the target company
had spent a large proportion of their sales on research and development (R&D).
Indeed, the results "...suggest that the country effect may be a proxy for the target's
R&D intensity". (pp. 18-19). In an attempt to explain these results, Eun et al. refer to
work by Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989, 1991), Servaes (1991) and Doukas (1995b),
who "...suggest that a firm's R&D/sales ratio may indicate not only the firm's R&D
intensity but also the quality of management...". (p. 16). Eun et al. goes on to argue
that,
"...well-managed (high R&D/sales) Japanese firms are likely to face positive
investment opportunities and, as a result, their decision to acquire U.S.
targets with above average R&D would be viewed positively by the stock
market. In contrast, poorly managed (low R&D/sales) British firms, which
tend to acquire less R&D intensive targets, are likely to face limited
investment opportunities, and thus have a greater proclivity to undertake
negative NPV projects. ... This interpretation of our empirical findings
suggests that in order to create synergy gains from cross-border
acquisitions, acquirers must possess the skills necessary to effectively
redeploy the targets' intangible assets toward higher-valued uses". (pp. 16-
17).
There are a number of problems with this interpretation of their results.
Firstly, there is a difficulty with the definition of "quality of management", and the
alleged relationship between R&D/sales and managerial quality. Eun et al. claim that
e.g., Lang et al. (1989, 1991), Servaes (1991) and Doukas (1995b) had suggested
such a link. This appears to be at best a misinterpretation of these papers, which all
look at the impact of Tobin's q on takeover-related returns to shareholders. None of
these papers even mentions the words research or development. It is far from clear
that R&D can be taken as a surrogate for q, at least not without any explanation.
Secondly, these papers do not test whether q is related to managerial
performance, nor do they define managerial performance. Rather, such a relationship
is put forward as a proposition. For example, Servaes (1991) wrote that "if q is
interpreted as a measure of managerial performance...". (p. 409), while Doukas
(1995b) argued that "if Tobin's q is used to separate firms into value maximizers (i.e.,
well-managed firms) and overinvestors (i.e., poorly-managed firms) the results indicate
that bidder abnormal returns are substantially higher for value maximizing firms than
for overinvesting firms". (p. 14).
Thirdly, the above quote by Eun et al. implies that not only the level of target R&D,
but also the level of bidder R&D to be an important factor influencing the level of
abnormal returns. However, contrary to this, their regressions (table 6) indicates that
the level of acquirer R&D is marginally and insignificantly negatively correlated with the
overall wealth gains from the acquisition.
A further problem is that the level of R&D expenditure may vary widely between
industries. If one is attempting to evaluate managerial performance based on
R&D/sales, one would expect an adjustment for industry averages. (Such an
adjustment was made by Servaes (1991) when evaluating the impact of q ratios).
Consequently, while Eun et al. establishes an interesting relationship between
target company R&D and abnormal returns, the paper offers a rather questionable
explanation for these results.
Cheng and Chan (1995) analysed cross-border acquisitions into the US. They did
not include the foreign bidders in their study. Their justification for this was, rather
simplistically that,
"the limited availability of data on foreign bidders poses problems in
conducting in-depth analysis on the subject. Since data on US firms are
available, focusing on international takeovers of US target firms allows us
to examine indirectly the behaviour of international bidding firms". (p. 637).
Their sample consisted of 70 large (purchase price minimum $100 million) cross-
border acquisitions of US companies over the 1985-1990 period. 29(41.4%) of these
acquisitions were carried out by UK bidders.
Firstly, Cheng and Chan analysed the size of the percent takeover premium96.
It was established that the average premium was 45.2% in these cross-border
acquisitions. This compares to a premium of 39.7% for 1,789 domestic acquisitions
(as reported in Mergerstat Review). Thus, "...it seems that the premium paid in
international takeovers is a little higher than [that observed in domestic] US takeovers".
(p. 648).
Secondly, Cheng and Chan undertook a more common market model event study,
with parameters estimated over days t-240 to t-41. While the whole event window
stretched from t-40 to t+3, the majority of the analysis is based on the three-day period
from t-1 to t+1. "For the -1 to 1 interval, the ...[mean CARs] are 21.80% ... for the
whole sample and 20.16% ... for the UK sample. These results suggest that US
targets of UK takeover seem to receive smaller abnormal returns than US targets of
international takeovers do in general". (pp. 650-651).
Finally, Cheng and Chan compared the abnormal returns to US targets in cross-
border acquisitions to the gains encountered in 219 domestic US acquisitions. While
the average CAR to US targets in cross-border acquisitions was +21.8%, the average
96	 The takeover premium was defined as the price paid for the target less the share price five days prior to the
bid announcement, divided by the same pre-bid value.
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gain was only +12.7% in the domestic acquisitions. There was thus some indication
of quite a sizeable cross-border effect. However, Cheng and Chan did not advocate
such an explanation. They "...believe that the higher abnormal returns received by US
targets in international takeovers are not necessarily due to overpayment ... by
international bidders. In fact, it is probably due to the type of takeovers and other
determinants (like payment methods) that result in a higher abnormal return in the
international sample". (p. 652).
It should be noted, however, that the analysis in this part of Cheng and Chan's
paper is rather weak. Firstly, while the cross-border takeovers took place during the
1985-1990 period, the sample of domestic acquisitions related to the period 1981 to
1987. No explanation was given as to why the two samples did not cover the same
time periods. A straight comparison may therefore be problematic.
Secondly, Cheng and Chan argued that the type of takeover may have been of
importance, "as mergers normally receive lower takeover premiums...". (p. 652). More
of the cross-border transactions (66.2%) than the domestic transactions (48.6%) were
mergers. Consequently, if returns are predicted to be lower in mergers than in other
types of takeovers, one would expect the cross-border sample to display a lower CAR
than the domestic sample. As Cheng and Chan appears to have had data on the type
of transaction, they could have tested for the significance of this variable by applying
cross-sectional analysis.
Waheed and Mathur (1995) analysed the wealth effects of international expansion
by US banks undertaken during the 1963 to 1989 period. Waheed and Mathur applied
the market model but, as did Conn and Connell (1990) and Connell and Conn (1993),
estimated the parameters over periods both prior to and after the bid
announcement97.
97 The results reported are based on an estimation period from t-170 to t-21 and t+21 to t+170. "Other
estimation periods of t=-150 to t=-30 and t=30 to t=150, and t=-100 to t=-21 and t=21 to t=100 were also
used with similar results being obtained'. (p. 834).
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The average two-day (t-1, t) cumulative abnormal returns associated with the 259
announcements of foreign expansion was -0.21%. This sample, however, included not
only acquisitions, but also establishment of representative offices, branches, joint
ventures and subsidiaries. Looking specifically at the 80 cross-border acquisitions, the
US banks, on average, encountered a negative CAR of -0.51%, significant at the 99%
level. Waheed and Mathur concluded that the "...results suggests that the costs and
risks associated with foreign expansion outweigh the diversification benefits expected
from foreign expansion". (p. 840).
Datta and Puia (1995) analysed the abnormal returns to shareholders of 112 US
companies which acquired companies abroad during the 1978 to 1990 period. Datta
and Puia applied the market model, with parameters estimated over days t-180, t-31.
They calculated abnormal returns over several event windows, ranging from a short
two day (t-1, t) to a 'long' 61 day window (t-30, t+30). Their reasoning for applying
several event windows related to the degree of market efficiency, and argued that,
"the two-day window ... is used to identify the immediate market reaction to
the acquisition announcement, based on the assumption that all relevant
information regarding the acquisition becomes public on the day of the
announcement and the market adjusts fully to that information. However,
arguments have been made that markets are not always capable of
predicting the full consequences of the acquisition immediately upon
learning of it... Hence in addition to the narrow window ... this study
employed a number of longer time periods..., on the assumption that they
provide more realistic pictures of wealth effects in cross-border acquisitions"
(p. 347).
Datta and Puia established that cross-border acquisitions, on average, resulted
in statistically significant negative abnormal returns to the US bidding companies (CAR
of -0.42% and -2.54% for the short and long event window, respectively).
The research also included an analysis of the difference in abnormal returns in
related and unrelated acquisitions. In related acquisitions (classified according to the
existing operations of the target and bidding companies), the abnormal losses were
small and insignificant, with the cumulative abnormal return over the period from t-30
to t+30 days amounting to -1.01%. However, unrelated acquisitions resulted in large,
significantly negative abnormal returns (-9.10%). The difference in abnormal returns
was significant at the 99% level for the long event windows.
A further variable analysed by Datta and Puia (1995), was the effect of 'cultural
distance' between the US and the country of the target company. The cultural
distance was classified according to "...four cultural dimensions... [These] are power
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individuality, and masculinity/femininity". (p. 344).
Using this classification process, acquisitions into the UK, Canada and Australia98
were considered to be in the low cultural distance group, while all other countries fell
into the high cultural distance group. (p. 348).
The results revealed that cumulative abnormal returns in acquisitions belonging
to the high cultural distance group were significantly negative (-5.85% over t-30, t+30)),
while there were no significant abnormal returns in acquisitions of companies in the
low cultural distance group (-0.39%). Datta and Puia (1995) concluded that their
findings "...lends credence to the theory that cultural fit plays an important role in
cross-border acquisitions" (p. 354), and that acquisitions of target companies based
in countries significantly different from the country of the bidding company result in
significant losses to bidding company shareholders.
4.4.	 Conclusion 
This chapter contains a discussion of previous literature on cross-border
acquisitions, with particular emphasis on the level of abnormal returns to target and
98 From this classification, it appear that cultural distance is associated with language, as all English speaking
countries were classified as having low cultural distance from the US, while all non-English speaking
countries were considered to belong to the high cultural distance group.
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bidding company shareholders, as well as a discussion of the extent to which these
abnormal returns are different from those observed in domestic acquisitions.
A summary of the overall findings is provided at the start of this chapter (see
Tables 4.1 and 4.2). However, due to the different methods applied in the different
studies, comparisons should be undertaken with care. As indicated in Table 4.1,
substantial controversy surrounds the issue of whether shareholders of bidding
companies gain or lose from cross-border acquisitions, with almost an equal number
of studies indicating gains as there are studies indicating losses.
With regard to target company shareholders, all studies indicate that these gain
significantly at the time of the bid announcement. While most studies suggest that
returns to target company shareholders are higher in cross-border than in domestic
acquisitions, the target company cross-border effect is frequently not significant.
Overall, the results, predominately based on the US market, suggest that target
company shareholders gain significantly from cross-border acquisitions (and generally
gain more than what is observed for target company shareholders in domestic
acquisitions), while the returns to bidding company shareholders are more varied.
These results are, however, based on the overall, mean, findings. In addition, several
of the papers highlighted the importance of controlling for various bid characteristics.
The main variables controlled for are discussed below.
Variations were found with regard to the nationality of the cross-border bidders by
Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Conn and Connell (1990), Cakici eta!. (1991 and 1996),
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Sudia (1992), Feils (1993), Eun et al. (1995), and
Cheng and Chan (1995). Other studies, such as Lin et al. (1994) found abnormal
returns to vary according to the nationality of the target companies99.
Several studies, such as Wansley, eta!. (1983), Tessema (1985), Biswas (1990),
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Cebenoyan et al. (1992), Feils (1993), Swenson
99 Several other studies have analysed the impact of the location of the target companies, although these
studies, such as Doukas and Travlos (1988), have tended to focus on the level of economic development
of the countries were the target companies were located.
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(1993), Pettway at al. (1993), and Dewenter (1995a and 1995b) also controlled for
method of payment, and returns to both bidders and targets are generally found to be
higher in cash than in share exchange transactions. This is consistent with what has
been found in domestic studies, e.g., Asquith (1993). However, Doukas and Traylos
(1988), Morck and Yeung (1992), and Lin et al. (1994) did not find method of payment
to have a significant impact on abnormal returns to US cross-border bidders.
Target company shareholders were also found by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991),
Cebenoyan eta!. (1992), Fells (1993), Song (1993), Swenson (1993), and marginally
by Dewenter (1995a and 1995b) to have gained more when the bid was competitive,_
while bidders performed worse in competitive bids (Cakici et al. (1996)).
Shaked at al. (1991), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Cebenoyan at al. (1992),
Markides and Ittner (1994), and Dewenter (1995a), controlled for industry sectors, and
found this variable to be of some importance. It should be noted, however, that
industry sectors are difficult to define, particularly for highly diversified companies.
A further variable included in some papers, was the relative size of the bidding
and target companies. Both Fells (1993) and Markides and Ittner (1994) found bidders
to perform better when acquiring large targets (relative to their own size), although
Cakici et al. (1996) did not find this variable to be of importance. Pettway et al. (1993)
found small targets to receive a higher premium than large targets.
Moving on to the more controversial variables, Servaes and Zenner (1990), Cakici
et al. (1991), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Swenson (1993), Kang (1993), Mathur
at al. (1994), Markides and Ittner (1994) and Doukas (1995b) all controlled for the
strength of the currency. The general finding was that returns to bidders is influenced
by the strength of the dollar (bidders gain more when their currency is strong).
However, Cebenoyan et al. (1992), Fells (1993), and Cakici et a/. (1996), who also
analysed this variable, did not find that the strength of the currency added anything of
significance to their analysis.
Another controversial issue, was the impact caused by changes in the US tax laws
during the 1980s. Servaes and Zenner (1990), Manzon et al. (1994), Dewenter
(1995a), and Doukas (1995b) found some support for this variable. However, Harris
and Ravenscraft (1991) and Markides and Ittner (1994) did not find tax variables to be
of significance. Cakici et al. (1996) did find the tax variable to be significant, but to
have the opposite sign to what was expected.
Finally, Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Doukas and Tra ylos (1988), and Doukas
(1995a) argued that US bidders performed better when they entered new markets.
This, however, was contradicted by Lin et al. (1994), who did not find this variable to
be of significance. Somewhat related, Markides and Ittner (1994) found US bidders
to perform better if they already had international experience. Looking at cross-border
acquisitions into the US, Cakici et al. (1996) found abnormal returns not to be related
to overseas exposure, while Song (1993) argued that foreign bidders performed better
if they already had operations in the US.
4.5.	 Limitations of existing research and originality of this thesis 
The focus of this thesis (as explained in the Introduction) is on domestic and
cross-border acquisitions into the UK during the 1986-1991 period. During this time
period the UK witnessed a major takeover boom, with particularly high levels of cross-
border acquisitions. Indeed, in 1990, the value of cross-border acquisitions into the
UK exceeded the value of domestic UK acquisitions. This thesis contains an analysis
of the shareholder wealth effects (for both target and bidding company shareholders)
of both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, as well as an analysis of the
differences in the levels of abnormal returns associated with domestic and cross-
border transactions (known as cross-border effects).
As was indicated in the above literature review, there appears to be only two
previous studies which have looked specifically at cross-border acquisitions into the
UK. Both Conn and Connell (1990) and Feils (1993) established that US bidders, on
average, lost as a result of their cross-border acquisitions into the UK. However,
neither study included an analysis of acquisitions into the UK by companies based
outside the US. In addition, neither study made any comparison to bidding companies
engaged in domestic acquisitions, as is done in this study.
Conn and Connell (1990) and Feils (1993) found that UK targets gained
significantly from cross-border acquisitions, although possibly not very much (at least
in comparison to US targets). Neither study compared target company abnormal
returns in cross-border acquisitions to that observed in domestic UK takeovers. This
study aims to fill that gap.
It should also be noted that Conn and Connell (1990) based their analysis on the
1971-1980 period. Thus, Feils (1993) appears to be the only previous study having
looked at takeover into the UK during the cross-border takeover boom of the late
1980s. Feils, however, analysed abnormal returns over a short time frame (11 days).
As indicated previously (and discussed further in the results chapters in this thesis),
such an event window may not be sufficient for capturing all (or even the main part)
of the wealth effects associated with cross-border acquisitions.
Harris and Ravenscraft (1992) argued that "together the bidder and target
shareholder return studies indicate that foreign acquisitions appear to create more
value than purely domestic acquisitions. However, additional evidence is needed
including analyses containing share price data on both firms involved in each
takeover". (p. 177). This study provides such evidence, by analysing the level of
abnormal returns to bidding company shareholders (in cross-border and domestic
acquisitions), as well as the joint abnormal returns to target and bidding company
shareholders..
CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
5.1.	 Summary 
This chapter contains a discussion of the 21 hypotheses tested in the empirical
section of this thesis. These hypotheses relate to the level of abnormal returns to
target and bidding company shareholders in cross-border and domestic acquisitions,
as well as to the differences in the levels of abnormal returns in cross-border and
domestic acquisitions (cross-border effects). Hypotheses relating to the cross-
sectional analysis are also discussed. The variables analysed are bid outcome, the
existence of competition in the bid, revision of bid terms, method of payment, pre-bid
stake by bidding company in target, relative size of targets and bidding companies and
the size of the company analysed.
5.2.	 Introduction 
As stated in the introduction to this thesis, the overall objective of this research is
to ascertain the extent to which shareholders of bidding and target companies gained
or lost from domestic and cross-border acquisitions into the UK during the 1986-1991
period, and to establish the degree to which abnormal returns differed between
domestic and cross-border acquisitions. In addition, various bid characteristics are
analysed, in an attempt to explain some of the cross-sectional variation in abnormal
returns. This chapter contains an explanation of the hypotheses tested in this study.
5.3.	 Hypotheses 
5.3.1.	 Target Company Shareholders
As evident from the literature review, target company shareholders in both
domestic and cross-border acquisitions have generally been found to gain significantly
over the period surrounding a takeover bid. It is therefore expected that shareholders
of UK listed companies bid for by both domestic and foreign predators will have gained
significantly as a result of bid announcements in the UK during the 1986-1991 period.
Hypothesis 1 - Cross-Border Target Companies 
HoCT	 No abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of target
companies in cross-border acquisitions into the UK.
H iCT Significant abnormal returns (positive or negative) accrued to
shareholders of target companies in cross-border acquisitions
into the UK.
Hypothesis 2 - Domestic Target Companies 
HO OT	 No abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of target
companies in domestic UK acquisitions.
H i DT	 Significant abnormal returns (positive or negative) accrued to
shareholders of target companies in domestic UK acquisitions.
In the literature on cross-border acquisitions, most studies (predominately relating
to the US market) have indicated that target company shareholders obtain higher
abnormal returns in acquisitions where the bidder was based abroad than in
acquisitions where the bidder was incorporated in the same country as the target. As
discussed in the literature review, no previous research appears to have tested
whether a similar positive target company 'cross-border effect' has been present in the
UK.
Hypothesis 3 - Target Companies 'Cross-Border Effect' 
HoCT effect There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to UK
target company shareholders in domestic and cross-border
acquisitions.
H i CT effect There were significant differences in the level of abnormal
returns to UK target company shareholders in domestic and
cross-border acquisitions.
In addition to the distinction between domestic and cross-border acquisitions, the
nationality of the overseas bidder may also have an impact on returns to target
company shareholders. As discussed in the literature, Fatemi and Furtado (1988),
Conn and Connell (1990), Cakici et al. (1991 and 1996), Harris and Ravenscraft
(1991), Sudia (1992), Feils (1993), Eun et al. (1995), and Cheng and Chan (1995), all
studied the variations in abnormal returns associated with cross-border bidders from
various countries.
As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the main arguments put forward for cross-
border acquisitions, is market access. If so, one could hypothesise that bidding
companies based outside the EC were prepared to pay an additional premium in order
to gain access to the Community. Thus, it is hypothesised that UK target companies
gained superior abnormal returns in cross-border acquisitions from companies based
outside the EC compared to acquisitions from companies based in other EC member
countries.
Hypothesis 4- Cross-Border Tarriet Companies - Nationality of Bidders 
HoCT nat No differences in abnormal returns to shareholders of UK target
companies in cross-border acquisitions were associated with the
nationality of the overseas bidders.
H i CT nat Significant differences in abnormal returns to shareholders of UK
target companies in cross-border acquisitions were associated
with the nationality of the overseas bidders.
Previous research on domestic acquisitions has indicated that the share price of
target companies tends to rise several months prior to the official bid announcement
(e.g., Franks et al. (1977)). Possible explanations for such pre-bid share price
performance include takeover rumours, insider trading and stake building by the
bidding company. The extent to which the timing of the rise in target companies share
prices differs between domestic and cross-border acquisitions appears not to have
been considered in the existing literature.
It may be hypothesised that cross-border acquisitions will be more difficult for the
UK market to predict, thus proving more of a surprise than domestic acquisitions. On
the other hand, cross-border acquisitions may be more complex to execute than
national bids, thus requiring longer time for preparation. If so, there may be a greater
risk of information leaking to the market. It is uncertain which (if either) of these
effects is the most important.
Hypothesis 5- Timing of Target Company Bid Rumour 
HoT timing There were no differences between domestic and cross-border
acquisitions with regard to the length of time prior to the bid
announcement at which target company share price rise.
I-1 1 T timing The length of time prior to the bid announcement at which target
company share price rose differed between domestic and cross-
border acquisitions.
Overseas bidding companies may have more difficulty imposing strict managerial
control over any new subsidiary than will domestic firms, due to distance from their
head office (Davies (1995), p. 42). As a result, one might expect to observe overseas
bidders to pursue acquisitions of UK companies which have performed relatively well
over the period prior to the bid lw. On the other hand, if there is a general hostility
towards foreign bidders, cross-border bidders may expect to face less opposition with
acquisitions of poorly performing target companies.
Hypothesis 6 - Pre-Bid Performance of Targets 
HoT pre-bid There were no differences in pre-bid performance between
target companies in domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
Hi T pre-bid There were significant differences (positive or negative) in the
pre-bid performance of target companies in domestic and cross-
border acquisitions.
100	 In this study, the pre-bid performance has been measured in terms of abnormal returns, cumulated from
eight months prior to the month of the bid announcement.
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5.3.2.	 Bidding Company Shareholders
As indicated in the literature review, controversy still surrounds the issue of
whether or not bidding company shareholders gain or lose from takeover activity. In
a perfectly competitive market for corporate control, all gains from a business
combination should accrue to target company shareholders. A high bid premium
should reflect expected synergies from the merger, rather than being a result of
overpayment. As a consequence, one would expect neither domestic nor overseas
bidders to encounter abnormal returns, regardless of any differences in average bid
premium offered by domestic and foreign bidders.
Other theories have, however, been suggested. According to Roll's Hubris
Hypothesis (Roll, 1986), successful bidders will tend to have overpaid. If so, one
would expect bidding companies to earn negative abnormal returns, particularly during
the period following the bid announcement.
With regard to cross-border acquisitions, Conn and Connell (1990) argued that the
UK market for corporate control was relatively inefficient compared to that of the
usiol. Although such an argument is questionable (as discussed in Chapter 4), if
level of efficiency in takeover markets is of importance, abnormal returns to bidders
could well be different in domestic and cross-border acquisitions, as well as for bidders
based in different countries. Conn and Connell argued that "...returns to foreign
bidders should be relatively high if the market for corporate control is relatively
inefficient in the UK and international capital markets are integrated". (p. 691).
101 Conn and Connell (1990) argued that security regulation in the US "...facilitate the flow of information
regarding mergers and hence encourage competitive bids". (p. 691). In addition, they argued that "...agency
costs appear to be significantly higher in UK firms due to the structure and remuneration arrangements of
boards of directors" (p. 691), with fewer non-executive directors and less reliance on share options than in
the US.
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Hypothesis 7- Cross-Border Bidding Companies 
HocB	 No abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of overseas
bidding companies in cross-border acquisitions into the UK.
H iCB Significant abnormal returns (positive or negative) accrued to
shareholders of overseas bidding companies in cross-border
acquisitions into the UK.
Hypothesis 8 - Nationality of Cross-Border Bidding Companies 
HoCB nat No differences in abnormal returns to overseas bidding
companies in cross-border acquisitions into the UK were
associated with the nationality of the bidder.
H i cB flat Significant differences in abnormal returns to overseas bidding
companies in cross-border acquisitions into the UK were
associated with the nationality of the bidder.
Hypothesis 9- Domestic Bidding Companies 
HoDB	 No abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of bidding
companies in domestic UK acquisitions.
1-1 1 DB	 Significant abnormal returns (positive or negative) accrued to
shareholders of bidding companies in domestic UK acquisitions.
Hypothesis 10 - Bidding Companies 'Cross-Border Effect'
HoCB effect No differences in abnormal returns to overseas and UK bidding
companies in cross-border and domestic acquisitions were
present.
H i CB effect Abnormal returns to overseas bidding companies in cross-border
acquisitions and UK bidding companies in domestic acquisitions
were significantly different.
5.3.3.	 Joint Abnormal Returns
With regard to takeovers in the UK, Limmack (1991) presented evidence that
acquisitions created value, but that the gain to target company shareholders exceeded
the total joint saving. Firth (1980), however, argued that acquisitions were overall
reducing shareholder wealth.
Previous research has indicated that target companies gain more from cross-
border than from domestic acquisitions. In addition, as discussed in the literature
review, there are some suggestions that US acquirors perform better than UK bidders.
As US predators constituted a large proportion of the cross-border acquisitions into the
UK (as discussed in Chapter 6), it may be hypothesised that the joint abnormal returns
to pairs of target and bidding company shareholders was higher in cross-border than
in domestic UK acquisitions.
Hypothesis 11 - Cross-Border Acquisitions 
Hoc No joint abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of overseas
bidding and domestic UK target companies in cross-border
acquisitions into the UK.
H i c Significant joint abnormal returns (positive or negative) accrued
to shareholders of overseas bidding and domestic UK target
companies in cross-border acquisitions into the UK.
Hypothesis 12 - Nationality of Bidder in Cross-Border Acquisitions 
HoC nat No differences in joint abnormal returns to shareholders of
overseas bidding and domestic UK target companies in cross-
border acquisitions into the UK were associated with the
nationality of the overseas bidder.
H iC nat Significant differences in joint abnormal returns to shareholders
of overseas bidding and domestic UK target companies in cross-
border acquisitions into the UK were associated with the
nationality of the overseas bidder.
Hypothesis 13 - Domestic Acquisitions 
Ho p	No joint abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of bidding
and target companies in domestic acquisitions into the UK.
HI D Significant joint abnormal returns (positive or negative) accrued
to shareholders of bidding and target companies in domestic
acquisitions into the UK.
Hypothesis 14 - Total Joint 'Cross-Border Effect'
Hoc effect No differences in joint abnormal returns to pairs of target and
bidding companies were observed between domestic and cross-
border acquisitions.
HI P effect Abnormal returns to pairs of target and bidding companies were
significantly different in domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
5.3.4.	 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Abnormal Returns
As evident from the literature review in Chapters 3 and 4, several studies have
suggested the level of abnormal returns to target and/or bidding company shareholders
is dependent not only on the nationality of the bidding company, but also on the
characteristics of the bid itself. The specific bid characteristics analysed in this study
are: whether or not the bid was successful; whether or not the bid was competitive;
whether or not the terms of the offer were revised; the method of payment offered;
whether or not a stake was held in the target by the bidder prior to launching the offer;
the relative size of the targets and bidders; as well as the size (the market value of the
target, the bidder or the joint market values) of the companies in question. These
variables are discussed further below'.
102	 As evident from the literature review, a number of other explanatory variables have been included in cross-
sectional analyses. Of particular relevance to cross-border acquisitions, may be level of previous
international experience, and the effect of exchange rate changes. Doukas and Travlos (1988) and Fatemi
and Furtado (1988) argued that bidding companies performed better from acquisitions into new markets.
An interesting aspect to study would also have been the importance of previous international acquisition
experience. However, the data which would have been required for such an analysis was not readily
available. While Servaes and Zenner (1990), Cakici et a/. (1991), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Swenson
(1993), Kang (1993), Mathur et al. (1994), Markides and lttner (1994), and Doukas (1995a) all found the
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a) Bid Outcome
Several papers analysed in the literature review (such as Franks et al. (1977),
Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Mathur et al. (1989), Lin et al. (1994) and Cakici et al.
(1996) have restricted their analysis to completed acquisitions, and have thus not
analysed the impact of bid outcome.
Limmack (1991) found that bidding companies performed significantly worse in
failed takeovers than in successful ones. Similar observations have been made in
other studies, such as Asquith (1983). In their review article of mergers and
acquisitions in the US, Jensen and Ruback (1983) also found bidding companies
generally to have performed better in successful than in failed offers. In a study of US
bidding companies, De et al. (1996) found bid outcome not to have had a significant
impact on the level of abnormal returns in single bidder offers, but to have been of
importance in competitive bids.
'While bidders in multiple-bid contests experience negative returns during
the announcement period of a successful bid, we find that they earn positive
returns if the bid is unsuccessful... In single-bid contests, however, both
successful and unsuccessful bidders earn similar statistically insignificant
positive returns. Taken together, our results underscore that success in
competitive acquisitions is costly to shareholders of the acquiring firms". (p.
262).
Competitive bids are discussed further below.
With regard to target company shareholders, Jensen and Ruback (1983) found
abnormal returns to targets in failed acquisitions to have been at least as high as that
of successful acquisitions during the bid period, although target company shareholders
experienced negative abnormal returns on the announcement of the unsuccessful bid
strength of the currency to be of some importance, Cebenoyan et a/. (1992), Feils (1993), and Cakici et a/.
(1996) did not find the variable to help explain cross-sectional variations in abnormal returns. As discussed
in section 2.4.3, any classification based on the strength of the currency is fraught with difficulty.
Consequently, an analysis of the exchange rate has not been included in the cross-sectional analysis in this
study.
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outcome.
In this study, the effect of bid outcome on the level of abnormal returns to target
and bidding company shareholders in cross-border and domestic acquisitions, as well
as on the level of any 'cross-border effect' is analysed.
Hypothesis 15 - Bid Outcome 
Ho outcome There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) in successful and failed
acquisitions.
H 1 outcome Abnormal returns were significantly different to companies
(target, bidding and joint) in successful and failed acquisitions.
b) Competition in Bid
Studies such as Bradley at al. (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Fowler
and Smidt (1989), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and De et al. (1996), have found
competitive bids to have had a negative impact on the level of abnormal returns to
bidding company shareholders. However, Franks et a/. (1989) argued that US
"...bidders pay more for targets that are contested (multiple bidders) ... but that bidders
do not experience significant negative announcement returns as a consequence". (p.
92). Similar results were obtained for the UK by Franks and Harris (1989) and
Limmack (1993).
Studies such as Michel and Shaked (1986), Stulz eta!. (1990), and Kaplan and
Weisbach (1992) for domestic acquisitions, and Song (1993) and Swenson (1993) for
cross-border acquisitions, found US targets to have gained substantially more in
competitive than in single bidder takeovers contests. Dewenter (1995a and 1995b)
found target company shareholders to have gained marginally more in competitive
bids, although not significantly so. In addition, Dewenter (1995a) also argued that
"foreign investors appear to pay ... less [than domestic bidders] with competitive
bidders". (p. 439).
Hypothesis 16 - Competition in Bid
Ho competitive There were no differences in the level of abnormal
returns to companies (target, bidding and joint) in single
bidder and multiple bidder (competitive) acquisitions.
H 1 competitive Abnormal returns were significantly different to
companies (target, bidding and joint) in single bidder and
multiple bidder (competitive) acquisitions.
c) Revision of Bid Terms
De eta!. (1996) analysed the impact of bid revision on the abnormal returns to US
bidding companies, and found revision of bid terms, even in single bidder offers, to
have had a negative impact on the performance of the bidders. They argued that
"such revision of bids may stem from potential competition. If so, our results imply that
both potential competition and actual competition have a negative impact on bidder
returns". (p. 262).
Limmack (1993) also found bidding company shareholders to have lost in bids
where the offer had to be increased due to resistance from target company
shareholders (although the level of cumulative abnormal returns were not significantly
different from those observed in uncontested offers). Limmack, however, also found
bid revision to have had little impact on the abnormal returns to target company
shareholders. De et al. noted that the mean CAR (from the month of the bid
announcement to the month of the bid outcome) in revised bids of +39.17% was only
0.89 percentage points higher than in uncontested bids, and was 26.05 percentage
points lower than in competitive bids. Thus, while De at al. (1996) argued that
competitive and revised bids had similar negative impact on bidding companies
abnormal returns, the two categories of bids appear to have had widely different
impact on the fortunes of target company shareholders.
Hypothesis 17- Revision of Bid Terms 
H0 revision There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) in revised and unrevised
offers.
H 1
 revision Abnormal returns were significantly different to companies
(target, bidding and joint) in revised and unrevised offers.
d) Method of Payment
Myers and Majluf (1984) argued that bidders tend to offer equity when managers
consider the shares of their company to be overvalued, and cash when the shares are
believed to be undervalued. As argued by Amihud eta!., however, "...investors expect
this and will, therefore, drive down the value of firms that issue new equity. Cash
(debt) financing of acquisitions will, therefore, be preferred unless its cost to insiders
is excessive". (Amihud eta!. (1990), p. 606).
A similar argument to that of Myers and Majluf (1984) was put forward by Hansen
(1987), who developed a model to explain why a bidder may chose to offer cash
(rather than offer an exchange of shares). His model was based on bargaining under
asymmetric information.
'When a target firm knows its value better than a potential acquirer, the
acquirer will prefer to offer stock, which has desirable contingent-pricing
characteristics, rather than cash". (Hansen (1987), p. 75).
Hansen further argued that,
"allowing the acquiring company to have proprietary information on its own
value sets up a double lemons problem... Recognizing the adverse
selection, the target must reduce further its estimate of the value of the
acquirer's stock. ...An equilibrium can develop whereby the acquirer offers
stock under some conditions (when it is "overvalued") and offer cash under
other conditions (when it is "undervalued")". (pp. 76-77).
Following Hanson's theory, one would expect the market to interpret cash offers as
signals of the bidding companies' shares being undervalued, and share offers as
signals of the share prices being too high. "...equity as a means of payment will
convey bad news about the bidder...". (Bhagat and Hirshleifer (1993), p. 1). If so,
there is a possibility of any change in the share price of the bidding company at the
bid announcement not being solely due to information regarding the acquisition, but
also reflect a general adjustment of expectations regarding future prospects of the
bidder. The different causes of any share price reaction at the time of a bid
announcement is, however, difficult to separate. Following the theory, one would
expect bidding companies' shares to react more favourably to cash than to share
financed acquisitions.
Fishman (1989) developed a theoretical model arguing that cash bids are likely
to be associated with larger gains to targets than share offers. His theory, also based
on asymmetric information, argues that the bidder can use cash bids "...to preempt
potential competition by signalling a high valuation" for the target. (p. 42). The
argument put forward was that acquisitions offering a high premium for the target will
tend to be cash offers, while low value acquisitions will tend to be share offers.
The theoretical models thus predicts that both target and bidding company
shareholders will perform better in cash than in other types of offers. The existing
empirical evidence generally supports the predictions of these theories.
Several studies, such as e.g., Traylos (1987), Franks et al. (1988), Franks and
Harris (1989), and Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) have found that US bidding
companies on average perform significantly better in cash than in equity financed
takeovers. However, Franks et al. (1991) found that, for US bidders, "although the
difference between the performance of all-cash and all-equity bidders is large, it is ...
not statistically significant". (p. 92). Similar results were obtained by Agrawal et al.
(1992). Peterson and Peterson (1991) found all US bidders to lose, regardless of the
method of payment.
With regard to UK bidders, Franks et al. (1988) found that, over the bid period,
there was little difference in the level of abnormal returns to bidders in cash and equity
financed acquisitions. However, over the two year period following the acquisition,
bidders having offered equity performed significantly worse than bidders who offered
cash. In another analysis of UK acquisitions, Limmack and McGregor (1992) argued
that, regardless of the period of analysis, abnormal returns to bidders in cash
acquisitions were approximately zero, while equity (or mixed) financed acquisitions
resulted in significant abnormal losses.
VVith regard to acquisitions in Japan, Pettway et al. (1993) found bidders to
perform better as a result of cash financed rather than equity financed acquisitions.
However, looking at acquisitions in France, Eckbo and Langohr (1989) argued that
"bidder firm abnormal returns are on average indistinguishable from zero in both all-
cash and all-stock offers". (p. 397).
There is thus some disagreement as to whether bidders perform better in cash
than in equity offers. However, several studies have suggested such a relationship.
It is also interesting to note that no study has indicated a superior performance to
bidders following equity financed offers. One can thus expect any abnormal gain to
bidders to be at least as high in cash financed as in equity financed offers.
With regard to the target company shareholders, Halpern (1973), Peterson and
Peterson (1991) and Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) all found takeover premiums for US
targets to be higher in cash than in share exchange transactions. Franks et al. (1988)
established that both US and UK targets gained significantly more in cash offers than
in bids offering an exchange of shares. Similar results were obtained by Eckbo and
Langohr (1989) for French acquisitions. In studies of cross-border acquisitions, studies
such as Wansley et al. (1983), Biswas (1990) and Harris and Ravenscraft (1991),
found target company shareholders to receive substantially higher premiums in cash
than in equity offers. Consequently, from the available empirical evidence it appears
to be clear that target company shareholders, on average, gain more from cash than
from share exchange offers.
When analysing the effect of method of payment for cross-border (and domestic)
acquisitions into the UK, two factors should be borne in mind. Firstly, it is important
to remember the requirement of the Takeover Code (The Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers (1990)) for bidders with a pre-bid stake in excess of 29.9% to offer a full cash
alternative. Cash offers are thus fairly common in the UK. Secondly, with particular
reference to cross-border acquisitions, the vast majority of cross-border acquisitions
tend to be cash financed. This may be associated with investors' reluctance to accept
payment in securities of companies not listed in the shareholder's home market.
Consequently, statistical testing of the impact of method of payment becomes difficult
for cross-border acquisitions, as the sample of transactions where cash is not offered
tends to be small (e.g., Dewenter (1995a)).
Hypothesis 18 - Method of Payment
Ho pay There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) depending on whether or
not the offer includes a full cash alternative
H 1 pay Abnormal returns were significantly different to companies
(target, bidding and joint) depending on whether the offer
includes a full cash alternative.
e) Pre-Bid Stake by Bidder in Target
Walkling and Edminster (1985) argued that pre-bid stakes by bidders in targets
was an important variable which ought to be analysed. "The percentage of target
shares controlled by the bidder prior to the offer provides a direct measure of
bargaining strength". (p. 30). They argued that target company shareholders would
have lower abnormal returns where the bidder controlled a large fraction of the target
company shares prior to the takeover. Elaborating on the issue, they argued that,
"at least four factors suggest a negative correlation between shares
controlled and bid premiums.
(1) Increased ownership provides a direct influence on the actions of the
target management.
(2) Share ownership may provide the bidder with access to important
target firm information...
(3) Bidders facing an upward supply curve for shares of the target firm
would pay premiums directly related to the percentage of shares
sought. Increased ownership in the target firm would reduce the
amount of shares needed to obtain any desired level of control.
(4) Bidders with a previous commitment in the form of share ownership
may be perceived as being more serious in their acquisition attempts.
As a consequence, arbitrageurs are more likely to purchase shares in
the open market, which may increase the pool of obtainable shares"
(Walkling and Edminster (1985) p. 35) .
Consequently, one would expect lower abnormal returns to target and higher abnormal
returns to bidding companies' shareholders where the predator held a stake in the
target prior to bid announcement. However, contrary to Walkling and Edminster's
expectations, Franks and Harris (1989), found UK targets to gain more when the
bidding company held a large (over 30%) pre-bid stake in the target. Thus, the limited
available empirical evidence seems to contradict the expectation as presented by
Walkling and Edminster.
Hypothesis 19 - Pre-Bid Stake 
Ho stake There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) depending on whether or
not the bidder held a pre-bid stake in the target.
H 1 stake Abnormal returns were significantly different to companies
(target, bidding and joint) depending on whether or not the
bidder held a pre-bid stake in the target.
f) Relative Size of Target and Bidding Companies
Singh (1971 and 1975) and Meeks (1977) established that target companies in UK
acquisitions tended to be substantially smaller than the bidding firms. The same
proved to be true in this study. However, as reported in Table 6.5 in the following
chapter, there were great variations in the size of both bidders and targets.
It may be argued that acquisitions of large target companies are likely to have
greater impact on the fortunes of acquiring companies than are small takeovers.
Asquith eta!. (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Peterson and Peterson (1991) and
Feils (1993), found a positive relationship between bidding company cumulative
abnormal returns and the size of the target relative to the size of the bidder. Similarly,
Markides and lttner (1994) found the relative size (as measured by sales rather than
market values) of the bidder and target to be highly significant.
However, not all previous studies have provided such conclusive results. While
Franks and Harris (1989) found abnormal returns to bidders to be "...somewhat higher
when the target is relatively large, the differences are not statistically significant". (p.
236). In their analysis of US bidders, Loderer and Martin (1990) obtained quite
confusing results with regard to relative company size. They found that bidders
performed better if the relative size of the target to the bidder was large. However,
they also found that acquisitions of very large targets resulted in losses to bidders. In
addition, "...large firms ... tend to pay too much for their targets...". (p. 26). Loderer
and Martin interpreted their results as,
"on balance, these results suggest that corporate acquisitions have positive
net present value proportional to acquisition size, but that there are enough
large acquisitions with negative net present value to leave a trace of a
negative relationship between announcement effects and dollar target size.
Moreover, large firms may be less careful in evaluating acquisition
prospects". (p. 27).
The last part of their argument may be questionable, and the authors do not offer any
logical argument as to why large bidders show less care than smaller ones.
Limmack (1993) found bidding companies, on average, to lose significantly in UK
acquisitions. However, the negative abnormal returns were smaller in acquisitions of
either very large or very small target companies (relative to the market value of the
bidder). With regard to large acquisitions, Limmack (1993) argued that "...bidders for
targets of similar size appear to arrive at more accurate valuation of the benefits from
the acquisition...". (p. 32), thus contradicting the argument of Loderer and Martin
regarding large bidders, as discussed above. With regard to the small negative
abnormal returns to bidding companies in small acquisitions, Limmack argued that a
possible explanation may be that even potentially large (percentage) overpayments for
such small targets may have had only a small impact on the large market values of the
bidders.
Franks et al. (1991) found "...no significant link between relative size and either
target or bidder gains". (p. 93). Similarly, Fowler and Schmidt (1989) found no
significant relationship between relative size of bidders and targets (as measured by
total assets) and bidder returns.
As evident from the existing literature, while several studies have indicated a
positive relationship between relative size and level of abnormal returns to bidding
company shareholders, not all empirical evidence support such a finding.
With regard to abnormal returns to target company shareholders, Franks et al.
(1991) found relative size not to be of importance. Pettway eta!. (1993), on the other
hand, found that "... gains to U.S. sellers are less positive when the buyer is large
relative to the seller...". (p. 92). Franks and Harris (1989) too found target company
shareholders, in this case in the UK, to have gained more when their company was
small relative to the size of the bidder. Similar results were obtained by Limmack
(1993), who argued that "...the premium paid to the targets increases with the relative
size of bidder to target". (p. 31). Peterson and Peterson (1991) argued that for the
US, "...smaller target firms receive greater absolute returns, but share less in the total
wealth changes to the combination". (p. 401). The existing empirical evidence of
higher percentage abnormal returns to small target firms, may "...suggest that bidders
are over-generous in the terms offered to relatively small targets...". (Limmack (1993),
pp. 31-32).
Hypothesis 20 - Relative Size of Targets and Bidders 
Ho rel size The level of abnormal returns to companies (target, bidding and
joint) were unaffected by the relative size of the target and
bidding companies.
H 1 rel size The level of abnormal returns to companies (target, bidding and
joint) varied significantly depending on the relative size of the
target and bidding companies.
g) Size of the Company
As discussed in more detail in section 6.4.2., several previous studies have
suggested that share returns differ between companies with large and small market
capitalisations, with small companies historically having outperformed larger ones.
This is commonly known as the 'size effect'.
The size effect, if present, may have important implications for takeover activity.
As argued by Banz (1981), "...large firms are able to pay a premium for the stock of
small firms since they will be able to discount the same cash flows at a smaller
discount rate". (p. 17). It can thus be hypothesised that the percentage abnormal
returns to target company shareholders will be higher the lower the pre-bid market
value of the target company.
In order to test whether or not the level of abnormal returns to shareholders is
dependent upon the market capitalisation of the company, a size variable was included
in the cross-sectional analysis.
Hypothesis 21 - Size of Company 
Ho size
H 1 size
The level of abnormal returns to companies (target, bidding and
joint) were unaffected by their size (as measured by pre-bid
market value)
The level of abnormal returns to companies varied significantly
depending on their size (as measured by pre-bid market value).
5.4.	 Conclusion 
This chapter contains a discussion of the hypotheses tested in this study.
Previous research (as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4) has indicated that target
company shareholders gain from both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, but that
the gains are generally higher in cross-border than in domestic transactions. This
thesis sets out to test whether shareholders of UK target companies in cross-border
and domestic acquisitions between 1986 and 1991 gained from such acquisitions and
to test whether a target company cross-border effect was present in the UK during this
time period. Hypotheses also relate to the timing of the abnormal returns to target
company shareholders, as well as to the impact of the nationality of the bidding firm.
Similarly, hypotheses relate to the level of abnormal returns to overseas and domestic
bidding companies, and the differences between the two (bidding company cross-
border effect), as well as to the level of joint abnormal returns to pairs of target and
bidding company shareholders.
Previous research has indicated that the characteristics of the bid may have an
important impact on the level of abnormal returns. Consequently, the empirical
analysis in this thesis include a cross-sectional analysis to control for variables such
as whether the bid was successful or failed (outcome), whether or not more than one
company bid for the target (competitive), whether or not the terms of the offer were
raised (revised), whether or not a full cash alternative was offered (pay), whether or
not the bidding company held shares in the target company prior to the bid
announcement (stake), the relative size of the target and bidding companies (relative
size) and the size of the company being analysed (size). Hypotheses relating to these
variables are discussed in the chapter. The working (null) hypotheses of this study
are:
Hypothesis 1 - Cross-Border Target Companies 
HoCT	 No abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of target companies in
cross-border acquisitions into the UK.
Hypothesis 2- Domestic Target Companies 
HoDT	 No abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of target companies in
domestic UK acquisitions.
Hypothesis 3 - Target Companies 'Cross-Border Effect' 
HoCT effect There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to UK
target company shareholders in domestic and cross-border
acquisitions.
Hypothesis 4 - Cross-Border Target Companies - Nationality of Bidders 
HoCT nat No differences in abnormal returns to shareholders of UK target
companies in cross-border acquisitions were associated with the
nationality of the overseas bidders.
Hypothesis 5- Timing of Target Company Bid Rumour 
HoT timing There were no differences between domestic and cross-border
acquisitions with regard to the length of time prior to the bid
announcement at which target company share price rise.
Hypothesis 6 - Pre-Bid Performance of Targets 
HoT pre-bid There were no differences in pre-bid performance between target
companies in domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
Hypothesis 7- Cross-Border Bidding Companies 
HoCB	 No abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of overseas bidding
companies in cross-border acquisitions into the UK.
Hypothesis 8- Nationality of Cross-Border Bidding Companies 
HoCB nat No differences in abnormal returns to overseas bidding companies in
cross-border acquisitions into the UK were associated with the
nationality of the bidder.
Hypothesis 9 - Domestic Bidding Companies 
Ho DB	 No abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of bidding companies
in domestic UK acquisitions.
Hypothesis 10 - Bidding Companies 'Cross-Border Effect'
HocB effect No differences in abnormal returns to overseas and UK bidding
companies in cross-border and domestic acquisitions were present.
Hypothesis 11 - Cross-Border Acquisitions 
Hoc No joint abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of overseas bidding
and domestic UK target companies in cross-border acquisitions into
the UK.
Hypothesis 12 - Nationality of Bidder in Cross-Border Acquisitions 
HoC nat No differences in joint abnormal returns to shareholders of overseas
bidding and domestic UK target companies in cross-border
acquisitions into the UK were associated with the nationality of the
overseas bidder.
Hypothesis 13 - Domestic Acquisitions 
Hop	 No joint abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of bidding and
target companies in domestic acquisitions into the UK.
Hypothesis 14 - Total Joint 'Cross-Border Effect'
Hoc effect No differences in joint abnormal returns to pairs of target and bidding
companies were observed between domestic and cross-border
acquisitions.
Hypothesis 15 - Bid Outcome 
Ho outcome There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) in successful and failed
acquisitions.
Hypothesis 16 - Competition in Bid
Ho competitive There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) in single bidder and
multiple bidder (competitive) acquisitions.
Hypothesis 17- Revision of Bid Terms 
Ho revision There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) revised and unrevised offers.
Hypothesis 18 - Method of Payment
Ho pay There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) depending on whether or not the
offer includes a full cash alternative.
Hypothesis 19 - Pre-Bid Stake 
Ho stake There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) depending on whether or not the
bidder held a pre-bid stake in the target.
Hypothesis 20 - Relative Size of Targets and Bidders 
Ho rel size The level of abnormal returns to companies (target, bidding and joint)
were unaffected by the relative size of the target and bidding
companies.
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Hypothesis 21 - Size of Company 
Ho size
	 The level of abnormal returns to companies (target, bidding and joint)
were unaffected by their size (as measured by pre-bid market value)
CHAPTER 6
DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
6.1.	 Summary 
In this chapter, the data used and the methodology applied are explained. The
study is based on an analysis of domestic and cross-border takeover bids for listed UK
companies during the 1986-1991 period. As far as possible, a census rather than
sample analysis was attempted, although partial bids, offers for investment trusts or
water companies, as well as some second bids were excluded from the analysis. Data
availability proved to be a problem. Nevertheless, the analysis (in Chapters 7, 8 and
9) is based on a large sample of 1,196 companies, split into 71 overseas bidding
companies from 14 different countries, 414 UK bidders, 143 UK target companies in
cross-border acquisitions, and 568 UK target companies in domestic bids. (Data was
available for an analysis of joint abnormal returns to target and bidding company
shareholders in 50 cross-border and 356 domestic acquisitions).
The analysis is based on event-study methodology, applying three different test
models; the capital asset pricing model, the market model, and the index model.
Cross-sectional analysis of (index model) abnormal returns is used to control for bid
characteristics, such as nationality of bidder (to test for cross-border effects), bid
outcome, whether or not the bid was competitive, or revised, the method of payment,
the presence of pre-bid stakes, the relative size (pre-bid market values) of the target
and bidding companies, as well as the size of the company in question.
In this study, the mean 13 values with both the capital asset pricing model and the
market model were below 1, while (particularly bidding company) market model a
value' s were large and positive. The problems of parameter estimation and 'thin'
trading are discussed. Other methodological difficulties encountered in this study, and
discussed in this chapter are: stock market size effects, bid programmes and
information leakage, size-differences between bidders and targets, and pre-bid stakes.
In addition, significant post-announcement 'drift' was observed for the bidding
companies. Possible explanations for such drift include information release, market
inefficiency, and model misspecification.
6.2.	 Introduction 
In this study, abnormal returns to shareholders of both target and bidding company
shareholders in domestic UK and cross-border acquisitions into the UK during the
1986-1991 period are analysed.
A major complication encountered in any analysis of share returns to foreign
companies' shareholders, such as a study of cross-border acquisitions, is the limited
share price information (and in particular, return data) available for overseas firms. As
indicated in the literature review in Chapter 4, a common approach has been to restrict
the analysis to the US companies engaged in cross-border acquisitions for which data
is relatively easy to obtain. For example, Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Doukas and
Traylos (1988), Traylos (1995), Sudia (1992), Morck and Yeung (1992), Manzon et al.
(1994), Markides and Ittner (1994), Lin eta!. (1994), Waheed and Mathur (1995), and
Datta and Puia (1995) all restricted their analysis to American bidding companies. An
analysis of the foreign target firms involved in the cross-border acquisitions were not
included in these studies.
Similarly, Wansley eta!. (1983), Cakici eta!. (1991), Shaked eta!. (1991), Harris
and Ravenscraft (1991), Cebenoyan eta!. (1992), Swenson (1993), Marr eta!. (1993),
Dewenter (1995a) and Cheng and Chan (1995) all restricted their analysis to US
companies targeted by foreign predators. Again, the foreign companies were excluded
from the analysis. Tessema (1985) combined these approaches, and looked at US
target and bidding companies engaged in international mergers. Consequently, of the
studies of cross-border acquisitions reviewed in Chapter 4, approximately 60%
confined their analysis to US companies, while excluding the foreign counterparts to
the cross-border transactions.
As explained in Chapter 4, Cheng and Chan (1995, p. 637) justified their exclusion
of foreign bidders by arguing that,
"...focusing on international takeovers of US target firms allows us to
examine indirectly the behaviour of international bidding firms".
Similarly, Marr et al. (1993, pp. 290-291) argued that
"...data on foreign firm's wealth effects are not readily available. The
empirical evidence from previous studies show that the gains to bidders are
negligible [and] ... that target shareholders capture most of the gains from
tender offers. Therefore, the wealth effects to target shareholders should be
a good measure of the premium from a takeover".
Both of these arguments assumes that abnormal returns to bidding companies in
cross-border acquisitions are insignificant, and similar to the abnormal returns found
(by others in previous studies) for domestic bidding companies.
Rather than relying on such questionable assumptions, this study includes an
analysis of the level of abnormal returns to overseas bidders from a variety of different
countries. In addition, a direct comparison is made to domestic acquisitions, allowing
for an analysis of target, bidder, and joint 'cross-border effects'. In their analysis of US
bidding companies in cross-border acquisitions, Datta and Puia (1995) argued against
analysing companies based in several different countries, due to the significant
problems involved in data acquisition.
"Given lack of data, the gains to the shareholders of acquired firms could not
be examined in this study. ... Our sample involved acquired firms in 18
different countries - difficulties associated with obtaining stock returns for
these firms ... is, to say the least, considerable. The potential wealth effects
for target firms are, undoubtedly, an interesting research question (along
with "total" wealth effects in cross-border acquisitions) that need to be
addressed in future studies. However, from a pragmatic standpoint such
studies would definitely have to limit the sample to acquisitions in a few
countries (e.g., UK) where stock returns are more readily available...". (pp.
354-355).
This study clearly shows that, while such a restrictive sample selection procedure
certainly would simplify the process of gathering data, the problems of data availability
for overseas companies can successfully be overcome. Through considerable effort
(as discussed below), data was gathered for a large number of the overseas bidding
companies, based in 14 different countries. This allowed for an explicit test of the
abnormal returns to overseas bidders, as well as to test whether these abnormal
returns were similar or different to those encountered by domestic UK bidders. Having
data for both targets and bidders also allows for an analysis of the 'total' wealth effects
of both cross-border and domestic acquisitions (and for a comparison of the two), as
recommended by Datta and Puia (1995).
6.3.	 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
Information was obtained from Acquisitions Monthly' on the announcement
and completion dates of both cross-border and domestic takeover offers for listed UK
companies. (No analysis of the large number of acquisitions of private British
companies has been undertaken in this thesis 104 ). While Acquisitions Monthly was
first published in 1984, it proved impossible to obtain a complete set of this journal for
the first two years of its existence l °5. It was therefore necessary to restrict the
analysis to takeovers announced on or after the 1 st of January 1986. As can be seen
from Figure 1.1 in the Introduction to this thesis, takeover activity, and in particular
103 The following tables in various issues of Acquisitions Monthly were applied: "New Bids for UK Public
Companies", "Pending Bids for UK Public Companies", and "Completed Bids for UK Public Companies".
Bids included in the "New Bids" tables, but not subsequently referred to in the "Completed Bids" tables, have
in this study been deemed to have failed.
104	 The objective of this thesis is to analyse the impact of takeover announcements on the share returns of the
target and bidding companies involved. The analysis has therefore been restricted to listed companies.
105 Despite contacting the publishers directly (as well as the National Library and several other major libraries
throughout the UK) it proved impossible to obtain copies of a complete set of the journal prior to January
1986.
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cross-border takeover activity, was relatively modest during 1984 and 1985.
Consequently, it is unlikely that access to information about takeovers during these two
years would substantially have altered the findings of this study.
Takeover bids for which the bid outcome 106 was known prior to the end of
December 1991 have been included in this study. Consequently, the analysis is based
on 6 years of data, covering (as illustrated in Figure 1.1) the major cross-border
takeover boom of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
This thesis is restricted to an analysis of takeover . bids for whole companies;
purchases of company divisions or subsidiaries are not included unless the subsidiary
had a separate stock market listing.
Acquisitions Monthly classifies the nationality of the bidding companies according
to where their ultimate mother-companies are incorporated. Consequently, a takeover
bid by, for example, a US corporation (such as e.g., Ford's acquisition of Jaguar)
carried out through a UK subsidiary (Ford UK), has been recorded as a cross-border
bid by the US firm. In this study the same classification of nationality as that given in
Acquisitions Monthly has generally been applied107.
In its tables on takeover bids, Acquisitions Monthly records offers for both UK and
Republic of Ireland companies. Acquisitions of Republic of Ireland companies have
been excluded from the analysis, while acquisitions of UK companies by Republic of
Ireland companies have been treated as cross-border bids. Also excluded are the few
transactions where Acquisitions Monthly could not determine which company was the
predator and which was the target (so called "pure mergers").
For the six year period under investigation, a total of 966 takeover bids for UK
listed companies were identified; 208 (21.53%) of which were made by foreign entities,
106 A takeover is classified as successful if the bidding company after the offer held a majority of the ordinary
shares of the target company. A bid is classified as unsuccessful if majority control was not obtained.
Consequently, "success" or "failure" in this context does not relate to whether shareholders gained or lost
from these transactions.
107 For a few overseas bidders, a stock market listing was only available in a country other than that given as
the home country of the company. In these few cases, the nationality of the bidder has been re-defined to
be where the company has its main stock market listing.
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756 (78.26%) by British institutions, and 2 (0.21%) joint cross-border and domestic
bids". As far as possible, this study was based on a census rather than a sample
of the domestic and cross-border acquisitions into the UK during the 1986 to 1991
period. However, as discussed below, the final samples were somewhat smaller than
the total number of bids during the period, mainly due to data limitations.
6.3.1.	 Cross-Border Takeover Bids
Not all of the 208 cross-border takeover bids for listed UK companies were
suitable for inclusion in the analysis. Consequently, some restrictions were imposed
on the final sample.
Firstly", partial takeover bids were excluded from the sample. In five
instances the foreign bidder obtained exemption from the City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers' (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (1990)) requirement of full takeover
bids 11 °. Such takeovers may have a different impact on share prices than do full
acquisitions of all outstanding shares. Due to the special nature of partial bids, it was
felt necessary to exclude the five partial cross-border acquisitions from the analysis.
Secondly, acquisitions of UK investment trusts were excluded 111 . Investment
trusts are generally valued on the basis of the market value of their highly liquid assets
such as shares and bonds. Indeed, the offer price for such trusts were frequently
stated as a certain percentage of net asset value, rather than a fixed offer price (cash
or shares in the bidding company) for each of the target company's shares. It is
108 These two joint cross-border and domestic takeover bids have not been included in the further analysis of
cross-border and domestic takeovers. As discussed below, other joint bids have also been excluded from
the analysis.
109 Some of the takeover bids may have been rejected on more than one criteria, such as partial bids for
investment trusts. In order to avoid double-counting, excluded takeovers have only been recorded once,
according to which selection criteria was breached first.
110 The Takeover Code Rule 9.1. requires any person or company acquiring ownership of 30 per cent or more
of the voting rights in a company to make a full bid for all the outstanding equity share capital (whether
voting or non-voting), unless consent is obtained from the Panel. Partial takeover bids are generally not
accepted.
111	 In a slightly different study from this (an analysis of the performance of shares recommended by brokers),
Dimson and Fraletti (1986) also found it necessary to exclude investment trusts from the analysis.
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therefore possible that the 'normal' pattern of bid premiums are not present in
acquisitions of investment trusts. Nine cross-border acquisitions were rejected from
the sample on this criteria.
The third group of international offers omitted were those for UK water
companies. There were several reasons for excluding water companies from the
analysis. Firstly, as explained by the Department of Trade and Industry (1991), "there
are special arrangements for water company mergers under the Water Act 1989. A
merger must be referred to the Mergers and Monopolies Commission if the water-
related assets of the acquiring company and the acquired company are each more
than £30m". (p. 5). Secondly, for several of the water companies the ordinary shares
had characteristics similar to preference shares. (The analysis in this study was
restricted to the impact of takeover bids on the ordinary shares of the companies
involved). Consequently, it was decided not to include the thirteen bids for water
companies in this study'''. It is interesting to note, however, that all of these thirteen
merger proposals involved French bidders'''.
In two instances did two overseas companies bid jointly for their British target.
The analysis in this study is restricted to takeover bids for whole companies by
individual companies, and these two joint bids were therefore excluded from the
sample.
In the existing literature, most studies have excluded companies which made or
received more than one takeover bid during the parameter estimation period of the
market model or the capital asset pricing model (which in this study extends from 67
to 9 months prior to the month of the bid announcement), or the analysis ('event')
period (which in this study extends from 8 months prior to the bid announcement, to
5 months after the bid announcement month (for bidders), as discussed further below).
112 It was also noticed that several of the water companies received takeover bids soon after being privatised.
Consequently, for several of the bids insufficient share price information would therefore have been available
for analysis had it been decided to include these acquisitions in the analysis.
113	 For a discussion of French companies' interests in the UK water industry, see Boulton (1995).
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The argument generally put forward in the literature for excluding frequent bidders (or
targets) is that the market model alpha and beta estimates may be affected by the
other bids, thus not providing an accurate measure of the 'normal' relationship
between share and market returns. If so, abnormal return estimates may be biased.
For two distinct reasons, the procedure of excluding frequent bidders (and
companies receiving more than one bid) has not been adopted in this study. Firstly,
there is a possibility that bidding companies which attempted a second acquisition
were companies which considered their first acquisition to have been financially
beneficial, while the ones which did not make a second bid may have been companies
who experienced difficulties associated with their first acquisition. As discussed in
Chapter 3, Limmack (1990) found experienced UK bidders to have performed better
than first-time buyers. On the other hand, in another study of UK acquisitions, Lahey
and Conn (1990) argued that "...there is no significant difference in the market's
reaction to acquiring firms with one merger as opposed to those with multiple
mergers". (p. 436). In his study of mergers and acquisitions in the German market,
BOhner (1991) established that "firms that have frequent experience of mergers tend
to gain from their mergers" (p. 513), while infrequent bidders tended to experience
large negative abnormal returns. Loderer and Martin (1990) found US bidders to have
performed better from their first acquisitions than from subsequent bids. Whether
frequent bidders perform better or worse than other bidders thus remains an open
question. However, by excluding frequent bidders, there is a danger of introducing a
bias into the analysis.
Secondly, there is a practical problem of data availability. Excluding frequent
bidders would significantly reduce the data set. In addition, if frequent bidders were
to be excluded from the analysis, it would be necessary to gather information on all
takeover bids (ideally not only of listed UK companies, but also for private firms and
overseas companies) made (or received) during the period from 67 months prior to,
to 5 months after the month of the bid announcement. It has, unfortunately, not been
possible to obtain this information114.
Consequently, while it is recognised that intervening events, such as previous
and/or subsequent acquisitions may affect the market model and capital asset pricing
model parameters, companies engaged in more than one acquisition have not been
excluded from the sample in this study. A number of bidders made several takeover
bids during the six year period of study, and each of these bids have been treated as
separate gevents' 116 . Similarly, competing takeover bids by different companies for
the same target firm have been accepted in this study, and treated as separate
observations 116. However, one cross-border acquisition was rejected from the
sample as it involved the second bid by the same bidder for the same target within
a 12 month period. There is a high probability that such a renewed bid was
anticipated by the market. If that is the case, there will have been little informational
impact of such a follow-up bid. The first takeover attempt has been included (as
unsuccessful), while the second bid was omitted from the sample.
On four occasions, information contained in Acquisitions Monthly was incomplete.
Unfortunately, these takeover bids had to be excluded from the analysis. In total, 34
cross-border takeover bids were rejected from the sample, as detailed in Table 6.1.
Following this screening process, a total of 174 cross-border takeover bids (by 156
different overseas entities) remained for analysis. A major problem encountered,
however, related to the limited data available for the overseas bidders. For the foreign
bidding companies, share price data (as well as some data on dividend payments) was
obtained from Datastream International. (For domestic companies, monthly log returns
114 The problems of identifying all acquisitions were recognised by Hughes, Mueller and Singh (1980a), who
in their sample of nonmerging firms included "...firms that had not engaged in merger activity (other than
perhaps a few acquisitions of unlisted firms)...". (p. 51).
115 In their study of acquisitions in the UK and the US, Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988) also included frequent
bidders in their analysis, and "in cases where several acquisitions were made by the same bidder, the bidder
was counted separately by each acquisition made". (p. 232).
116	 The impact of the competitive nature of bids has been analysed in the cross-sectional analysis in Chapters
7, 8, and 9.
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Table 6.1
Cross-Border Acquisitions - Analysis of Rejected Takeover Bids
Certain takeover bids were excluded from the analysis (see text for explanations). These included partial
takeover bids, bids for UK investment trusts, water companies, joint bids (by two or more bidders), and
second bids by the same bidder for the same target within 12 months. Finally, a few bids were excluded
from the analysis due to insufficient information in Acquisitions Monthly (AM).
Partial Invest.
Trust
Water Joint Second
Bid
Incom-
plete AM
Data
Total
Australia 2 2
Belgium 1 1
Denmark 1 1
Eire 1 1
France 13 1 14
Luxembourg 2 2
Malaysia 1 1
Netherlands 1 1
Norway 1 1
New Zealand 1 1
South Africa 1 2 3
Saudi Arabia 1 1
US 1 2 2	 _ 5
Total I	 5 9 13 2 1 4	 _ 34	
_
were obtained from the London Business School Share Price Database"). The
Datastream database is international in coverage, and contains, amongst other things,
share price information for several thousand companies. However, even in this
database, there is a possible bias towards larger companies'''. This may influence
the findings of this thesis if company size is an important variable in determining the
level of abnormal returns to companies involved in cross-border acquisitions'''.
Several overseas bidding companies appears not to have been listed (or, for some
117	 I am grateful to Strathclyde University for granting access to their computer system containing the LBS data.
118	 As will be discussed later, however, data was obtained from Datastream for a few foreign companies with
very small market values. There does therefore not appear to be a serious size-bias in the database.
119	 The issue of company size is discussed further in section 6.5.2, and is included in the cross-sectional
analyses in Chapters 7, 8, and 9.
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other reason, were not included in the Datastream database). In addition, for some
companies insufficient data was available for any analysis'''. Similarly, for some of
the target companies, data availability was a problem. The Acquisitions Monthly lists
classify OTC (over the counter) companies as listed, and therefore includes takeovers
of such companies in the lists from which the samples in this study were drawn.
Share price data was, however, generally not available for such companies.
A further difficulty encountered, was a lack of return data. Although Datastream
adjusts share prices for capitalisation changes, it does not make adjustments for
dividend payments. Share prices, therefore, had to be separately adjusted for dividend
payments in order to obtain return data for the overseas bidding companies. While
Datastream's coverage of share price information is generally very good, it is
surprisingly patchy with regard to dividend payments. To overcome this problem, it
was necessary to obtain a large part of dividend data from various Stock Exchanges
and companies directly 121.
Ideally, it would have been desirable if data was available for both the target and
the bidding companies, so as to enable a calculation of the total value creation/loss
from cross-border acquisitions. However, imposing such a requirement would have
further limited the sample size. Consequently, analysis has been undertaken for all
targets and bidders for which data was available. The analysis (using the index
model, as explained below) included 71 cross-border bidders and 143 UK target
120 Bidding companies have only been included in the final analysis if there were no missing values during the
'event window' stretching from t-8 to t+5, where t refers to the month of the bid announcement. (Target
companies were excluded if there were missing values during the period t-8, t. However, for some target
companies, a share listing was not available for the month after the bid announcement. Consequently,
sample sizes for target companies for month t+1 is marginally smaller than for the other event periods, as
discussed further below).
121 Gratitude is expressed to staff of the following organisations for their considerable assistance: Amsterdam
Stock Exchange, Association Vaudoise des Instituts Financiers Lausanne, Australian Stock Exchange,
Baden-Wiittembergische Wertpapierbci rse zu Stuttgart, Barclays Registrars, Bavarian Stock Exchange in
Munich, Bourse de Genêve, Bremer Wertpapierbd rse, BOrsenkammer des Kantons Basel-Stadt, Central
Registration Hong Kong, Consiglio di Borsa Milano, Datastream International, Irish Stock Exchange, Jardine
Matheson, Kobenhavns Fondsbors, New Zealand Stock Exchange, Nobel Industrier, Oslo Bors, Procordia,
Rheinisch-Westfglische BOrse zu DOsseldorf, SBF Bourse de Paris, SBF Nancy, SBF Nantes, Stock
Exchange of Hong Kong, Toronto Stock Exchange, Vancouver Stock Exchange, Vardepapperscentralen
VPC, and West Canada Depository Trust Company.
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companies in cross-border acquisitions. (Sufficient data was available for an analysis
of matched pairs of target and bidding companies in 55 cross-border acquisitions, as
detailed in Chapter 9). The detailed listing of the companies included in the analysis
of cross-border acquisitions, is contained in Appendix A at the back of the thesis.
A breakdown of the nationality of the bidding companies in the cross-border
acquisitions is given in Table 6.2. As can be seen, sufficient data was available for
analysis of bidding companies from 14 different countries, and for UK target
companies bid for by foreign entities based in 22 different countries.
Table 6.2
Cross-Border Acquisitions - Sample Sizes By Nationality of
Bidding Companies - Index Model
This table lists the nationality of the bidding companies in cross-border takeover bids for listed UK
companies announced after 1 January 1986 and for which thew bid outcome was known prior to 31
December 1991. Analysis was attempted for virtually all bids (exceptions detailed in Table 6.1). Cross-
border targets refers to UK target companies which received takeover bids from entities listed abroad.
Cross-border bidders refers to the overseas entities which bid for UK listed companies. The final sample
sizes for cross-border targets and bidders are smaller than the number of bids for which analysis was
attempted, due to limited data availability.
Bids for
which
Analysis
Attempted
Sample Size
Cross-Border
Targets
Cross-Border
Bidders
Austria 1 0.6% 1 0.7% 0 0.0%
Australia 12 6.9% 11 7.7% 4 5.6%
Belgium 1 0.6% 1 0.7% 0 0.0%
Bermuda 1 0.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
British Virgin Islands 2 1.2% 1 0.7% 0 0.0%
Canada 5 2.9% 4 2.8% 4 5.6%
Cayman Islands 2 1.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Denmark 2 1.2% 1 0.7% 1 1.4%
Eire 7 4.0% 6 4.2% 6 8.5%
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Table 6.2. (continued).
Bids
which
for Sample Size
Analysis
Attempted
Cross-Border
Targets
Cross-Border
Bidders
Finland 3 1.7% 3 2.1% 0 0.0%
France 24 13.8% 20 14.0% 10 14.1%
Germany 9 5.2% 8 6.0% 5 7.0%
Hong Kong 1 0.6% 1 0.7% 0 0.0%
Italy 1 0.6% 0 0.0% 1 1.4%
Japan 6 3.5% 6 4.2% 5 7.0%
Liechtenstein 3 1.7% 3 2.1% 0 0.0%
Luxembourg 1 0.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Malaysia 1 0.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Netherlands 7 4.0% 7 4.9% 4 5.6%
Norway 2 1.2% 1 0.7% 1 1.4%
New Zealand 12 6.9% 9 6.3% 3 4.2%
Panama 1 0.6% 1 0.7% 0 0.0%
South Africa 2 1.2% 2 1.4% 0 0.0%
Saudi Arabia 1 0.6% 1 0.7% 0 0.0%
Sweden 14 8.1% 13 9.1% 3 4.2%
Switzerland 15 8.6% 12 8.4% 7 9.9%
USA 38 21.8% 31 21.7% 17 23.7%
TOTAL 1 174 100% 1 143 100% 71 100%
6.3.2.	 Domestic Takeover Bids
The total number of domestic acquisitions during the period of investigation was
756. A similar screening process to that used for the cross-border takeover bids was
applied. Firstly, takeover bids for preference shares were excluded from the analysis,
as this thesis is restricted to acquisitions of ordinary shares. Three bids were excluded
on this criteria. Secondly, 8 partial takeover bids were eliminated from the sample.
Thirdly, a total of 43 of the domestic takeover bids were for investment trusts, which
fall outwith the scope of this study. Fourthly, 6 offers for water companies were
rejected. The fifth restriction imposed was to exclude 9 domestic joint bids. The final
group of bids to be rejected, were 3 takeover attempts which represented a second
bid by the same bidder for the same target within a 12 month period. A further
problem encountered, was that of insufficient information in the Acquisitions Monthly
listings. Unfortunately, this necessitated the exclusion of a further 15 domestic
takeover bids. This screening process left a total of 669 domestic takeover bids for
further analysis. These takeover bids are detailed in Appendix B at the end of the
thesis.
However, as was the case for the cross-border bids, data availability proved to be
a problem. Sufficient data was available for 568 domestic bidders and 414 target
companies in domestic acquisitions. (Sufficient data was available for a full analysis
of the joint abnormal returns to matched pairs of target and bidding companies in 356
domestic acquisitions, as detailed in Chapter 9). A summary of the overall sample
sizes are given in Table 6.3. The sample sizes were smaller for the capital asset
pricing model and the market model than for the index model, due to additional data
requirements of the capital asset pricing model and the market model relative to that
of the index model.
A breakdown of the various samples by year of bid announcement is contained
in Table 6.4. As can be seen from this table, there were relatively few domestic
takeover bids during the last two years of the analysis. This corresponds to the
general decline in domestic takeover activity, as depicted in Figure 1.1 in the
Introduction to this thesis. With regard to the overseas bidding companies, it can be
seen that the lack of available data was a particular problem for acquisitions during the
first two years of the analysis.
Table 6.3.
Overall Sample Sizes
IM = index model, MM = market model, and CAPM = capital asset pricing model. The models are discussed
in section 6.4.5. t refers to time period (month) relative to the month of the bid announcement.
TARGET COMPANIES
ICross-Border Acquisitions I	 Domestic Acquisitions
Time
period
IM MM CAPM IM MM CAPM
t-8, t 143 118 118 568 442 442
t+1 126 104 104 550 427 427
BIDDING COMPANIES
ICross-Border Acquisitions I	 Domestic Acquisitions
Time
period
IM MM CAPM IM MM CAPM
t-8, t+5 I	 71 50 48 I	 414 361 361
6.3.3.	 Bid Characteristics
As explained in the previous chapter, this thesis includes an analysis of the impact
on the level of cumulative abnormal returns of various bid characteristics. The
variables included in the cross-sectional analysis are as follows:
NATIONALITY Nationality is a dummy variable taking the value 0 if the bidder
was based in the UK (domestic bid), and 1 if the bidder was
based abroad (cross-border bid). This variable provides a
measure of any cross-border effect.
OUTCOME Outcome is a dummy variable taking the value 0 if the bid was
successful (in that the bidding company obtained control of the
target company) and 1 if the offer failed.
COMPETITIVE Competitive is a dummy variable taking the value 0 if there was
a single bidder and the value 1 if more than one company bid for
the target (competitive bid).
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REVISED Revised is a dummy variable taking the value 0 if the offer was
not revised and the value 1 if the terms of the offer were revised
(offer price increased).
PAY Pay is a dummy variable taking the value 0 if there was not a full
cash alternative and the value 1 if the offer provided target
company shareholders with a full cash alternative.
STAKE Stake is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bidding
company held a stake in the target company prior to the bid
announcement, and 0 if no such pre-bid stake was present.
RELSIZE	 Rel Size is the pre-bid equity market value of the target divided
by the pre-bid market value of the bidder.
SIZE	 Size is the natural log of the pre-bid market value (in £ million)
of the company in question.
Table 6.5. provides summary information regarding the characteristics of the
takeover bids. As can be clearly seen from this table, overseas bidders tended to be
very large organisations, although large variations were observed. Indeed, the pre-bid
market value of the overseas bidders averaged 4.7 times that of the domestic bidders.
Overseas bidding companies also tended to bid for relatively large UK targets.
Other noteworthy differences between domestic and cross-border acquisitions,
include the greater reliance on cash financing in cross-border than in domestic
acquisitions. This is as one would expect if UK investors are reluctant to receive
payment in the form of securities issued by companies based abroad. Overseas
bidders more often than domestic bidders held a pre-bid stake in the target. However,
despite this difference in the occurrence of pre-bid stakes, and the fact that marginally
more domestic than cross-border bids were competitive, the difference in the success
rates between domestic and cross-border acquisitions was surprisingly marginal.
Table 6.5.
Analysis of Bid Characteristics - Index Model
Variables as defined in the text.
Bid characteristics
Cross-
Border
Targets
Domestic
Targets
Cross-
Border
Bidders
Domestic
Bidders
Sample size 143 568 71 414
Market Mean 151.1 103.5 2374.6 503.5
value (£m)
Std. 331.8 382.1 3554.0 1233.3
Outcome Successful 112 452 59 326
(78.3%) (79.6%) (83.1%) (78.7%)
Failed 31 116 12 88
(21.7%) (20.4%) (16.9%) (21.2%)
Competitive Single 114 492 57 358
bidder (79.7%) (86.6%) (80.3%) (86.5%)
Competitive 29 76 14 56
(20.3%) (13.4%) (19.7%) (13.5%)
Revised Not revised 120 493 63 354
(83.9%) (86.8%) (88.7%) (85.5%)
Offer 23 75 8 60
revised (16.1%) (13.2%) (11.3%) (14.5%)
Pay Full cash 138 369 68 271
alternative (96.5%) (65.0%) (95.8%) (65.5%)
No cash 5 199 3 143
alternative (3.5%) (35.0%) (4.2%) (34.5%)
Stake No stake 82 433 41 309
(57.3%) (76.2%) (57.7%) (74.6%)
Stake 61 135 30 105
(42.7%) (23.8%) (42.2%) (25.4%)
6.4.	 Methodology 
The fundamental aim of this thesis is to establish the degree to which
shareholders of target and bidding companies engaged in domestic and cross-border
acquisitions into the UK over the 1986-1991 period gained or lost from these
transactions, as well as to analyse the differences in abnormal returns to the different
groups of shareholders. The following sections sets out the methodology applied to
achieve these objectives.
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6.4.1.	 Event Study Methodology
Event study methodology, as first developed by Fama et al. (1969), involves
estimating the impact on share returns of a firm-specific event, such as the
announcement of a takeover bid. The abnormal return associated with the event, also
known as the 'wealth effect', is a measure of the gains or losses to shareholders
attributable to the event. The abnormal return is calculated as the difference between
the 'Actual' (observed) return on the share and the return on the share one would have
'Expected' had no event taken place:
Abnormal return = Actual return - Expected return.
The actual return, as the name implies, is the observed return on the share (through
dividend payments and share price changes). The expected return is a measure of
the return on the share one would have expected had no event taken place. Following
the event, the expected return is an unobservable quantity, thus having to be
estimated.
There are several possible models, with varying degree of sophistication and
complexity, which can be used for estimating expected returns. Brown and Warner
(1980 and 1985) applied simulation data to test various models, and concluded that,
"we find that a simple methodology based on the market model performs
well under a wide variety of conditions. In some situations, even simpler
methods which do not explicitly adjust for marketwide factors or for risk
perform no worse than the market model". (Brown and Warner (1980), p.
280).
Dyckman et al. (1984) undertook similar simulation analysis to evaluate the merit
of the mean-adjusted returns method, the index model and the market model. They
argued that the three models had similar abilities in detecting abnormal returns,
"...although we find a slight preference for the Market Model. While this difference is
statistically significant, it does not appear important". (pp. 28-29).
Malatesta (1986), in a simulation test of a fairly complex joint generalised least
squares technique, found that "the results provide no evidence that joint generalized
least squares is superior to simpler procedures". (p. 27).
As discussed in the literature review, papers applying more than one test model
(such as e.g., Franks and Harris (1989) and Limmack (1991)) have occasionally
obtained conflicting results depending on the return generating hypothesis applied.
Authors such as Limmack (1991) therefore argued in favour of using more than one
model.
In this study, three different test models have been applied. These are the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM), the market model (MM), and lastly, the index model (IM).
All three models adjust for general market movements, while the first two models also
allow for different levels of company risk. The detailed specifications of these models
are discussed below in section 6.4.5.
6.4.2.	 Parameter Estimation Period and 'Event Window'
If stock markets are efficient, share prices should react quickly to the release of
new information (Fama (1991)). However, as indicated in the literature review,
previous studies have suggested that, with regard to takeovers, information appears
to leak to the market prior to the official bid announcement122.
Magenheim and Mueller (1988) argued that analysis of takeover effects would be
relatively easy "...if all of the relevant information regarding an acquisition were to
become public on the day the acquisition is announced and the market could be
122 For example, Franks et al. (1977) found that share prices of target companies started rising significantly
three months prior to the announcement of the takeover bid. Similar results were obtained by e.g., Franks
and Harris (1989), Limmack (1991), and Kennedy and Limmack (1996). Hannigan (1988) argued that
"...take-overs provide prime insider dealing opportunities...", and used an Acquisitions Monthly survey
(published march 1986) to support her argument: "Acquisitions Monthly ... found that of 1200 mergers
studied, the price of the target rose by 54% during the 6 months before the bid, 39% during the month
before and 25% on the day before". (p. 18). Although the Acquisitions Monthly survey looked exclusively
at target companies (rather than both targets and bidders as in this study), it is plausible that if investors can
predict who will become takeover targets as much as six months prior to the bid announcement, they may
also be able to identify the bidding companies.
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assumed to adjust fully in that day to the new information. But news of an acquisition
is known to leak into the market prior to the first public announcement, and it is
unrealistic to assume that the market is capable of predicting the full future
consequences of an acquisition immediately upon learning of it". (p. 172). In addition,
to establish whether the post bid share price performance differ between, for example,
successful and failed bidders (as found by e.g., Asquith (1983) and Limmack (1991)),
it is necessary to include a period subsequent to the bid announcement in the
analysis. Consequently, event windows covering only the announcement day or a few
days surrounding it, are unlikely to capture the full stock market impact of the
acquisition. To overcome these possible problems, a fairly long period of analysis (or
'event window') has been applied in this study, extending from eight months prior to
the month of the bid announcement (t-8) to five months after the bid announcement
(t+5) for bidding companies and one month after the bid announcement (t+1) for
targets' and joint abnormal returns to target and bidding company shareholders.
The capital asset pricing model and the market model base expectations regarding
share returns during the event period on the relationship between market and share
returns during some other period unrelated to the event. This period, known as the
parameter estimation period, is usually taken as a period prior to the bid
announcement, although some studies, such as Mandelker (1974), Conn and Connell
(1990), Connell and Conn (1993) and Waheed and Mathur (1995) have also applied
other estimation periods. The capital asset pricing model and market model
parameters (a and 13) should be estimated over a period not affected by the
forthcoming event. As previous studies have found share returns to rise significantly
several months prior to the official bid announcement, a 60-month parameter
estimation period, stretching from t-68 to t-9, where t refers to the month of the bid
123	 The majority of target companies shares are delisted soon after bid announcement. Consequently, data was
not available for all target companies during month t+1.
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announcement124 , has been applied in this study.
6.4.3.	 Return Data
With all three models applied in this study for estimating expected returns, return
data (incorporating dividend payments) rather than purely price data should be applied.
Return on a share can be calculated either on a discrete or a logarithmic basis.
Strong (1992) argued that,
"there are both theoretical and empirical reasons for preferring logarithmic
returns. Theoretically, logarithmic returns are analytically more tractable
when linking together sub-period returns over longer intervals (simply add
up the sub-period returns). Empirically, logarithmic returns are more likely
to be normally distributed and so conform to the assumptions of standard
statistical techniques." (p. 535).
Such log returns have been applied in this study, calculated as:
Ra = log[(Pa+Da)/Pit_ll
where
Pa
	the price of security i at the end of period t,
Da
	dividend (if any) announced for share i during time period t, and
P 1_1
	
the price of security i at the end of time period t-1 (adjusted for any
capitalisation changes).
Monthly log return data for domestic companies (cross-border takeover targets as well
as bidders and targets in domestic acquisitions) was obtained from the London
Business School Share Price Database, while for overseas bidders return data had to
be calculated separately from share price and dividend data, obtained from
Datastream and various other sources.
124	 The capital asset pricing model and the market model have only been applied for companies where at least
30 observations were available during the parameter estimation period.
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6.4.4.	 Choice of Market Indices
The share performance of the overseas bidding companies are compared to the
performance of a stock market index in the company's home market. It was decided
to use the Financial Times World Index for the country in question as a proxy for
calculating the return on the relevant market (R m) 125 . The main advantage of the FT
World Indices are that they are calculated on a consistent basis, weighted according
to market capitalisation and using arithmetic rather than geometric averaging 126. The
FT World Indices are, however, only available from January 1981. This has slightly
reduced the number of observations available for the beta estimation for takeover bids
that took place during 1986127.
As is the case with market indices in general, the FT World Indices do not adjust
for dividend payments. These indices are in other words price indices. Ideally,
adjustment should therefore be made for dividend payments by companies constituting
the index. However, obtaining the information required for such an adjustment would
be immensely complicated and time consuming. Another approach is to make an
adjustment for the overall dividend yield on the market. This approach was, for
example, used by Dimson and March (1983 and 1986), who stated that "index returns
are calculated by incorporating the published dividend yield...". (1986, p. 118).
However, such an approach was not possible in this study, again due to data
limitations. Dividend yield information for the FT World Indices is only available from
February 1986 onwards. Regrettably, it was therefore necessary to calculate return
125 Conn and Connell (1990) applied both a domestic market model (DMM) and an international market model
(IMM). They concluded, however, that "...there is no compelling reason to incur the extra research costs
associated with the more complex IMM". (p. 708). Consequently, in this study domestic models are used,
with the market portfolio proxied by the stock market index in the company's home market.
126 Some indices, especially older ones, are calculated in such a way that serious biases may be introduced.
(Economist (1996)). For example, the American Dow Jones index "...is price-weighted, with a stock with
a $100 share price counting for twice as much as a $50 share". (Financial Times (1996)). The old FT-30
index provides a geometric rather than an arithmetic mean. (Financial Times (1996)). The FT World Indices
do not suffer from such problems. However, as pointed out by e.g., Roll (1992), the FT indices "...generally
include only the larger and more liquid individuals stocks". (p. 8).
127	 For bids taking place in e.g., January 1986, the 60 month beta estimation period should ideally have
included data from May 1980 onwards.
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on the market indices without making adjustments for dividend payments as follows:
R 	 log (FTWIt/FTVVI m)
where
FTVVI	 Financial Times World Index price level for the relevant country.
For individual companies, the adjustment for dividend payments have an important
impact on the return data. This is due to dividend payments being "lumped" into one
(eg for Canadian, Danish, New Zealand, Norwegian and Swiss companies), two (eg
in Ireland, and Britain), or four (eg US) payments per year. For the market as a whole,
however, particularly if an overall annual dividend yield rate is being applied, the
adjustment for dividend payments is very smooth. Consequently, not adjusting R m for
dividend payments is likely to introduce much less bias than would have been the
effect of not adjusting Ri128.
The lack of sufficient dividend yield data caused problems in calculating the 'true'
yield on the market. Roll (1977) went further and argued that the stock market index
is in itself misspecified as a proxy for the return on the market. However, with regard
to the problems in calculating market returns, Schipper and Thompson (1983) argued
that "...whatever bias result from misspecification should be contained in the entire
matrix of residuals, both in and out of event periods. Unusual residual behaviour in
the event periods, relative to the residuals in the non-event periods, is suggestive of
something more than model misspecification". (p. 96). Thus, despite the
methodological difficulties encountered in this study (some of which are discussed in
more detail in section 6.5), it is believed that the abnormal returns (and the differences
in abnormal returns between different groups of shareholders) obtained in this study
give a fair indication of the impact on shareholder returns from acquisitions in or into
the UK.
128	 In his PhD thesis on cross-border acquisitions into the US, Song (1993) did not adjust share returns (R) for
dividend payments.
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6.4.5.	 Event Study Methodologies Applied in Study
As mentioned above, three different event study methodologies have been applied
in this study. This section contains a discussion of the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM), the market model (MM) and the index model (IM) as applied in the analysis.
a) The Capital Asset Pricing Model
The theoretical assumption underlying the capital asset pricing model, is that the
rate of return on a company's shares should be determined by the company's level of
systematic risk (as measured by /3), the return on the market, and the risk free rate of
return, as follows:
Rft = Rft + /3,(Rmt - Rft) +
where
R 	 return on share i (as previously defined) during time period t,
Rift	 the risk free rate of interest 129 during time period t 130 ,
the slope of the regression line (a measure of systematic risk of share
i)
R 	 return on market (as previously defined) in time period t, and
the regression residual.
/3 values were calculated using up to 60 monthly observations' from t-68 to t-9,
where t refers to the month of the bid announcement 132 . Abnormal returns (AR)
129 Where available (from Datastream), a short-term (generally 3 month) interest rate has been applied as a
proxy for the risk-free rate of return. The specific interest rates applied in this study were as follows:
Australia = 3 months Treasury bills, Canada = 3 months Treasury bills (auction), Denmark = Discount rate,
Eire = 3 months, France = 3 month money, Japan = 3 month bills, Netherlands = Netherland Interbank 3
months, New Zealand = Interbank 3 months, Norway = Discount rate, Sweden = Commercial Bank Prime
Lending, Switzerland = Commercial Bank Prime Lending, United Kingdom = 3 months Treasury bills
(discount), United States = 13 weeks Treasury bills (discount), and West Germany = Frankfurt Interbank 3
months.
130	 The interest rates have been converted from annual rates to monthly rates using 12th root.
131	 Neither the capital asset pricing model not the market model have been applied if less than 30 observations
were available during the parameter estimation period.
132 Limmack (1991) estimated parameters over a period from 67 to 7 months prior to the month of the bid
announcement. Limmack excluded the period from t-6 to t-1 from the parameter estimation period, so as
to avoid any problem of the parameters being influenced by bids being anticipated. As Limmack obtained
fairly high mean alpha values for bidding companies (0.006), it was decided to be even more cautious and
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were calculated for each month during the test period (from t-8 to t+5 for bidders, and
from t-8 to t+1 for targets) as:
ARft = Rft - [Rft + /3,(Rmt-Rft)]
The capital asset pricing model has been extensively tested, and several papers
have questioned the assumptions underlying the model. For example, Fama and
French (1992 and 1996) argued that /3 is not successful in explaining cross-sectional
variations in share returns. Instead, Fama and French argued that share returns were
associated with company size (discussed further in section 6.5.2) and the ratio of book
to market value of equity. Handa et al. (1993) also rejected CAPM, but argued that
the model was less inefficient the longer the return measurement interval. Reid (1980)
expressed concern regarding the application of CAPM in the analysis of mergers and
acquisitions.
"...One is left with a considerable feeling of discomfort with the way a very
special theoretical result, based on full general equilibrium reasoning, under
the assumption of identical estimates of the distribution of returns by all
agents, has been asked to provide a simple answer to the complicated
question of whether a takeover or merger is wealth creating". (p. 12).
Despite the potential problems associated with the capital asset pricing model, the
model has been applied in this study. While it is recognised that this model rests on
strict assumptions (which may not be met in practice), it is believed that the results
obtained using this model, particularly when viewed in conjunction with the other two
models, provide a valuable insight into the impact of acquisitions on shareholder
wealth.
use a slightly earlier time period (t-68, t-9) for the parameter estimation. (However, as discussed in section
6.5.1, the high bidding company a values observed in this study may indicate that even this time period was
not a period of 'normal returns). Conn and Connell (1990) observed large abnormal returns to US targets
in cross-border acquisitions during the period from t-9 to t-2. Thus, including this pre-bid period in the event
window in this study allows for a comparison with their results.
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b) The Market Model
Rather than being based on a theoretical return generating framework as the
capital asset pricing model, the market model is based on an empirical relationship
between market and share returns. As with the capital asset pricing model, the market
model parameters were estimated on monthly data for the time period t-68 to t-9. The
equation applied was as follows:
= a 1 + $1 R 	 Eit
where the variables are as defined for the capital asset pricing model, except for a,
which is the regression intercept.
Abnormal returns were calculated for the analysis period as
AR,t = R ft - (a1+
The key assumption of the market model (as applied in this study) is that the level
of expected return on a share is determined by a share's level of systematic risk, /3,
and that the relationship remains constant over time.
As was the case with CAPM, application of the market model has also been
criticised in the literature. Garrett (1991), for example, argues that "...the market model
as it stands may be inappropriate". (abstract). Similar views have been put forward
by e.g., Coutts eta!. (1994 and 1995). As mentioned above, Roll (1977) argued that
the market portfolio as applied in the market model, may be misspecified. Despite the
reservations expressed regarding the market model, the model has been applied in
this study, and as evident from the literature review in Chapters 3 and 4, the market
model is the most commonly used model in the existing literature. As argued by
Schipper and Thomson (1983) (and discussed in section 6.4.4), despite the potential
problems with model specification, any changes in the abnormal returns at the time of
a takeover provides an indication of the impact the event has had on shareholder
wealth.
c) The Index Model
The simplest model applied is the index model. This model is a variation of the
market model, but assumes a to be zero and /3 to be 1 for every share. In other
words, the expected rate of return on any share is equal to the return on the stock
market index for the same time period:
Rit = Rmt +
Abnormal returns are simply calculated as the difference between the return on the
share and the return on the market:
AR 	 Rit - Rmt
While the assumptions of the index model may be unrealistic, the model has
gained increased recognition in the takeover literature. For example, Franks and
Harris (1989), Limmack (1991), and Parkinson and Dobbins (1993) all applied the
index model (as well as other models), while Limmack (1990) based his analysis
exclusively on the index model. Brown and Warner (1980 and 1985) argued that in
most instances, the index model was no worse than the market model at detecting
abnormal returns. However, a number of advantages of the index model were of
particular relevance to this study. ' Firstly, due to the limited data requirements of the
index model, a larger number of acquisitions could be analysed using this model than
was the case for either the capital asset pricing model or the market mode1133.
Secondly, as discussed in section 6.5., a number of methodological difficulties, in
particular with regard to the estimation of alpha and beta values, raise questions
regarding the appropriateness of the market model and, to a lesser extent, the capital
asset pricing model.,
The analysis of the level of abnormal returns to target and bidding company
shareholders in cross-border and domestic acquisitions, and the analysis of cross-
border effects (as contained in Chapters 7 and 8), has been based on all three test
models. However, the cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns (contained in
133	 Sample sizes are detailed in Table 6.3.
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Chapters 7, 8 and 9), as well as the analysis of joint abnormal returns to pairs of target
and bidding company shareholders (Chapter 9), is based on the index mode1134.
Although the majority of previous research (as discussed in the literature review) has
been based on the market model, the index model was selected for the cross-sectional
analysis in order to maintain as large a sample size as possible.
6.4.6.	 Statistical Testing of Average Abnormal and Cumulative Abnormal
Returns
A number of different methods have been applied in the existing literature for
measuring the level of statistical significance of the abnormal return estimates. One
method, as described by Strong (1992) is to "... calculate the average abnormal return
and standard error across event securities to give a t-statistic as follows" (pp. 544-
545):
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where
t(N-1)
mean prediction error (estimated average abnormal return) for time
period t,
prediction error (estimated abnormal return) for security i during time
period t,
SE =	 standard error,
number of companies in the sample.
The test statistic is distributed according to the Student-t distribution with N-1
degrees of freedom. This method has been applied by e.g., Franks eta!. (1991), and
has been used in this study for the index model and the capital asset pricing model.
There are, however, some potential limitations of the t-test, as this test,
134	 Similarly, while Franks and Harris (1989) and Parkinson and Dobbins (1993) applied the same three test
models, their results were reported using only the index model.
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"...assumes independent drawings from an identically distributed normal
population. It is therefore implicitly assumed that the mean effect of the
event is identical across securities. In addition, no allowance is made for
variances of abnormal returns being unequal across securities or for cross-
correlation in abnormal returns". (Strong (1992), p. 545).
Salinger (1992) added that,
"...ignoring either the intertemporal or contemporaneous correlation of
residuals can result in significant underestimates of standard errors". (p. 39).
Several researchers (such as e.g., Fatemi and Furtado (1988) and Doukas and
Travlos (1988)) have adopted methods similar to Brown and Warner's Crude
Dependence Adjustment. This method takes into account "any cross-sectional
dependence in the performance measures..." (Brown and Warner (1980), p. 251). This
method has, however, not been adopted in this study. The takeover bids analysed in
this study took place over a 6 year period. There is therefore limited clustering of
event months, and no logical reason for expecting cross-sectional dependencies to be
present1".
A more powerful test than the Crude Dependence Adjustment, is the Patell
Standardised Residual (PSR) test, developed by Patell (1976) 136. "...When the
parameters of the market model are estimated from observations outside the TP [test
period], abnormal returns are prediction errors rather than true residuals and should
therefore be standardised...". (Strong, (1992), p. 545).
"The PSR test explicitly recognises the possibility of different residual variances
across securities, and weights the abnormal returns accordingly. But, as Patell notes,
135 In addition, in order to undertake the Crude Dependence Adjustment, a full set of residuals for the parameter
estimation period would have been required. While such residuals were available for the market model and
the capital asset pricing model, they were frequently not available for the index model (due to limited data
availability). If applying the Crude Dependence Adjustment to index model results, the index model sample
sizes would have been substantially reduced (equivalent to the market model samples).
136 The PSR test is explained in detail in Patel! (1976), pp. 254-260, and Strong (1992), pp. 545-547. The
following section draws extensively on the material from these two sources. The test has been used in other
studies, such as Bradley et a/. (1988), Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Kumar et a/. (1992) and Song (1993).
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Test period
A
the PSR test continues to assume cross-sectional independence of abnormal returns
and no change in residual variances between the ... parameter estimation period and
the test period". (Strong (1992), p. 546).
The statistical significance levels of the market model abnormal returns and
cumulative abnormal returns were calculated using the PateII Standardised Residuals
(PSR) test. In the explanations, the following general notation has been applied:
Estimation period period over which the market model parameters
have been estimated (t-68 to t-9 months),
period over which abnormal returns have been
estimated (t-8, t+1 for targets and t-8, t+5 for
bidders),
estimated value,
average/mean value,
individual security,
time period.
The procedures involved in calculating PSR can be summarised as follows:
1. Estimate the variance, S2 i , of the prediction errors (estimated abnormal returns)
(Ea) during the parameter estimation period,
E eft
2t=1 
-
T-2
where
number of observations during the estimation period.
2. Calculate C a, which is an adjustment for the increase in variance due to prediction
outside the estimation period.
(13,7n - Fine 
T	 T
E(Rnit - /4,n)2
-
— N(0,1)
where
R
	 on market index during time period t, and
average return on market index during parameter
estimation period.
3. Calculate PateII Standardised Residuals (Vit). The test statistic (of the statistical
significance of the abnormal return for a single company for a single time period)
is distributed Student-t with T-2 degrees of freedom.
Vft - 	 	 t(T-2)
\IF„
4. Calculate the Cumulative Patel! Standardised Residuals (WO over the event
window for each security. The test statistic (of the statistical significance of the
cumulative abnormal return for a single company) is distributed Student-t with T-2
degrees of freedom.
1
WiL =	 E 	 if	 t (T-2)\IL
where
length of event window (cumulative abnormal returns
have been calculated for different lengths of event
windows, ranging from 1 to 14 months).
5. Calculate the test statistic (Z vt) for the standardised average abnormal return for
time period t. This test statistic is distributed approximately unit normal for large
samples.
TR„, = —E R,„,
T
6. Calculate the test statistic (Z) for the standardised average cumulative abnormal
return for event window of length L. The test statistic is distributed approximately
unit Normal for large N.
ZwL.
(N
'1.1 7; -4
1 - N(0,1)
N
E WiL
1=1
When testing for the level of statistical significance of the difference in mean
abnormal returns to different samples, such as the testing of 'cross-border effects', the
t-test for differences in means has been applied. This t-statistic is calculated as
follows (Weiss and Hassett (1986), pp. 423):
xi X2
t - 	
-	
- Student- t
1/(sl2 i n1) + (41 n2)
where
5c,	 =	 mean abnormal return for sample 1,
a,	 =	 standard deviation of mean abnormal returns for sample 1, and
N i	=	 number of observations in sample 1.
The test statistic is distributed Student-t with degrees of freedom (df) given by:
KS12 / n1 ) + (41 n2)]2 
df - (si2 i ni )2	 (41 n2)2
	  + 	
n1 -1	 n2 - 1
6.4.7.	 Cross-Sectional Analysis
As discussed in Chapter 5, cross-sectional analysis was undertaken in an attempt
to ascertain the impact of bid characteristics on the levels of abnormal returns, and on
the differences in abnormal returns to shareholders in cross-border and domestic
acquisitions (cross-border effects).
As discussed in section 6.3.3, the variables included in the cross-sectional
analysis were whether the bid was launched by overseas or domestic bidders
(nationality), whether the bid was successful or failed (outcome), whether or not there
were more than one bidder pursuing the target company (competitive), whether or not
the terms of the offer were improved (revised), whether or not the offer included a full
cash alternative (pay), whether or not the bidding company held shares in the target
company prior to the bid announcement (stake), the relative pre-bid market values of
the target and bidding companies (rel size), and the market value of the company in
question (size).
If explanatory variables in multiple regression analysis (as used in the cross-
sectional analysis) are highly correlated, problems of collinearity may occur. The
correlation matrices for the explanatory variables are given in Tables Cl to C9 in
Appendix C. As can be seen from these tables, the correlation between the various
variables was generally low'. Consequently, collinearity appears not to have been
a serious problem in the cross-sectional analyses. However, for both target and
bidding companies in cross-border acquisitions, a surprisingly strong correlation
(-0.702) was found between method of payment and the relative size of targets and
bidders. It is worth noting, however (as specified in Table 6.4) the number of cross-
border acquisitions not including a full cash alternative was very small. These results
suggest that the few cross-border acquisitions were a full cash alternative was not
available involved acquisitions where target company was relatively large (relative to
the size of the bidder). In domestic acquisitions, the correlation between pay and
relative size was negligible.
In the cross-sectional analysis, index model cumulative abnormal returns have
been analysed for the whole analysis period (from t-8 to t+1 for targets and from t-8
to t+5 for bidders). In addition, cross-sectional analysis of pre-bid period (t-8, t-2) and
event period (t-1, t) cumulative abnormal returns have been undertaken for both
targets and bidders. However, data for the post-bid period (from t+1 to t+5) was only
available for bidding companies.
Thirteen different regression specifications are reported in the cross-sectional
137 E.g., Weiss and Hassell (1986), argued (p. 526) that correlation coefficients between -0.4 and +0.4 indicate
only weak linear correlation. Only 6 of the 210 correlation coefficients reported in Appendix C exceed ±
0.4.
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analysis (see e.g., Table 7.3). Firstly, each of the explanatory variables are analysed
in isolation 138
 (regressions 1 to 7). In the final regression (number 13), all the
explanatory variables are included. In addition, five different regression specifications
are analysed, which each applied different subsets of explanatory variables.
As discussed in Chapter 5, De et al. (1996) found successful bidding companies
to have lost significantly in competitive or revised bids. With regard to target company
shareholders, however, Limmack (1993) found competitive and revised offers to have
provided significantly different levels of abnormal returns. In regression 8, the effect
of bid outcome, bid competition, and revision of offer terms were analysed together,
in an attempt to establish which, if any, of these variables account for the cross-
sectional variation in abnormal returns.
Regression 9 looks at the link between bid outcome, the existence of competition
in the bid, and whether or not the bidder held a stake in the target prior to the bid
announcement. It may be hypothesised that offers in which the predator held a stake
in the target prior to the offer provided bidders with an advantage over other potential
predators (as suggested by e.g., Walkling and Edminster (1995)). If this is the case,
one would expect such offers to be less likely to be competitive or to prove
unsuccessful than bids in which the bidder held no pre-bid stake'.
As discussed in section 5.3.4, previous research has suggested that both target
and bidding company shareholders obtain higher abnormal returns in cash than in
equity offers. As indicated in Table 6.4, a much higher proportion of cross-border bids
included a full cash offer than was the case in domestic acquisitions. The differences
in the means of payment could therefore potentially help to explain any positive cross-
border effect. If method of payment provide a signal to investors regarding the 'true'
value of a company's shares (as suggested by e.g., Myers and Majluf (1984), Hansen
138	 In the analysis of cross-border effects as in e.g., Table 7.13, the Nationality variable is included as an
additional explanatory variable in all regressions.
139 Appendix C indicates that, as one would expect, competitive bids are more likely to fail than are single-
bidder offers. However, contrary to expectations, the correlation between stake and outcome or competition
was generally very low.
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(1987) and Fishman (1989)), method of payment may be associated with the outcome
of the offer or the level of competition for the target 140. These relationships have
been analysed in regressions 10 and 11.
Previous literature has highlighted the impact of both company size and the
relative size of the target and bidding companies. In regression 12, these two
variables were analysed jointly, in order to ascertain which of the two size effects is
of most importance.
6.5.	 Methodological Difficulties Encountered in the Study 
6.5.1.	 Parameter Estimation
While the share price behaviour of a single company may reasonably be expected
to deviate substantially from that of the market index, one would expect a large
portfolio of companies to behave in a manner similar to that of the overall market
index. Consequently, the mean a for a large portfolio of companies is expected to be
close to 0, while the mean 13 should be close to 1. (This is the assumption underlying
the index model). However, such mean values were generally not observed for the
sample companies in this study. As reported in Table 6.6, the mean a, particularly for
bidding companies, was substantially above 0, while the mean market model and
capital asset pricing model Os for all samples were below 1. As reported in Table 6.7,
previous studies (based on the market model) have obtained similar positive alpha
values for bidders and generally, although not consistently, beta values of less than
1.
There are two main potential explanations for these parameter estimates. Firstly,
companies involved in takeover activity may in some way be different from the
companies which constitute the overall market indices. A second possibility is that the
a and 13 values obtained in this study suffer from estimation problems.
140	 It is acknowledged, however, that (as indicated in Appendix C) the correlation between pay and either bid
outcome or the level of competition, was generally low.
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Table 6.6.
Analysis of Market Model and Capital Asset Pricing Model
Parameters
This table reports statistics for the regression coefficients obtained in this study. The parameters have been
estimated using a minimum of 30 monthly observations during the 60-month period from t-68 to t-9, where
t refers to the month of the bid announcement.
Cross-
Border
Targets
Domestic
Targets
Cross-
Border
Bidders
Domestic
Bidders
Sample size I	 118 442 50/48141 361
Market
Model
Alpha
values
Mean -0.00046 0.00382 0.00923 0.01007
Std 0.0214 0.0160 0.0183 0.0154
Max 0.0464 0.0618 0.0881 0.0580
Min -0.1422 -0.0491 -0.0282 -0.0486
Percent
negative
46.6% 39.1% 22.0% 20.5%
Beta
values
Mean 0.8570 0.8041 0.7884 0.9216
Std 0.3500 0.4255 0.4614 0.3750
Max 1.6134 2.0664 1.6277 2.003
min142
-0.3628 -2.2047 -0.3883 -0.8974
Percent
negative
1.7% 2.0% 10.0% 2.2%
Capital
Asset
Pricing
Model
Beta
values
Mean 0.8592 0.8165 0.8137 0.9488
Std 0.3514 0.4215 0.4377 0.3651
Max 1.6184 2.0439 1.6233 1.9909
Min -0.4624 -2.0969 -0.1755 -0.8591
Percent
negative
1.7% 2.3% 6.3% 1.4%
Conn and Connell (1990) and Connell and Conn (1993) found that the cumulative
abnormal returns were highly sensitive to the period over which the market model
parameters were estimated: "The sensitivity of CAR estimates to the different
141	 The sample size of 50 refers to the market model, and 48 to the capital asset pricing model.
142	 While the range of beta values obtained in this study was larger than those reported by e.g., Connell and
Conn (1993), a similar large spread (from -0.1032 to +2.6101) was obtained by Francis et a/. (1993).
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Table 6.7.
Comparative Analysis of Average Market Model Parameters
Estimation period refers to the time period over which the market model parameters (a and /I) were
estimated. All studies applied data from the time period prior to the period of the bid announcement (pre).
For bidding companies, Connell and Conn (1993) also applied parameters estimated over a period after the
bid announcement (post) and a combination of the two (pooled).
Bidding Companies
Authors Market Estimation
period
a /3
Franks and Harris (1989) UK Pre 0.0095 0.92
Limmack (1991) UK Pre 0.006 0.86
Connell and Conn (1993) UK Pre 0.0029 1.0609
Pooled -0.0033 1.0706
Post -0.0087 1.0488
US Pre 0.0014 0.8055
Pooled -0.0025 0.8032
Post -0.0067 0.8189
Target Companies
Authors Market Estimation
period
a 13
Franks and Harris (1989) UK Pre 0.0044 N.A.
Limmack (1991) UK Pre 0.002 0.71
Connell and Conn (1993) UK Pre -0.0008 0.5899
US Pre -0.0031 1.0221
estimation periods appear to result from a significant decline in the intercept term,
alpha, of the market model from a positive to a negative value from pre to post-event
estimation". (Connell and Conn (1993), p. 63). (See Table 6.7). It may be that
companies decide to acquire other companies following a period of unusual good
share price performance (as argued by e.g., Kennedy and Limmack (1996)). If the
market model parameters are estimated during such an exceptional time period, it is
possible that the a values will be inflated. In this study the parameters have been
estimated over a long (60 month) period, ending nine months prior to the month of the
bid announcement. Such a long parameter estimation period was adopted in an
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attempt to overcome some of the parameter estimation problems. However, as shown
in Table 6.6, positive alpha values were obtained for almost 80% of the bidding
companies. If the assumptions of the capital asset pricing model hold, one would
expect the mean market model alpha values to be close to (143 1 )Rf. If so, the mean
alpha value should be 0.00112 for cross-border and 0.00044 for domestic bidders143.
The observed alpha values for bidding companies are, however, substantially above
these levels. The high positive mean alpha values indicate that over the 14 month
event period (t-8, t+5), the average overseas bidding company and the average
domestic bidding company is expected to have a rate of return of 11.36% or 13.48%,
respectively, in addition to the rate of return required to compensate for the share's
level of systematic risk. These large positive mean a values may indicate that even
this long parameter estimation period was insufficient to overcome the problem of
positive mean a values being caused by exceptionally good pre-bid share performance
of both overseas and domestic bidding companies. The high a values explain why,
as discussed in Chapter 8, the market model suggested significantly lower abnormal
returns to shareholders of bidding companies than did the capital asset pricing model
and the index model.
Another interpretation of the high (bidding company) a values and low /3 values
observed in this study, is that these results were caused by 'thin' or nonsynchronous
trading. "Nonsynchronous trading of securities introduces into the market model a
potentially serious econometric problem of errors in variables". (Scholes and Williams
(1977), p. 309). "The major source of bias is the tendency for prices recorded at the
end of a time period to represent the outcome of a transaction which occurred earlier
in or prior to the period in question". (Dimson (1979), p. 179). As was explained by
Fowler et al. (1980), /3 will be downwardly biased if the share is less frequently traded
than the index, and upwardly biased if the share is more frequently traded than the
143	 These approximations of the mean expected constant terms are calculated using the capital asset pricing
model 13 values (using data for months t-68 to t-9) and the risk free interest rate for month t.
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average share in the index144.
In this study, high a values and low 13 values were observed, in particular for the
overseas bidding companies. These parameter estimates may have been caused by
the shares of the overseas bidding companies being less frequently traded than the
stock market indices in the relevant markets. It should be remembered, however, that
infrequent trading has generally been found to be of greater concern in studies based
on daily rather than monthly data (Scholes and Williams (1977) and Brown and Warner
(1985)). In addition, nonsynchronous trading may be predominately a feature of small
companies (see Roll (1981)). Although some of the overseas bidding companies
included in this study were small, the majority of bidders were large organisations145.
Thin trading has thus generally been considered to be more of a cause of concern in
studies of target companies. The mean 13 values for the target companies in this study
are substantially below 1. However, such low target company 13 estimates are not
restricted to this study. Indeed, as indicated in Table 6.7, several previous studies
have reported even lower target company beta values.
Various approaches can be adopted when faced with thin trading problems. In
an analysis of insider trading, Pope eta!. (1980) applied a screening process whereby
"...any thinly-traded security was eliminated from the sample..." (p. 365). Such a
procedure has not been applied in this study for two main reasons. Firstly, such a
procedure would require data on the occurrence of non-trading, something which was
not readily available. A potentially more serious problem, however, would have been
the reduction in the sample sizes. Consequently, no attempt has been made to
eliminate infrequently traded shares from the sample.
Another approach is to try to correct the beta values for the effect of thin trading,
144 In the UK, share price data is based on price quotations, not transaction prices. It is thus possible for the
recorded share price in the UK to change even if no transaction takes place. It may thus be argued that
the problems associated with slow price adjustments due to thin trading is less of a problem in a market
(such as the UK) where price quotations are reported than in other markets (e.g., the US) where share price
data refer to transaction prices.
145	 As reported in Table 6.5, the mean pre-bid market value of the overseas bidders was £2,374.6 millions,
although the standard deviation was high, at £3,554.0 millions.
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as did e.g., Franks et al. (1977). While these techniques, with various degrees of
sophistication (and data requirements), attempt to adjust for the thinness of trading
problem, Fowler, Rorke and Jog (1980) were critical as to the usefulness of these
models (interestingly, their criticism also extended to a model developed by two of the
authors). Fowler et al. (1980) evaluated the effectiveness of four beta correction
techniques. These were (i) the Scholes and Williams technique (Scholes and Williams
(1977)), (ii) the Scholes and Williams Extended (as developed by Fowler and Rorke
(1979) and discussed in Fowler et al. (1980), (iii) the Scholes and Williams with Jafnike
technique, and (iv) the Dimson techniq ue-146 (Dimson (1979)). They concluded that
"in general, the OLS [ordinary least squares] beta estimates seem to be better than
those produced using any of the bias correcting techniques. ... Overall, there does not
yet exist a technique that seems to have general applicability and effectiveness in
reducing the thin trading bias so as to produce any significant improvement over the
OLS estimator using a conventionally calculated index". (p. 89). Fairly similar
conclusions were reached by Brown and Warner (1985), who argued that
"methodologies based on procedures suggested by Scholes and Williams and of
Dimson do seem to reduce biases in OLS estimates of 13. However, the specification
and power of the actual tests for abnormal performance is similar to that obtained with
the OLS market model, and this conclusion applies to samples having trading
frequencies systematically different from average". (p. 26).
Dimson and March (1983) suggested yet another method for obtaining unbiased
beta estimates in the presence of thinly traded shares. Their `trade-to-trade technique'
involves matching the length of time over which market and share returns are
calculated. This method, however, is rather complicated to implement, as it requires
data on the specific timing of the last transaction during each time period (e.g., month).
146 Fowler and Rorke (1983) argued that "...the Dimson procedure is incorrect and cannot generally be expected
to yield consistent beta estimates". (p. 279). Roll (1981), however, had reservations regarding Fowler and
Rorke's comment: "Fowler and Rorke argue that Dimson's method is biased. However, I have been unable
to ascertain whether they are correct and whether the bias is material if it exists. The empirical evidence
[in Roll's paper] indicate that the bias is probably not very large". (p. 885).
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Consequently, such a technique has not been adopted in this study147.
Baker et al. (1995) argued that a large number of shares listed on the London
Stock Exchange "...may be classified as thinly traded. (p. 1). However, in their
analysis, Baker et a/. found that "calculation of excess returns using models which
incorporate leads and lags [one method of correcting for thin trading] does not
materially affect the results...". (p. 6).
Despite the various beta correction techniques suggested in the literature, none
appears to be very successful at improving the quality of the parameter estimates 148 .
Consequently, no adjustment for thin trading have been made to the market model or
capital asset pricing model parameters in this study.
6.5.2.	 Stock Market Size Effect
One of the most important stock market anomalies established in the literature
(and one which may have a direct impact on the results obtained in analyses of
takeover activity), is the 'size effect'. Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) established
that companies with low market capitalisation, on average, experienced higher rates
of share returns than did larger companies. Although the size effect appeared to have
been strong and to have been present over a long time period (e.g., Banz based his
analysis on US data from 1926 to 1975), Banz warned against placing too much
emphasis on the results:
147 It is worth noting that Bowie and Bradfield (1996) argued that the trade to trade technique may not fully
overcome the problems associated with thin trading. They found that there was a tendency for ordinary
least squares to overestimate the /3 coefficients for thinly traded securities.
148 Draper and Paudyal (1995) analysed the effectiveness of various techniques for calculating robust /3
estimates, to control for the impact of non-normal share distributions. While there was some merit in the
application of these techniques when applying daily data, "...a similar conclusion does not hold for estimates
derived from monthly data". (p. 175). In addition, they were unable to identify any single beta correction
technique which would universally provide 'better' 13 estimates than those obtained using the normal OLS
procedures, and argued that "a definitive answer is impossible". (p. 164).
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"It is not known whether size per se is responsible for the effect or whether
size is just a proxy for one or more true unknown factors correlated with
size". (Banz (1981), p. 3).
Levis (1988) analysed the average return for 10 different size-portfolios of UK
shares over the 1966 to 1982 period. He discovered that "the smallest portfolio seems
to outperform its largest counterpart by about 6 per cent per annum". (p. 161).
Similarly, looking at average stock returns in the UK over the 1984 to 1989 period,
Miller (1992) found the equally weighted geometric mean return to have been 26.2%,
while the capitalisation weighted geometric mean was 20.2%. (p. 21). These numbers
suggest that, on average, higher returns were earned by smaller companies than by
larger ones (as smaller firms would have a higher weighting in the equally weighted
than in the value weighted mean). Thus, historically, a size effect appears to have
been present in the UK.
Other researchers have argued that other market anomalies were associated with
firm size. For example, Keim (1983) argued that 50% of the annual size effect (in the
US) took place in January. Similar observations were made by Blume and Stambaug
(1983), Reinganum (1983) and Chen (1988). For the UK, Baker and Limmack (1995)
and Baker et a/. (1995) established that the historic excess returns to small firms has
been particularly strong in January and to a lesser extent in April. The size effect thus
appears to have, at least partially, been associated with a seasonality effect149.
Pope, Morris and Peel (1990) gave two reasons as to why small companies may
appear to have higher returns than larger firms:
149 The possibility of a calendar effect has not been controlled for in this study. While day of the week and
month of the year effects may have an impact on estimated abnormal returns (Draper and Paudyal (1995)),
controlling for such effects is of more relevance to studies applying either daily data or short 'event windows'.
The event window in this study is close to a year (10 months for targets (t-8, t+1) and 14 months (t-8, t+5)
for bidders). Consequently, any seasonality effect, if present, would be expected to have little impact on
the overall level of estimated average cumulative abnormal returns. In addition, the takeover
announcements analysed in this thesis were spread over a six year period with no apparent clustered in
particular calendar months (the bid announcement dates are specified in Appendix A and B). As argued
by Baker and Limmack (1995), the findings from their analysis of firm size and monthly seasonalities have
particular relevance "...for those undertaking research in which clustering of event dates is likely to be a
feature". (p. 2).
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"First, the transactions costs of trading in the shares of small firms are
typically greater than those of dealing in the securities of larger companies,
and consequently the realisable abnormal returns ... will be overstated...
Second, in the relatively thin market for small company shares, market
prices and quotations tend to be particularly sensitive to the volume of a
transaction...". (p. 375).
However, no comprehensive theory regarding the cause of the size effect appears to
have been established yet.
The size effect, if present, may cause problems for studies of mergers and
acquisitions, such as this one (Dimson and March (1988)). As indicated previously in
this chapter, takeover targets tend to be significantly smaller than the average bidding
company. If takeover targets are also smaller than the average company in the stock
market index used to estimate expected returns, the target may, if a market size
anomaly is present, be seen to have outperformed the market even if the event itself
had no impact on share prices. Consequently, with e.g., the index model, the
'abnormal' return may be overestimated, with part of the CAR being due to the size
effect rather than to the announcement of the bid. As explained by Dimson and March
(1984), it has been suggested that the size effect may be less of a problem with the
market model, as the alpha term may incorporate the size effect. However, as argued
by e.g., Dimson and March (1986), there may still be a problem if the magnitude and
direction of the size effect is not constant over time. Indeed, in his analysis, Keim
(1983) found the magnitude of the size effect to have been highly volatile.
With regard to bidding companies, these, generally large firms, may have
underperformed relative to the index due to their size rather than due to the 'event'.
With bidding companies, the market model (pre-bid) alpha values may not be a
sufficient adjustment for the size effect (even assuming the size effect to be constant
over time), as the size of the bidder will change on the completion of the acquisition.
Consequently, the size effect, if large, may result in an underestimate of the
performance of large bidders.
Banz (1981) noted that the size effect may have an important impact on the theory
of mergers, as
"...large firms are able to pay a premium for the stock of small firms since
they will be able to discount the same cash flows at a smaller discount rate".
(p. 17).
However, Banz did provide a warning, in that
"naturally, this might turn out to be completely nonsense if size were to be
shown to be just a proxy". (p. 17).
Fama and French (1992), however, added further support to the size anomaly.
They tested a large number of possible factors which may have an impact on share
returns 150. They found size (as well as book to market value of equity) to be
important explanatory variables. Fama and French concluded that the size effect was
indeed real, and not simply a proxy for other variables. However, the authors also
acknowledged that, while the size effect had been present in the US over the 1963 to
1990 period, we do not know whether the size effect will continue to be present in the
future.
Although Fama and French (1992) argued that the size effect is not simply a proxy
for other anomalies, it is still not fully understood why returns appears to be higher for
small companies than for firms with high market capitalisations. An additional
complication present, is that Banz (1981) found the size effect to be neither linear nor
exponential. Instead, he observed that very small companies had systematically
superior returns, while there was little difference in the return between the medium
sized and the large firms. The size effect (if present) can thus only explain
acquisitions of small companies, and not mergers between large companies who are
already capitalised at a high rate.
150 Contrary to the capital asset pricing model and the market model predictions, Fama and French found the
level of systematic risk (13) to have very little explanatory power of the cross-sectional variation in share
returns.
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One approach to control for the possibility of a size effect, would be to compare
share returns to a portfolio of companies of similar size', rather than relying on
general market indices. However, such a procedure has not been adopted in this
study. Firstly, there is a theoretical consideration. While the size effect appears to be
present, little seems to be known as to why there should be a size effect. Secondly,
as company size would change every time the share price changed, constant
adjustments to the portfolios would be required. Such an approach would be
excessively cumbersome. Thirdly, as acknowledged by Banz, the direction and
magnitude of the size effect varies over time. Malkiel (1990) added: "No sooner had
it [the small firm effect] been discovered in the early 1980s than it failed to work: Small
stocks were relatively poor performers throughout the bull market of the 1980s". (p.
194). It is thus difficult to allow for size variations in empirical studies. Lakonishok
(1988) added that,
"many of us are very doubtful if small companies will outperform large in the
future. For example, in the last three years small companies did not perform
well. Therefore, we should not automatically adjust for size". (p. 216).
Further, Lakonishok did not find adding the size effect as a variable in the analysis to
have been beneficial. An alternative means of controlling for a size effect, is to include
size as an explanatory variable in the cross-sectional analysis. This is the approach
adopted in this study, where both the log pre-bid market value of the company in
question, as well as the relative size of the target and bidding companies, have been
included in the cross-sectional analysis.
151 Franks et a!. (1991), Kennedy and Limmack (1996) and Sudarsaman (1996) all applied size-matched control
portfolios as one of their benchmarks against which companies' returns were analysed. Kennedy and
Limmack argued that the "results ... are consistent with the observation (Franks and Harris, 1989; and
Dobbins and Parkinson, 1993) that standard benchmarks over-estimate abnormal performance in targets
and under-estimate abnormal performance in bidding companies". (p. 281). However, Kennedy and
Limmack do not report the significance of the difference in the level of abnormal returns obtained using
either the FT All Share Index or Size-Matched Portfolios.
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6.5.3.	 Analysis of Abnormal Returns to Bidding Companies
a) Bid Programmes and Information Leakage
In addition to the difficulties discussed above, there are further complications
encountered in measuring abnormal returns to shareholders of bidding companies.
As argued by Roll (1988a), It is much easier to ascribe price movements to the bid
when the firm is surprised. The bidding firm is not surprised, and this complicates the
attribution of price movements of its shares to the takeover event". (p. 242). However,
while Roll is correct in arguing that the managemenet of the bidding company may not
have been surprised by the bid, it is far from certain that the bid was not a surprise to
the shareholders of the bidding company.
A related problem was highlighted by Schipper and Thomson (1983). They
measured "...the impact of acquisition activity on firm value by differentiating between
specific merger events and programs of acquisition activity". (p. 85). They argued that
bidders often announce a plan to undertake several acquisitions in the future. As the
stock market is likely to react to announcements of such bid programmes, there is a
possibility that the share price reaction to subsequent merger announcements will not
reflect the full benefit or cost of the merger, but rather result in an adjustment to
previous expectations. Similar arguments were put forward by Jensen and Ruback
(1983) who argued that "since stock price changes reflect changes in expectations, a
merger announcement will have no effect if its terms are fully anticipated in the market.
Furthermore, targets are acquired once at most, whereas bidders can engage in
prolonged acquisition programs". (p. 18).
Any study focusing on individual acquisition announcements (such as this study)
may not capture the full wealth effect (to the bidding company shareholders) of a bid
announcement, if the bid is partially anticipated. This is an inherent limitation of this
kind of study, and is acknowledged. However, even if the stock market predicts future
acquisitions, they are unlikely to know the specific timing and nature of such
transactions (otherwise, one would expect there to be no element of 'surprise' to
shareholders of target companies either).
Event study methodology, as the name implies, involves an analysis of the impact
on shareholder wealth from certain 'events', such as mergers and acquisitions. The
possibility of the event being anticipated is an inherent problem in studies of takeover
activity based on such methodology. However, in order to minimise the problem
caused by potential bid leakage, this study applies a relatively long event-window,
including a period of 8 months prior to the month of the bid announcement.
Consequently, the effect of bid leakage should be captured in the pre-bid abnormal
returns.
b) Relative Market Values of Target and Bidding Companies
Jensen and Ruback (1983) argued that "...measuring the gains to bidding firms
is ... difficult because bidders are generally much larger than target firms. Thus, even
when the dollar gains from the takeover are split evenly between bidder and target
firms, the dollar gains to bidders translate into smaller percentage gains". (p. 20). In
this study the average pre-bid market value of overseas bidders was 15.7 times that
of the target companies in cross-border acquisitions, while the respective figure for
domestic UK acquisitions was 4.7. As discussed in Chapter 5, previous research
(such as Loderer and Martin (1990) and Franks et al. (1991)) has highlighted the
impact of relative company size on bidding companies' abnormal returns. In this
study, company size (as measured by their pre-bid market value of equity), as well as
the relative size of the bidder and target, are included as variables in the cross-
sectional analysis. In addition, in Chapter 9, the abnormal returns to pairs of bidders
and targets are analysed. These joint abnormal returns directly control for the different
market values of bidders and targets, thus overcoming some of the problems identified
by Jensen and Ruback (1983).
c) Joint Abnormal Returns and Pre-Bid Stakes by Bidders in Target Companies
As indicated above, in Chapter 9 joint abnormal returns to shareholders of pairs
of target and bidding companies are analysed. Similar analyses were undertaken by
Firth (1980) and Limmack (1991) for the UK, and Maquieira eta!. (1995) for the US.
A potential complication in such analysis arise when the acquiring company holds a
toehold stake in the target company prior to the bid announcement. When this is the
case, the abnormal returns to the bidder will, in part, be influenced by the abnormal
return to the target, as reflected in the bidder's share holding. When combining the
abnormal returns to targets and bidders, there is thus a potential danger of the joint
abnormal returns overstating the total shareholder impact of the acquisition, by double-
counting part of the abnormal return to target company shareholders.
One way to overcome this problem would be to calculate the combined cumulative
abnormal returns as the abnormal returns to shareholders of the bidding company plus
the abnormal return on the fraction of target shares not held by the bidder prior to the
bid announcement. This approach would, however, require detailed information on the
size of the toehold in every transaction. In this study, data regarding pre-bid stakes
was obtained from Acquisitions Monthly. This source did not always provide
information regarding the size of any toehold. Consequently, as reliable data with
regard to the size of any toehold was not available, the transactions have only been
classified according to whether or not the bidding company held a stake in the target
company prior to launching the takeover bid.
Due to the data limitations, no direct adjustment for the effect of pre-bid stakes by
bidders in targets could be made to the joint cumulative abnormal returns152.
However, the impact of pre-bid stakes is analysed in the cross-sectional analysis.
152 Similarly, Limmack (1991) and Maquieira et al. (1995) made no such adjustment. Firth (1980), however,
made such an adjustment, in addition to exclude from the sample bids in which the predator held a stake
of 30% or more of the target company's shares prior to launching the bid.
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6.5.4.	 Bidding Company Post-Announcement 'Drift'
Event study methodology is based on the assumption that stock markets are
efficient, and that the share price of a company will react quickly to the release of new
information. With regard to mergers and acquisitions, the main 'event' has generally
been deemed to be the announcement of the takeover bid, although previous research
(as indicated in the literature review) has indicated that share prices, particularly of the
target companies, react prior to the official bid announcement.
If the stock market is able to fully assess the proposed acquisition at the time of
the bid announcement, one would expect abnormal returns, if any, during the period
following the bid announcement to be small. However, as discussed in Chapter 8,
overseas bidding companies, on average, experienced negative abnormal returns in
every month during the post-event period (t+1, t+5). According to the market model,
domestic bidding companies also encountered large negative abnormal returns during
this period 153 . The results in this study, particularly for cross-border bidders, thus
display a strong post-announcement 'drift' in abnormal returns.
Previous research, such as Asquith (1983), Franks eta!. (1988), Franks and Harris
(1989), Limmack (1991) and Agrawal et al. (1992), have observed similar negative
post-event abnormal returns. As outlined by Fama (1991), there is an ongoing debate
as to what may explain such post-event drift. There are at least three possible
explanations.
Firstly, it may be the case that price sensitive information was released to the
market after the official bid announcement. For example, the eventual outcome of the
bid will not have been known until some time after the offer was made. As argued by
Roll (1986), "At the original bid announcement ... there is only a probability of success.
Between the bid announcement and the final outcome this probability goes to 1.0 for
the bids in the successful group. Thus, if the combination itself has value for the
153 The index model and the capital asset pricing model indicated more neutral post-bid returns to domestic UK
bidders. This may suggest that the negative 'drift in market model returns for domestic bidders were due
to estimation problems rather than being an indication of market inefficiency.
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bidder, these bidding firms should increase in value over this interim period. They do
not". (p. 209).
The proposition that the negative drift is attributable to the failed bidders is not fully
supported by the data for cross-border bidders in this study. While the average time
from bid announcement until the bid was declared unconditional (in the successful
cross-border acquisitions) was approximately 31 days (standard deviation of 29 days),
the largest negative post-announcement abnormal returns were observed during
month t+5. It is not yet known why such large negative abnormal returns were
encountered during this month. A further problem with the information release
hypothesis, is that while bidding companies in failed takeover bids performed worse
than successful bidders (as indicated in Table 8.4), the negative cumulative abnormal
returns over the post-bid period observed for cross-border bidders were not confined
to predators in failed bid attempts. All groups of cross-border bidders, on average,
appears to have experienced abnormal share price losses during this time period.
A second possible explanation is that the negative post-announcement abnormal
returns to bidders were due to the bidding companies overpaying for their targets, but
the market being slow to realise this overpayment. This would be consistent with the
'hubris' hypothesis suggested by Roll (1986). "One possibility is that acquiring firms
on average pay too much for their target firms, but the market only realizes this slowly;
the market is inefficient". (Fama (1991), p. 1602). Market inefficiency was also offered
as a possible explanation for post-earnings announcement drift by Brown and Pope
(1995). Agrawal et al. (1992), however, did not find support for this hypothesis.
Limmack (1991) found the negative post-event drift to have been predominately
attributable to smaller bidding companies, and argued that "...while the market takes
a considerable period to adjust to bids made by smaller companies, market reaction
to bids undertaken by larger companies is more rapid and takes place in the period
immediately surrounding the bid". (pp. 248-149). The results in this study tend to
support Limmack's findings. The cross-sectional analyses (as reported in Chapter 8)
reveal that, in both cross-border and domestic acquisitions, small bidders have
performed significantly worse than larger ones during the post-bid (t+1, t+5) period.
The slow adjustment of share prices for smaller companies may be associated with
the problem of nonsynchroneous trading, as discussed in section 6.5.1.
A third possible explanation for the post-announcement drift is that it is caused by
model misspecification. All three models applied in this study (the index model, capital
asset pricing model, and the market model) assume fl to remain constant over time.
The models do therefore not allow for any changes in risk. If the level of systematic
risk of the bidder changes over the time period of the bid, this may render the models
inappropriate. Franks et al. (1991) investigated this point, and argued that "...our
results indicate that prior findings of negative postmerger share-price performance for
bidders are more likely due to benchmark errors than to mispricing at the time of the
announcement". (p. 95). Some researchers have, however, gathered evidence
rejecting the theory that post-announcement drift is caused by inadequate
measurement of risk changes. Agrawal et al. (1992) analysed the post-merger
performance of US acquiring firms (1955-1987), and "...conclude that Franks, Harris
and Titman's [1991] results are specific to their sample period". (p. 1614). Agrawal et
al. found that "...neither the firm size effect nor beta estimation problems are the cause
of the negative post-merger returns". (p. 1605). In their study of earnings
announcements, Ball et al. (1993) argued that "the results suggest that post-
announcement drift persists after controlling for risk changes, but it is weaker than
reported previously [when risk was assumed to be constant]". (p. 632). Brown and
Pope (1995) did not find the post-earnings announcement drift to be an artefact of the
experimental design. Similarly, Bernard and Thomas (1989) "...concluded that much
of our evidence cannot plausibly be reconciled with arguments built on risk
measurement but is consistent with a delayed price response". (p. 34). Thus, the
explanation of the post-announcement drift still eludes us.
In this study, statistically significant negative abnormal returns were observed for
the post announcement period for cross-border bidders using all three test models,
and for domestic bidders using the market mode1 154. The post-event drift was
particularly strong for smaller bidders, indicating a potential market inefficiency.
Insufficient post announcement return data was available to test for a significant
change in the level of systematic risk of the overseas bidders'''. It is therefore not
known whether the negative post-announcement abnormal returns were predominately
attributable to information release, market inefficiency, or model misspecification. This
is an area which would benefit from further research.
6.6.	 Conclusion 
This chapter contains a discussion of the data used and the methodology applied
in this study, which focuses on the impact of domestic and cross-border acquisitions
into the UK during the 1986-1991 period on the wealth of target and bidding
companies' shareholders.
Studies focusing on cross-border acquisitions, such as this one, face problems
relating to data availability. As evident from the literature review (Chapter 4), the
majority of the literature on cross-border acquisitions tends to be limited to an analysis
of US target and/or bidding companies, or an analysis of acquisitions between UK and
US companies. This appears to be at least partially attributable to the difficulty of
obtaining return data for companies based outside these two countries. As argued by
Marr et al. (1993), "...data on foreign firm's wealth effects are not readily available". (p.
290). Similarly, while Datta and Puia (1995) recognised the need for studies analysing
returns to both target and bidding company shareholders, they argued that "...such
studies would definitely have to limit the sample to acquisitions in a few countries (e.g.,
154 Franks and Harris (1989) did also find large negative post-event abnormal returns with the market model,
while no drift was apparent for the index model and the capital asset pricing model. As discussed in section
6.5.1. above, the difference in abnormal returns between the market model and the other models, may be
associated with parameter estimation problems.
155	 For example, Conn and Connell (1990) applied observations for both the pre- and post-bid period in their
estimation of market model parameters.
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UK) where stock returns are more readily available". (p. 355). With regard to the
cross-border acquisitions, this study contains an analysis of the overseas bidding
companies as well as the UK target companies. By contacting numerous stock
exchanges and various companies directly (to fill the gaps in the Datastream files),
return data was obtained for 71 overseas bidding companies based in 14 different
countries. This data allow for an analysis of national variations. In addition, having
data for both target and bidding company shareholders (in both cross-border and
domestic acquisitions) allows for an analysis of overall (joint) wealth effects, as well
as an analysis of cross-border effects.
In the existing literature, various test models (such as the market model, the
adjusted /3 model, the capital asset pricing model and the index model) have been
applied in the analysis of the wealth effect of acquisitions. In addition, different
parameter estimation periods and event windows have been adopted. As different
models may provide substantially different results, there are potential limitations of
basing the analysis on a single model. In addition, short event windows (as frequently
applied, particularly in US studies) are unlikely to capture the full wealth effect of
acquisitions, due to bid leakage and post-event 'drift'. In this study, three different test
models have therefore been applied (the market model, the capital asset pricing model
and the index model). In addition, long parameter estimation period (from month t-68
to t-9) and long event windows (from t-8 to t+5 for bidders and from t-8 to t+1 for
targets and joint returns) have been applied in this study.
This chapter also contains a discussion of the main methodological difficulties
encountered in this study, including parameter estimation, size effects, analysing
abnormal returns to bidding company shareholders and post-announcement 'drift'.
With regard to parameter estimation, the bidding company market model constant (a)
terms were on average positive and large. This caused the mean market model
abnormal returns to bidding company shareholders to be substantially lower than those
obtained using either of the other models. Due to the parameter estimation problems,
it is believed that the index model provide the most appropriate benchmark against
which to evaluate bidding company returns. For bidding companies, there was also
a problem of significant negative abnormal returns being observed for the months
following the bid announcement (post-announcement 'drift'). Potential causes for the
drift include information release, inefficient markets and model misspecification.
However, none of these factors appear to fully account for the drift, which cause still
eludes us.
CHAPTER 7
ANALYSIS OF ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR
SHAREHOLDERS OF LISTED UK COMPANIES
TARGETED IN CROSS-BORDER AND DOMESTIC
ACQUISITIONS
7.1.	 Summary 
In acquisitions in the UK during the 1986-1991 period, shareholders of the 143
listed UK companies targeted in cross-border acquisitions and shareholders of the 568
target companies in domestic UK acquisitions, on average, suffered negative abnormal
returns during the early pre-bid period (from t-8 to t-3, where t refers to the bid
announcement month). Over the following four month period (t-2, t+1), however, large
positive abnormal returns were, on average, earned by shareholders of both categories
of target companies.
For shareholders of target companies in cross-border acquisitions, total event
window (t-8, t+1) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) amounted to +20.21% with the
index model (IM), +25.27% with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and +26.98%
for the market model (MM), all significant at the 99% level. For target company
shareholders in domestic acquisitions, the corresponding figures were +17.71% (IM),
+19.12% (CAPM), and +16.66% (MM), all significant at the 99% level.
The additional cumulative abnormal returns in cross-border as compared to
domestic acquisitions for the whole event window (from t-8 to t+1) amounted to +2.50
percentage points for the IM, +6.15 percentage points for the CAPM, and +10.31
percentage points for the MM. These differences, while indicating a positive target
company cross-border effect, were not statistically significant, except for those of the
market model. However, looking at the more narrow period from t-2 to t+1 months,
target company shareholders in cross-border acquisitions gained significantly more
than targets in domestic acquisitions. There is thus evidence of a positive target
company cross-border effect to have been present in the UK over the 1986-1991
period.
Further analysis established that target companies in cross-border acquisitions
obtained significantly higher CARs where the acquiring companies were based outside
the European Community compared to where the acquirer was based within the EC.
Cross-sectional analysis revealed that target company shareholders obtained
significantly higher CARs in bids where a full cash alternative was offered, compared
to security exchange offers. The percentage abnormal return was also found to be
related to company size, with the percentage cumulative abnormal returns to target
company shareholders being higher for targets with low pre-bid market value. Target
companies in domestic acquisitions were also found to gain more in competitive bids,
successful offers and (predominately during the pre-bid period) where the bidding
company held a stake in the target company prior to bid announcement.
7.2.	 Introduction 
As was discussed in the literature review (Chapters 3 and 4), the existing literature
has established that, regardless of which market or time period is being analysed, or
what methodology is applied, target company shareholders, on average, earn large
positive abnormal returns during the period leading up to an including the time of the
bid announcement.
With regard to cross-border acquisitions, the existing literature, based
predominately on the US market, generally conclude (as summarised in Table 4.2) that
shareholders have gained more when the bidding company was based in a different
country to that of the target, compared to when the bidder and target were domiciled
in the same country. The additional abnormal returns to target company shareholders
in cross-border acquisitions relative to domestic acquisitions, has become known as
the target company 'cross-border effect'. This chapter sets out to analyse the
abnormal returns to UK target companies in both cross-border and domestic
acquisitions, as well as to test whether a target company cross-border effect, similar
to that observed in the existing literature with regard to the US market, was present
in the UK during the 1986 to 1991 period. Cross-sectional analysis is also undertaken
in an attempt to explain the variations in abnormal returns.
In section 7.3, the average abnormal returns (AR) and average cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) to UK target companies in cross-border acquisitions is
analysed, while the analysis of target companies in domestic UK acquisitions is
contained in section 7.4. A comparative analysis of the abnormal returns and a
discussion of the UK cross-border effect is provided in section 7.5, while section 7.6.
contains concluding remarks.
7.3.	 UK Target Companies in Cross-Border Acquisitions 
7.31.	 Abnormal Returns to Target Companies in Cross-Border Acquisitions
Into the UK
The average monthly abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns to the 143 UK
target companies 156 in cross-border acquisitions into the UK over the 1986-1991
period, are given in Table 7.1. As can be seen from this table, on average, target
companies, regardless of the choice of test model, underperformed during the period
from eight to three months prior to the month of the bid announcement (t-8, t-3).
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during this period ranged from -6.60% with the
market model, to -7.79% with CAPM and -10.88% with the index model, all significant
at the 99% level.
It is difficult to directly attribute these large negative abnormal returns over the pre-
bid period to the forthcoming bid announcements. A more plausible explanation for
these results is that overseas bidding companies have targeted UK companies with
a history of, at least short-term, poor share price performance.
In their exploratory analysis of cross-border acquisitions by 7 large UK companies,
156	 As discussed in chapter 5, due to data limitations, sample sizes were smaller for CAPM, MM, and for month
t+1.
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Harris and Nicholls (1988) argued that "there seems little willingness to make
acquisitions of badly managed companies and create a 'turnaround'. Most ... expected
their acquisitions to be well managed...". (p. 103). One could therefore hypothesise
Table 7.1
Average Abnormal Returns to Target Companies in Cross-
Border Acquisitions into the United Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
Average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to shareholders of UK target
companies which received takeover bids from overseas companies (1986-1991). The AR/CAR has been
estimated using the market model (MM), the index model (IM), and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
specified as follows:
IM:	 logeRi = logeRm +
CAPM:	 logeR; = logeRf + p i (loge Rn, - log e R i) + A
MM:	 logeR; = a, + Alog o R, + A
where log e is the natural log, Fti is the return on the share, R,„ the return on the market, Rf the risk-free
interest rate (approximated by using a short-term government bond) a, and fl, regression coefficients, and
A the estimated abnormal return during time period i. Time periods refer to months relative to the month
of the bid announcement, which is denoted t.
Index Model Capital Asset Market Model
Period Pricing Model
t-8 -0.0281—* -0.0342—* -0.0305—
(-2.78) (-3.24) (-2.77)
t-7 -0.0145* -0.0091 -0.0067
(-1.62) (-0.91) (-0.95)
t-6 -0.0043 0.0039 0.0034
(-0.45) (0.38) (0.22)
t-5 -0.0170 -0.0052
(1.87) (-0.60) (-0.77)
t-4 -0.0286— -0.0217*** -0.0182*
(-2.78) (-2.10) (-1.48)
t-3 -0.0164* -0.0114 -0.0089
(-1.58) (-1.09) (-1.25)
t-2 0.0330— 0.0288** 0.0323—*
(2.42) (1.91) (3.97)
t-1 0.0655—* 0.0705
(4.32) (4.39) (8.51)
t 0.1848—* 0.1901
(6.69) (5.92) (21.38)
t+1 0.0368 0.0299*
(2.87) (2.77) (1.55)
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Table 7.1 (Continued)
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Index Model Capital Asset Market Model
Period Pricing Model
t-8, t-7 -0.0426—* -0.0432.— -0.0372—
(-3.46) (-3.57) (-2.65)
t-8, t-6 -0.0469—* -0.0393*** -0.0337***
-2.75) (-2.17) (-2.02)
t-8, t-5 -0.0638—* -0.0448... -0.0389***
(-3.14) (-2.05) (-2.14)
t-8, t-4 -0.0924**** -0.0665.— -0.0570.—
(-3.87) (-2.69) (-2.57)
t-8, t-3 -0.1088*— -0.0779.— -0.0660.—
(-3.76) (-2.65) (-2.86)
t-8, t-2 -0.0758— -0.0491* -0.0337
(-2.33) (-1.44) (-1.14)
t-8, t-1 -0.0103 0.0214 0.0403*.
(-0.28) (0.55) (1.94)
t-8, t 0.1745—* 0.2115
(4.03) (4.27) (8.95)
t-8, t+1 (t) 0.2021**** 0.2527.— 0.2698.—
(4.31) (4.57) (8.57)
t-statistics (PateII z-scores for the market model) are given in brackets. *, **, *** and **** indicates that the
null hypothesis of abnormal return/cumulative abnormal return equal to zero has been rejected at the 80,
90, 95 or 99 percent level of significance respectively. Following Strong (1992) and Kumar, Sen and Shome
(1992), the PateII Standardised Residual (PSR) Test (PateII (1976)) has been applied for the MM. The
simple t-test (Strong (1992), pp. 544-545) has been applied for the IM and CAPM.
t As explained in Chapter 6, not all target companies remained listed during the month following the bid
announcement. Consequently, abnormal returns could not be calculated for all companies during
month t+1. The presence of missing values causes difficulties when calculating average cumulative
abnormal returns for time period (t-8, t+1). Three different approaches can be adopted:
a) Calculate the sum of the average abnormal returns for each time period during the event window:
t+1
CAR (t-8, t-F1) = E ARS
A major limitation of this approach is that there appears to be no available method for calculating the
level of statistical significance of these average cumulative abnormal returns.
b) A second approach is to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns for each company over the time
period t-8 to t+1, and then calculate the average of these cumulative abnormal returns:
N t+1E E ar„
CAR (t-8, t+1)
	 1.1 t-8 
However, further problems are encountered when operationalising this approach in the presence of
missing values, giving rise to two possibilities:
- 222 -
Calculate the cumulative abnormal returns for each company on the data available. Thus, while
for the majority of companies the cumulative abnormal returns would be based on data for
(t-8,t+1), for some the cumulation period would be (t-8, t). In effect, this approach assumes the
missing values to be 0. Such an assumption may not be valid, rendering this approach
questionable.
An alternative is to exclude from the analysis companies where missing values are present.
Consequently, cumulative abnormal returns for time periods including t+1 will only be calculated
for companies where abnormal return estimates were available for this month.
The last approach has been adopted in this thesis. This method avoids making assumptions regarding the
missing values. A potential limitation of this approach is that it reduces the sample size. However, as the
target company sample sizes are relatively large (and there are few missing values during time period t+1),
this is believed to not be a major problem for this study.
Finally, it is worth noting that the three different approaches of calculating the cumulative abnormal returns
produce very similar results with regard to the (t-8, t+1) CAR:
Approach a)
b) i.
ii.
IM CAPM MM
0.2113 0.2537 0.2697
0.2070 0.2487 0.2662
0.2021 0.2527 0.2698
Where no missing values are present (such as for the bidding companies discussed in Chapter 8), the three
approaches to calculating cumulative abnormal returns will produce identical results.
that overseas bidding companies would tend to target relatively well performing UK
companies. However, on the basis of the pre-bid share performance of the target
companies, the evidence in this study does not support such a hypothesis.
While the largest positive abnormal returns were observed in the month of the bid
announcements, large and highly significant positive abnormal returns were also
observed during the two months prior to the bid announcement month. These large
pre-bid abnormal returns highlights the potential limitation of several previous studies
(such as e.g., Tessema (1985), Biswas (1990), Feils (1993), and Eun et al. (1995))
which applied short event windows to the analysis of abnormal returns to target
companies in cross-border acquisitions. Further research would be required to
establish the cause of these large positive pre-bid abnormal returns. Possible
explanations include stake-building in the target companies by the bidding
companies157 , bid speculation/bid rumours, and insider trading. Regardless of the
cause of the pre-bid CAR, studies using short event windows (such as the four studies
mentioned above, which all applied 11 day event windows) are unlikely to capture the
157	 This issue is developed further in the cross-sectional analysis in section 6.3.3.
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full shareholder wealth effect of cross-border acquisitions.
Over the four month period from t-2 to t+1, the average CAR to UK target
companies in cross-border acquisitions amounted to +32.01% with the index model,
+33.16% with the CAPM, and +33.56% with the market model, all highly statistically
significant. Thus, over the 1986 to 1991 period, shareholders of UK listed companies
experienced large positive abnormal returns when their companies were bid for by
overseas companies. Taking into consideration the poor performance of the target
companies over the first six months of the event window, total abnormal returns over
the ten month period from t-8 to t+1 were still highly significant, ranging between
+20.21% and +26.98% depending on the test model applied. The cumulative
abnormal returns are depicted in Figure 7.1.
7.3.2.	 National Variations
As indicated in Table 6.2 in the previous chapter, the cross-border takeover bids
for UK listed companies over the 1986-1991 period were undertaken by foreign entities
based in 27 different countries. While data was available for UK companies targeted
by companies based in 22 countries, the number of observations for several countries
was too small for any meaningful analysis. Consequently, the observations have been
classified into 4 distinct groups depending on the domicile of the overseas bidding
company:
a) Companies based in the EC' (43 observations').
As bidding companies based in the EC are already within the Single Market,
one may hypothesise that such bidders may not be prepared to pay as high
a premium for market entry as companies based outside the Community.
158 The classification of countries between EC and non-EC members relates to the 12 EC member countries
as of 1991. Sweden, Finland and Austria have later joined the EU, but were not members of the community
at the time of the cross-border takeover bids. Consequently, in this study, companies from these countries
have in this study been classified as being based in non-EC member states.
159	 Due to data limitations during month t+1, CAR (t-8, t+1) was based on 34 observations for the EU, 30 Non-
EU, 26 US, and 36 rest of the world.
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Figure 7.1.
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Target Companies in
Cross-Border Acquisitions into the United Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
Average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to listed UK target companies who received takeover bids from
overseas companies (1986-1991). For information on model specifications, see Table 7.1.
b) Companies based in non-EC European countries (33 observations).
As indicated in Chapter 6, non-EC continental bidders (in particular from
Sweden and Switzerland) were active buyers of UK companies during the
1986-1991 period. For companies based in these relatively small countries,
access to the Single Market may have been a primary motive for the
acquisitions of UK firms. If so, it may be hypothesised that UK target
company shareholders will experience higher abnormal returns in such
transactions than in intra-EC acquisitions.
C) Companies based in the US (31 observations).
Companies based in the US are exposed to a highly competitive home
takeover market. One would therefore expect (although data was not
- 225 -
available to test this) US bidders to have more takeover experience than
companies based in e.g., Continental Europe. One may therefore
hypothesise that US bidders will obtain higher abnormal returns than bidders
based in other countries. With regard to UK target company shareholders,
it may be that US bidders, due to their experience, will be able to identify UK
targets where it is not necessary to pay high takeover premiums. Based on
an assumption of the UK takeover market being less efficient than the US
one, Conn and Connell (1990) argued that returns to US bidders would be
high and returns to UK targets low in cross-border acquisitions into the UK
by US bidders.
d) Companies based in the rest of the world (36 observations).
This diverse category of bids includes cross-border acquisitions by
companies based outside Europe or the US.
The average index model cumulative abnormal returns to the various sub-groups
of UK target companies in cross-border acquisitions, are given in Table 7.2. The
second part of the table contains an analysis of the differences in mean CARs for the
various groups.
The results in Table 7.2 indicates that the level of abnormal returns to UK target
companies subject to cross-border acquisitions varied significantly depending on the
nationality of the overseas bidding companies. Looking at the total analysis period
(t-8, t+1), UK target companies gained less from acquisitions in which the bidding
company was based within the EC, compared to acquisitions by companies based
outside the union. The large differences in cumulative abnormal returns, ranging
between +17.28% and +25.40%, were statistically significant, although generally only
at the 80% level of significance.
One possible explanation for these results could be that companies based outside
the EC were prepared to pay higher takeover premiums for their UK targets in order
Table 7.2.
Average Index Model Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Target
Companies in Cross-Border Acquisitions into the United
Kingdom by Nationality of the Bidding Company (1986 - 1991)
For information on model specification, see Table 7.1. The second part of the table contains an analysis
of the differences in mean cumulative abnormal returns. Cell reference = column heading less row heading.
Thus, the first cell (-0.1728) refers to CAR of UK target companies bid for by companies based in the EC,
less CAR to UK target companies bid for by companies based in non-EC member countries.
Event window All EC Non-EC
European
US Rest of
the world
(t-8, t+1) 0.2021-* 0.0506 0.2233 0.3046-
(4.31) (0.48) (3.54) (3.64) (2.89)
(t-8, t-2) -0.0758- -0.1245*** -0.0649 -0.015 -0.0805
(-2.33) (-2.10) (-0.99) (-0.21) (-1.16)
(t-1, t) 0.2504- 0.2107-* 0.2551- 0.2375-* 0.3045-*
(8.22) (3.13) (5.57) (5.74) (4.28)
Event
window
EC Non-EC
European
US
Non-EC (t-8, t+1) -0.1728*
European (-1.40)
(t-8, t-2) -0.0596
(-0.69)
(t-1, t) -0.0444
(-0.55)
US (t-8, t+1) -0.1833* -0.0105
(-1.48) (-0.12)
(t-8, t-2) -0.1099 -0.0503
(-1.23) (-0.53)
(t-1, t) -0.0268 0.0176
(-0.34) (0.29)
..
Rest of the (t-8, t+1) -0.2540 -0.0813 -0.0707
world (-1.70) (-0.66) (-0.57)
(t-8, t-2) -0.0439 0.0156 -0.0660
(-0.49) (0.16) (0.67)
(t-1, t) -0.0938 -0.0494 -0.0670
(-0.96) (-0.58) (-0.81)
t-statistics are given in brackets. *,**, *** and **** indicates that the null hypothesis or cumulative abnormal
returns (or differences in cumulative abnormal returns) equal to zero has been rejected at the 80, 90, 95 or
99 percent level of significance respectively.
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to gain access to the European Single Market. This would be consistent with a
'market entry hypothesis'. It is worth noting, however, that a large proportion of the
difference in cumulative abnormal returns to UK target companies subject to
acquisitions by companies based within or outside the EC, took place over the period
prior to the bid announcement (t-8, t-2). Indeed, underperformance during the pre-
event period was only significant for UK target companies subject to EC bidders. It
may thus be the case that, for some as yet unknown reason, EC-based bidders had
a stronger tendency than other cross-border predators to target poorly performing UK
companies.
7.3.3.	 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Target
Companies in Cross-Border Acquisitions Into the UK
In this section, cross-sectional analysis of the index model cumulative abnormal
returns to target companies in cross-border acquisitions is undertaken, in an attempt
to explain the variation in abnormal returns to the different companies in the sample.
As explained in the previous section, shareholders of UK companies targeted in
cross-border acquisitions, on average, experienced total cumulative abnormal returns
(applying the index model) of +20.21% over the time period t-8 to t+1. The regression
output from the cross-sectional analysis is summarised in Table 7.3. As can be clearly
seen from these regressions, method of payment proved to be the only significant
explanatory variable. The results indicate that the positive cumulative abnormal
returns were confined to offers in which there was a full cash alternative. Although the
effect of payment is statistically significant, the explanatory power of the regressions
is relatively low (maximum adjusted R 2 of 4.6%). It is also worth bearing in mind that
the sample includes only 5 observations in which there was not a full cash alternative.
The size of the payment effect should therefore be interpreted with care.
The outcome of the bid does not appear to have had a significant impact on the
level of abnormal returns to target company shareholders subject to cross-border
takeover bids, at least not as captured by the t-8, t+1 cumulative abnormal returns.
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As one would expect, target company shareholders gained more in competitive than
in single-bidder acquisitions and in bids that were revised, although neither of the
variables were statistically significant. Contrary to the expectations of the size effect
hypothesis, large targets were found to have gained marginally more than smaller
ones. The effect of pre-bid stakes and the relative size of the target and bidding
companies were found to be small, and the signs varied between the different
regressions. It thus appear that the presence or otherwise of pre-bid stakes and the
relative size of the companies had only insignificant impact on the level of abnormal
returns (t-8, t+1) to shareholders of listed UK companies bid for by overseas bidders.
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 breaks down the cross-sectional analysis of the cumulative
abnormal returns into two sub-sections, Table 7.4 looking at the pre-bid period (t-8,
t-2), and Table 7.5 the bid period (t-1, t).
As highlighted in Figure 7.1, shareholders of target companies in cross-border
acquisitions earned, on average, negative abnormal returns over the period prior to the
announcement of the takeover bids. None of the explanatory variables were generally
successful in explaining a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in
abnormal returns during this pre-bid period (Table 7.4). The regression results indicate
that large companies performed better than smaller ones, although the size variable
was no longer significant once other explanatory variables were included in the
analysis.
While large companies performed better than smaller ones during the pre-bid
period, small targets outperformed larger companies during the period of the bid
announcement (although significant only at the 80% level), as reported in Table 7.5.
Thus, over the total analysis period, the pre-bid market value of target companies did
not have a significant impact on the level of abnormal returns.
The effect of the method of payment was not statistically significant during the
event period (t-1, t) when analysed in isolation, but was significant when all variables
1were included in the cross-sectional analysis 160 .
7.4.	 UK Target Companies in Domestic UK Acquisitions 
7.4.1.
	 Abnormal Returns to Target Companies in Domestic UK Acquisitions
The average monthly abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns to 568 listed UK
companies 161 targeted in domestic acquisitions during the 1986-1991 period, are
provided in Table 7.6.
As was the case with the target companies in cross-border acquisitions (as
discussed above), target companies in domestic acquisitions substantially
underperformed (relative to both the market and to their market-adjusted performance
during the previous five years) during the period prior to the bid announcement. For
all three test models, negative abnormal returns were observed for every month up to
and including month t-3.
The end of the downward trend in share performance appears to have occurred
two months before the month of the bid announcement. In this month, target
companies experienced relatively small (although significant with the market model)
positive abnormal returns. The abnormal returns during month t-1 were in excess of
3% with all three test models (significant at the 99% level), while the gains during the
bid announcement month were approximately 19% (also significant at the 99% level).
The cumulative abnormal returns are contained in the second half of Table 7.6,
and are depicted in Figure 7.2. The graph confirms that target companies in domestic
UK acquisitions, on average, underperformed up until t-3, while earning large positive
abnormal returns during months t-1 and t. During these two months, cumulative
abnormal returns ranged between +22.12% and +23.12%, depending on test model
applied.
160	 It is worth noting that, as specified in Table 6.4, less than 5% of the cross-border bids did not include a full
cash alternative.
161	 Sample size relates to the index model. As explained in Chapter 6, sample sizes were smaller for CAPM,
the market model, and for month t+1.
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Taking into account the poor performance over the period prior to the bid, total
cumulative abnormal returns over the total analysis period (t-8, t+1), amounted to
+17.71% for the index model, +19.12% for the capital asset pricing model, and
+16.66% for the market model, all significant at the 99% level. While there are some
differences in the levels of abnormal returns between the different test models, these
differences are relatively small. All three models indicates that shareholders of UK
companies targeted in domestic acquisitions during the 1986 to 1991 period gained
significantly during the period surrounding these bid announcements.
Table 7.6.
Average Abnormal Returns to Target Companies in Domestic
Acquisitions in the United Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
For information on model specifications, see Table 7.1.
Index Model Capital Asset Market Model
Period Pricing Model
t-8 -0.0155 -0.0184.-
(-3.18) (-2.86) (-3.59)
t-7 -0.0098** -0.0048 -0.0073
(-1.86) (-0.87) (-0.96)
t-6 -0.0062* -0.0068 -0.0091-
(-1.28) (-1.25) (-1.75)
t-5 -0.0059 -0.0022 -0.0045
(-1.14) (-0.39) (-1.00)
t-4 -0.0075. -0.0020 -0.0044
(-1.58) (-0.37) (-0.39)
t-3 -0.0148 -0.0189....
(-2.51) (-2.59) (-3.26)
t-2 0.0035 0.0083 0.0062-
(0.56) (1.17) (1.76)
t-1 0.0335- 0.0390.- 0.0369****
(4.87) 5.06) (9.87)
t 0.1877- 0.1923
(20.06) (17.92) (43.38)
t+1 0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0029
(0.27) (-0.07) (-1.08)
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Table 7.6 (Continued).
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Index Model Capital Asset Market Model
Period Pricing Model
t-8, t-7 -0.0253—* -O.0205
(-3.55) (-2.75) (-3.24)
t-8, t-6 -0.0315— -0.0273—* -0.0347—
(-3.62) (-2.87) (-3.64)
t-8, t-5 -0.0374— -0.0295.— -0.0392....
(-3.76) (-2.77) (3.65)
t-8, t-4 -0.0449— -0.0314— -0.0436.—
(-3.98) (-2.51) (-3.44)
t-8, t-3 -0.0596— -0.0483.— -0.0625.—
(-3.36) (-3.20) (-4.47)
t-8, t-2 -0.0562— -0.0400— -0.0563—
(-3.47) (-2.21) (-3.48)
t-8, t-1 -0.0226* -0.0010 -0.0194
(-1.29) (-0.05) (0.24)
t-8, t 0.1651— 0.1914—* 0.1708—*
(8.28) (8.54) (14.68)
t-8, t+1 O.1771 0.1666*—
(8.64) (8.00) (13.38)
t-statistics (PateII z-scores for the market model) are given in brackets. *, **, *** and **** indicates that the
null hypothesis of abnormal return/cumulative abnormal return equal to zero has been rejected at the 80,
90, 95 or 99 percent level of significance respectively. Following Strong (1992) and Kumar, Sen and Shome
(1992), the PateII Standardised Residual (PSR) Test (PateII (1976)) has been applied for the MM. The
simple t-test (Strong (1992), pp. 544-545) has been applied for the IM and CAPM.
7.4.2.	 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Target
Companies in Domestic UK Acquisitions
Over the total analysis period (t-8, t+1), target companies in domestic UK
acquisitions earned cumulative abnormal returns, using the index model, of +17.71%.
The cross-sectional analysis of these abnormal returns is contained in Table 7.7.
Although these regressions are unable to explain a large proportion of the cross-
sectional variation in abnormal returns (maximum adjusted R2 of 4.3%), a number of
variables were found to be highly statistically significant.
As was the case with cross-border acquisitions, target company shareholders in
domestic UK acquisitions obtained significantly higher abnormal returns from offers
% LOGE
20
15 -
10 -
5 -
0
-5 -
-10 IIIIIIII
-9	 -8	 -7	 -8	 -5	 -4	 -3	 -2	 -1	 0	 1
MONTH (RELATIVE TO BID ANNOUNCEMENT)
—a— DT MM	 DT CAPM —0-- DT IM
Figure 7.2.
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns
to Target Companies in Domestic Acquisitions
in the United Kingdom
(1986 - 1991)
Average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to listed UK target companies who received takeover bids from
overseas companies (1986-1991). For information on model specifications, see Table 7.1.
which included a full cash alternative. These results lend support to the previous
literature (such as Halpern (1973), Wansley et al. (1983), Franks et al. (1988), Eckbo
and Langohr (1989), Biswas (1990), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and Kaplan and
Weisback (1992)), which found the levels of abnormal returns to vary significantly
dependent on the method of payment. It should be noted, however, that the data for
this study did not distinguish between cases where cash only was offered and cases
where shareholders were given a choice between cash and equity. Consequently,
while the results of this study confirms that target company shareholders obtained
larger gains where a full cash alternative was available, these results may not be
directly comparable to some of the previous literature, particularly the ones concerning
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the US market where there is usually a clearer distinction between cash and equity
offers.
With regard to the method of payment, it is also interesting to note that, while the
abnormal returns relating to the bid announcement were higher for companies in which
shareholders received a full cash alternative, these companies also performed better
than the other targets during the period prior to the bid announcement. (The cross-
sectional analysis of the cumulative abnormal returns relating to the pre-offer period
and to the bid period, are given in Tables 7.8 and 7.9 respectively). While e.g., tax
theories may help explain why the (pre-tax) returns were higher in cash than in equity
offers, it is not yet known why cash offers appears to be associated with companies
which performed well during the period prior to the bid announcement.
Looking at the overall analysis period, abnormal returns were found to be
significantly higher in successful than in failed bids (with most regressions, although
the variable was not significant on its own). From Tables 7.8 and 7.9, it can further
be observed that target company shareholders performed only insignificantly worse
than targets in successful bids during the period prior to, and including, the month of
the bid announcement. Consequently, from these data, bid failure does not appear
to have been apparent at the time of the bid announcement. However, once the
month following the bid announcement was included in the analysis, cumulative
abnormal returns for target companies in failed bids were significantly lower than for
targets in successful acquisitions.
Over the total analysis period, shareholders of target companies gained
significantly more in competitive than in non-competitive offers. The additional
abnormal returns in competitive bids were in excess of 15 percentage points. These
results support earlier findings by e.g., Stulz et al. (1990), Kaplan and Weisback
(1992), Song (1993) and Swenson (1993). However, breaking down the analysis into
the pre-bid period and the offer period (as reported in Tables 7.8 and 7.9), indicates
that, although bid competition had a positive impact on abnormal returns during the bid
period, the effect of this variable appears to have been stronger during the period prior
to the bid announcement. While these results may appear surprising, there are a
number of possible explanations for this finding. The most plausible explanation,
however, relates to the research design. In this study, takeover bids by different
bidding firms for the same target company have been treated as separate 'events'.
Consequently, there is a possibility that the high pre-bid performance of target
companies in competitive bids, was due to the announcement of another takeover bid
for the target during the period prior to the announcement of the competitive bid. This
could have inflated the share price of the target company prior to the announcement
of the second (competitive) bid. Another possible, although less plausible explanation,
is that the takeover bids became competitive due to the strong pre-bid performance
of the companies targeted.
Target companies in which the bidding companies held a stake prior to the bid
announcement, gained more than targets in which no stake was present 162. Looking
at the sub-periods, it is clear from Table 7.8 that this superior performance took place
during the period prior to the bid". This may be due to an increase in the demand
for, and therefore the price of, target companies' shares caused by the build-up of the
stake during the pre-bid period'. The accumulation of shares may also have
fuelled takeover rumours.
Size appears to have had a negative effect on the abnormal returns to the target
companies' shareholders, as smaller companies gained more than larger ones'.
162	 This variable was not, however, significant once all variables were included in the regression analysis.
163	 Indeed, target companies in which the bidder held a pre-bid stake, gained somewhat less from the bid
announcement than did the other targets.
164	 Further research would be required to establish the timing and impact on share returns of these stake
accumulations.
165 The difference in cumulative abnormal returns to small and large targets may be an indication of size-related
market anomaly (as discussed in Chapter 6) rather than a takeover effect. However, it is worth bearing in
mind that for target companies in cross-border acquisitions (as discussed above), large companies
outperformed smaller ones during the period prior to the bids, although, as for domestic targets, gained less
(in percentage terms) than smaller targets at the time of the bid announcement. This seems to indicate that
the impact of size (as observed in the cross-sectional analyses) was, at least partially, associated with the
takeover bids, rather than purely an artifact of any market-wide size related anomaly.
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Target company shareholders gained more during the bid period (t-1, t) if the
terms of the offer were improved. As the bid revision resulted in additional abnormal
returns, this seems to indicate that the bids were revised not due to the original bids
being particularly low, but due to other factors'''.
7.5.	 Comparative Analysis of UK Target Companies in Cross-Border and 
Domestic Acquisitions 
7.5.1. Differential Abnormal Returns to Target Company Shareholders in
Cross-Border and Domestic Acquisitions (Target Company 'Cross-
Border Effect').
In this section, the differences in average abnormal and cumulative abnormal
returns to UK target company shareholders in 143 cross-border and 568 domestic
acquisitions is analysed. The differences in average abnormal and cumulative
abnormal returns, also known as the target company 'cross-border effect', are given
in Table 7.10 on the following pages.
As discussed in sections 7.3.1. and 7.4.1, UK target companies in both cross-
border and domestic acquisitions significantly underperform over the period prior to the
bid announcement. However, as can be seen from Figure 7.3, UK target companies
in cross-border acquisitions performed worse than target companies in domestic UK
acquisitions during the early pre-bid period (t-8, t-4). The differences in abnormal
returns were not, however, generally statistically significant (except for month t-4,
where, according to the IM and CAPM, target companies in cross-border acquisitions
performed significantly worse than target companies in domestic UK acquisitions).
During the bid announcement month, the differences in abnormal returns were small.
However, during months t-2, t-1, and t+1, target companies gained (generally
significantly) more in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions. Indeed, over the four
month period from t-2 to t+1, the differences in cumulative abnormal returns to cross-
166 One reason for bid revision may be if the bid is competitive. Indeed, the correlation coefficient between
these two variables was positive, at 0.198. Another cause for bid revision may have been opposition to the
bid by target company management. Unfortunately, no data was available on whether or not the bids were
hostile.
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border and domestic takeover targets, amounted to +7.99 percentage points for the
index model (significant at the 95% level), +8.58 percentage points for the capital asset
pricing model (90% significance level) and +10.23 percentage points for the market
model (95% significance level) 167. The results provide clear evidence of a large,
positive target company cross-border effect in the UK over the 1986-1991 period.
Table 7.10.
Differences in Average Abnormal Returns to Target Companies
in Cross-Border and Domestic Acquisitions in the United
Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
For information on model specifications, see Table 7.1. The table shows the percentage point target
company 'cross-border effect' (abnormal return to target company shareholders in cross-border acquisitions
less abnormal returns to target company shareholders in domestic UK acquisitions).
Index Model Capital Asset Market Model
Period Pricing Model
t-8 -0.0126 -0.0184* -0.0121
(-1.13) (-1.55) (-1.02)
t-7 -0.0047 -0.0043 0.0006
(-0.45) (-0.37) (0.05)
t-6 0.0019 0.0107 0.0125
(0.18) (0.92) (1.09)
t-5 -0.0111 -0.0033 -0.0007
(-1.07) (-0.31) (-0.06)
t-4 -0.0211** -0.0197- -0.0138
(-1.86) (-1.69) (-1.19)
t-3 -0.0017 0.0055 0.0100
(-0.14) (0.45) (0.82)
t-2 0.0296- 0.0204 0.0261*
(1.98) (1.22) (1.56)
t-1 0.0320- 0.0315- 0.0370***
(1.92) (1.76) (2.07)
t -0.0029 -0.0023 0.0094
(-0.10) (-0.07) (0.27)
t+1 0.0356**** 0.0426-* 0.0328-
(2.62) (2.26) (2.26)
167 These cumulative abnormal return values refer to the (reduced) samples of cross-border and domestic
companies for which data was available for month t+1. (For a discussion of data availability, see Chapter
6).
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Table 7.10 (Continued).
Differences in Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Index Model Capital Asset Market Model
Period Pricing Model
t-8, t-7 -0.0173 -0.0227* -0.0115
(-1.22) (-1.50) (-0.74)
t-8, t-6 -0.0154 -0.0120 0.0010
(-0.80) (-0.59) (0.05)
t-8, t-5 -0.0265 -0.0153 0.0003
(-1.17) (-0.63) (0.01)
t-8, t-4 -0.0475** -0.0350 -0.0135
(-1.80) (-1.27) (-0.48)
t-8, t-3 -0.0492* -0.0295 -0.0035
(-1.54) (-0.92) (-0.11)
t-8, t-2 -0.0196 -0.0091 0.0226
(-0.54) (-0.23) (0.59)
t-8, t-1 0.0124 0.0224 0.0596*
(0.31) (0.52) (1.39)
t-8, t 0.0094 0.0201 0.0690
(0.20) (0.37) (1.27)
t-8, t+1 0.0250 0.0615 0.1031**
(0.49) (1.02) (1.70)
t-statistics are given in brackets. *, **, *** and **** indicates that the null hypothesis of abnorma
return/cumulative abnormal return equal to zero has been rejected at the 80, 90, 95 or 99 percent level of
significance respectively. The level of statistical significance has been calculated using a t-test for
differences in mean (Weiss and Hassett (1986), pp. 422-426).
However, taking into account the poor pre-bid performance of UK target companies
in cross-border acquisitions, the difference in cumulative abnormal returns over the
total analysis period (t-8, t+1) of 2.50 percentage points with the index model, 6.15
percentage points with the capital asset pricing model and 10.31 percentage points
with the market model, was only statistically significant (at the 80% level) with the
market model.
Lessard (1993) argued that the difference in abnormal returns to shareholders of
target companies in domestic and cross-border acquisitions may be due to the
different types of companies targeted. With regard to cross-border acquisitions into
the US, Lessard suggested that a possible "...explanation might be that domestic and
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Figure 7.3.
Differences in the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns to
Target Companies in Cross-Border and Domestic Acquisitions in
the United Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
Average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to listed UK target companies who received takeover bids from
overseas companies, less the CAR to listed UK target companies who received takeover bids from other
UK companies. For information on model specifications, see Table 7.1.
foreign firms bid for different populations of target firms". (pp. 282-283). According to
Lessard, there is thus a possibility of any 'cross-border effect' having more to do with
the characteristics of the takeover targets, than purely with the nationality of the
bidding firm. This issue is analysed in the cross-sectional analysis in the following
section.
7.5.2.	 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Target Company 'Cross-Border Effect'
As indicated in the previous section, while the total (t-8, t+1) index model CAR
was found to be 2.5 percentage points higher in cross-border than in domestic
acquisitions, the difference was not found to be statistically significant. In the cross-
sectional analysis, several significant variables were identified. However, the influence
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of bidder nationality generally remained insignificant. The regression output from the
cross-sectional analysis of total event window target company cross-border effect, is
summarised in Table 7.11. These results clearly indicate that, as was the case for
target companies in domestic acquisitions, the most significant explanatory variable
was related to the method of payment. Target company shareholders, on average (in
both cross-border and domestic acquisitions) appears to have gained an additional 10
to 14 percentage point (depending on regression specification) where the offer
contained a full cash alternative. Indeed, the target cross-border effect, as identified
in the previous section, disappear once the method of payment is controlled for.
Consequently, the cross-border effect appears to be associated with a 'payment
effect'. The cross-sectional analyses of the pre-bid and bid periods are contained in
Tables 7.12 and 7.13. These regressions indicate that the vast majority of the
payment effect, as one would expect, took place during the bid period'''.
The evidence in Table 7.13 also indicates that target company shareholders
experienced additional positive abnormal returns in revised bids (although the effect
of bid revision was not significant for either of the event window sub-periods). During
the bid announcement period, target companies also gained (marginally) more in
competitive than in single-bidder contests. This variable was not, however, significant
for the total (t-8, t+1) event window.
It was further established that target company shareholders gained additional
abnormal returns where the bidding company held a pre-bid stake in the target
company. As this additional abnormal return took place during the period prior to the
offer (as reported in Table 7.12) rather than during the bid period, one possible
explanation for this result could be that the pre-bid share price was pushed up by the
building of the share stake (rather than being directly attributable to the bid itself).
Finally, the results highlight the impact of company size. Firstly, larger companies
168 This is different from the results for the domestic targets (as summarised in Table 6.7), which suggested that
target companies where there was a cash offer also performed better than other targets in the period prior
to the bid announcement.
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gained less (in percentage terms) than did smaller target companies. Secondly, target
company gains were also smaller where the pre-bid market capitalisation of the target
company was large relative to that of the bidder. These results indicate that bidding
companies were prepared to pay higher premiums for smaller targets than for larger
ones. The determinants of such size-related differentials is an area which could
benefit from further research.
7.6.	 Conclusion 
During the 1986 to 1991 period, large positive abnormal returns accrued to
shareholders of listed UK companies targeted by either overseas or domestic UK
bidding companies. The gains to target company shareholders (from t-8 to t+1, where
t refers to the month of the bid announcement) were, however, higher in cross-border
(at +20.21% with the index model, +25.27% with the capital asset pricing model and
+26.98% with the market model) than in domestic (at +17.71% with the index model,
+19.12% with the capital asset pricing model and +16.66% with the market model)
acquisitions. Thus, a positive target company cross-border effect, similar to that
previously observed for the US market by e.g., Wansley eta!. (1983), Tessema (1985),
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Shaked et al. (1991), Cebenoyan et al. (1992), Marr
et al. (1993), Swenson (1993) and Cheng and Chan (1995), appears to have been
present in the UK during the 1986-1991 period.
The index model target company cross-border effect of +2.5 percentage points
was not statistically significant, although the gains to target company shareholders in
cross-border acquisitions was significantly higher than those observed for domestic
target companies during the shorter event window from t-2 to t+1 (index model cross-
border effect of +7.99 percentage points). Cross-sectional analysis revealed that
target company shareholders gained significantly more if either of the following
conditions were met: if the bid was revised, if the bid included a full cash alternative,
if the bidding company held shares in the target company prior to the bid
announcement, if the target company was small relative to the size of the bidding
company, or if the target company was small.
In particular, the method of payment appears to have had a very significant impact
on target company shareholder returns. Indeed, the target company cross-border
effect was associated with a method of payment effect, as the cross-border effect was
marginally (insignificantly) negative once the method of payment was controlled for.
The positive target company cross-border effect thus appear to be due to the higher
abnormal returns to target company shareholders in cash bids and the larger
proportion of cross-border than domestic bids including a cash alternative169.
169 As discussed in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.5), shareholders in 96.5% of the target companies in cross-border
acquisitions were offered cash, while a full cash alternative was only available to shareholders of 65% of
the UK target companies in domestic acquisitions.
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CHAPTER 8
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FOR LISTED OVERSEAS
AND DOMESTIC UK COMPANIES BIDDING FOR
LISTED UK COMPANIES
8.1.	 Summary 
This chapter contains an analysis of the abnormal returns to 71 overseas and 414
domestic companies which bid for listed UK companies during the 1986-1991 period.
The results obtained are highly dependent on the model used. Three different test
models are applied; the index model (IM), the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and
the market model (MM). The market model results are generally lower than those
observed for the other models, due to the high a values (discussed further in section
6.5.1).
During the month of the bid announcement, overseas bidders, on average,
experienced small abnormal gains, amounting to +0.80% with the index model (IM),
+1.43% with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and +0.23% with the market
model (MM). These positive abnormal returns are, however, only significant with the
CAPM (significant at the 80% level). In addition, large negative abnormal returns are
observed with all models for the five month period (t+1, t+5) following the bid
announcement. Over the total analysis period (t-8, t+5), overseas bidders obtained
abnormal returns averaging -5.34% with the IM (significant at the 80% level), -3.55%
with the CAPM, and -16.46% with the MM (significant at the 99% level). Further
analysis revealed that the abnormal losses were particularly large for overseas bidders
based in European countries based outside the European Community, while bidders
based outside Europe and the United States experienced abnormal gains.
With regard to the domestic UK bidders, the results vary significantly with the
various models. During the pre-bid period (t-8, t-1), domestic bidders outperformed
the market, as they had during the parameter estimation period. Consequently, the
IM and CAPM revealed large pre-bid gains, while the MM results were close to zero.
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However, with all three models, share returns were found to deteriorate significantly
at the time of the bid announcement. Abnormal losses were observed for the month
of the bid announcement; -0.19% with the IM, -0.22% with CAPM, and -1.11% with the
MM (significant at the 95% level). In addition, over the post-bid (t+1, t+5) period, all
models reveal negative abnormal returns, which were particularly large with the market
model. Over the total analysis period (t-8, t+5), cumulative abnormal returns to
domestic UK bidders amounted to +6.79% with the IM (significant at the 99% level),
+7.84% with the CAPM (99% level of significance), but -5.42% with the MM (significant
at the 95% level).
While the three models provide conflicting with regard to whether domestic bidders
gained or lost from the transactions, the models provide uniform evidence regarding
the difference in abnormal returns to domestic and cross-border bidders. Overseas
bidding companies were found to have performed significantly worse than domestic
bidders. The difference in abnormal returns (the bidding company 'cross-border
effect') over the total analysis period (t-8, t+5) amounted to -12.13 percentage points
with the IM (significant at the 99% level), -11.39 percentage points with the CAPM
(significant at the 95% level) and -11.04 percentage points with the MM (significant at
the 90% level).
Cross-sectional analysis of index model cumulative abnormal returns revealed that
while size was found to have a positive impact on bidder returns in cross-border
acquisitions, the reverse was true for domestic bidders. Both sets of bidders were
found to perform better in cash than in security exchange offers, although this variable
was not significant for overseas bidders due to the small number of cross-border bids
not including a cash alternative. The negative bidding company cross-border effect
remained highly significant even when controlling for the different characteristics of
domestic and cross-border bids.
8.2.	 Introduction 
While target company shareholders have almost invariably been found to gain
significantly from mergers and acquisitions, much more controversy surrounds the
issue of whether takeover activity also benefit shareholders of acquiring companies.
The existing literature regarding domestic UK acquisitions (as discussed in Chapter 3)
is inconclusive. Similarly, different cross-border studies have reached different
conclusions, with (as summarised in Table 4.3) almost equal number of studies
suggesting positive and negative bidding company abnormal returns.
This chapter sets out to analyse the abnormal returns to bidding companies which
launched takeover bids for UK listed companies during the 1986 to 1991 period. In
section 8.3, the abnormal returns to overseas (cross-border) bidding companies is
analysed, while a study of the gains and losses to domestic UK bidders is contained
in section 8.4. The comparative analysis of abnormal returns to bidding companies
in cross-border and domestic acquisitions (known as the bidding company 'cross-
border effect') is discussed in section 8.5, while concluding remarks follow in section
8.6.
8.3.	 Overseas Bidding Companies in Cross-Border Acquisitions Into the UK 
8.3.1.	 Abnormal Returns to Cross-Border Bidding Companies
Table 8.1 contains the average monthly abnormal and cumulative abnormal
returns to 71 overseas bidding companies m in cross-border acquisitions into the UK
during the 1986-1991 period. The cumulative abnormal returns are depicted in Figure
8.1. The table indicates that the three test models generally provide consistent results
with regard to the direction of any abnormal returns. However, as was the case with
e.g., Franks and Harris (1989) and Parkinson and Dobbins (1993), the market model,
170	 As discussed in Chapter 6, the sample size of 71 applied to the index model. Due to data limitations, the
market model sample was restricted to 50 and the CAPM sample to 48 observations.
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the index model and CAPM suggested rather different levels of abnormal returns'''.
Table 8.1.
Average Abnormal Returns to Bidding Companies in Cross-
Border Acquisitions into the United Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
For information on model specifications, see Table 7.1.
Index Model Capital Asset Market Model
Period Pricing Model
t-8 -0.0110 0.0054 -0.0054
(-1.01) (0.39) (-0.45)
t-7 0.0063 -0.0044 -0.0068*
(0.85) (-0.43) (-1.43)
t-6 0.0163** 0.0156** 0.0065*
(1.95) (1.91) (1.40)
t-5 -0.0015 -0.0026 -0.0081
(-0.17) (-0.23) (-0.15)
t-4 -0.0071 -0.0123 -0.0236
(-0.81) (-1.15) (-1.22)
t-3 -0.0020 0.0076 -0.0024
(-0.29) (0.90) (-0.16)
t-2 -0.0111 -0.0051 -0.0167*
(-1.26) (-0.48) (-1.49)
t-1 -0.0036 -0.0066 -0.0126
(-0.42) (-0.72) (-0.80)
t 0.0080 0.0143* 0.0023
(0.94) (1.58) (0.54)
t+1 -0.0032 -0.0112 -0.0162
(-0.37) (-1.03) (-1.18)
t+2 -0.0074 -0.0040 -0.0122
(-0.96) (-0.42) (-0.93)
t+3 -0.0042 0.0056 -0.0028
(-0.43) (0.54) (-0.17)
t+4 -0.0084 -0.0008 -0.0153
(-0.81) (-0.09) (-0.28)
t+5 -0.0245*** -0.0371*** -0.0514-
(-2.01) (-2.50) (-4.83)
171 Franks and Harris (1989) found a large difference in the (post-announcement) cumulative abnormal returns
depending on the control model applied. The CAR (or TAR in their terminology) over the 24 months
following the bid announcement was positive (and significant) using the index model and CAPM, and
significantly negative when applying the market model.
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Table 8.1 (Continued)
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Index Model Capital Asset Market Model
Period Pricing Model
t-8, t-7 -0.0047 0.0010 -0.0122*
(-0.37) (0.05) (-1.33)
t-8, t-6 0.0115 0.0165 -0.0057
(0.76) (0.88) (-0.28)
t-8, t-5 0.0100 0.0140 -0.0138
(0.66) (0.80) (-0.31)
t-8, t-4 0.0030 0.0017 -0.0373
(0.17) (0.09) (-0.83)
t-8, t-3 0.0010 0.0093 -0.0397
(-0.06) (0.45) (-0.82)
t-8, t-2 -0.0100 0.0043 -0.0563*
(-0.52) (0.18) (-1.32)
t-8, t-1 -0.0137 -0.0023 -0.0690*
(-0.73) (-0.09) (-1.52)
t-8, t -0.0057 0.0120 -0.0667
(-0.28) (0.47) (-1.25)
t-8, t+1 -0.0088 -0.0079 -0.0829*
(-0.39) (-0.03) (-1.56)
t-8, t+2 -0.0162 -0.0032 -0.0951-
(-0.66) (-0.10) (-1.77)
t-8, t+3 -0.0205 0.0024 -0.0979*
(-0.74) (0.07) (-1.64)
t-8, t+4 -0.0289 0.0016 -0.1131-
(-0.99) (0.05) (-1.66)
t-8, t+5 -0.0534* -0.0355 -0.1646.-
(-1.60) (-0.88) (-2.89)
t-statistics (PateII z-scores for the market model) are given in brackets. *, **, *** and **** indicates that the
null hypothesis of abnormal return/cumulative abnormal return equal to zero has been rejected at the 80,
90, 95 or 99 percent level of significance respectively. Following Strong (1992) and Kumar, Sen and Shome
(1992), the PateII Standardised Residual (PSR) Test (PateII (1976)) has been applied for the MM. The
simple t-test (Strong (1992), pp. 544-545) has been applied for the IM and CAPM.
With regard to the pre-bid period overseas bidding companies, on average,
experienced positive abnormal returns during month t-6 (statistically significant with all
three models). It is not known why such positive abnormal returns were observed for
this month. However, over the next five months average abnormal returns were
% LOGE
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- 15
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Figure 8.1.
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Bidding Companies in
Cross-Border Acquisitions into the United Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
Average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to overseas companies making takeover bids for UK listed
companies (1986-1991). For information on model specifications, see Table 7.1.
negative m. Over the period prior to the bid (t-8, t-1) cumulative abnormal returns
were insignificantly negative with the index and capital asset pricing models (at -1.37%
and -0.23%, respectively), and significantly negative (at -6.90%, significant at the 80%
level) with the market model.
The differences in the level of abnormal returns between the various models,
appear to be a direct reflection of the different assumptions underlying the models,
particularly with regard to the regression constant. While the index and capital asset
pricing models fix the regression intercept (at 0 for the IM and (1-/'3)R 1 for the CAPM),
the market model alpha is estimated from past returns. The assumption of the market
model is that the historical relationship between return on the market and return on the
172	 The only exception was the small positive abnormal return during t-3 for CAPM.
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share provides a good prediction of the future relationship. One implication of this
assumption is that if the share outperformed the market during the parameter
estimation period, as reflected in a positive a value', the share is expected to
continue to outperform the market during the analysis period.,
The mean a for the overseas bidding companies in this study was 0.00923. As
the expected a value (calculated as (143)R f
 from the capital asset pricing model) is
only 0.00112, one interpretation of the mean a value, is that the average bidding
company is expected to have a rate of return of 0.811% per month (or 9.74% per year)
in addition to the rate of return required to compensate for the share's level of
systematic risk. The large negative abnormal returns observed using the market
model indicate that overseas bidding companies were not able to fulfil this expectation
over the period surrounding the bid announcement. The very high market model a
values may be due to estimation problems, which may render the market model
unreliable as a benchmark. However, the negative post-bid abnormal returns were not
restricted to the market model. The average overseas bidding company not only
performed worse than it had in previous periods, but also marginally underperformed
relative to the stock market index in its home market.
During the month of the bid announcement, positive abnormal returns (of +0.80%
with the index model, +1.43% with the CAPM (significant at the 80% level), and
+0.23% with the market model) were observed. Thus, looking simply at the short term
abnormal returns, small positive abnormal returns during the bid announcement month
were observed in this study. These short-term results are somewhat inconsistent with
the results of Feils (1993), who established that US bidders lost marginally over an 11
day period surrounding the announcement of a takeover bid for a UK company.
However, the findings in this study may be consistent with those of e.g. Tessema
(1985), Doukas and Travlos (1988), Morck and Yeung (1992), Markides and lttner
173	 As discussed in section 6.5.1, the positive a value may be a result of nonspichroneous trading rather than
a clear indication of superior pre-bid share price performance.
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(1994) and Doukas (1995a), who all applied short event windows to establish that US
companies gained, or did at least not lose, from cross-border acquisitions 174 . It
should be remembered, however, that UK was only one of the target countries
included in these studies. With regard to studies analysing cross-border acquisitions
into the United States, several papers have established short-term abnormal losses
to shareholders of cross-border bidders (e.g., Mathur et al. (1989 and 1994), Servaes
and Zenner (1990) and Song (1993)). It is worth stressing, however, that the positive
abnormal returns for the bid announcement month observed for the cross-border
bidders in this study were not statistically significant (except for CAPM which was
significant at the 80% level) and foreign bidding companies usually experienced
significant negative abnormal returns over the period following the bid announcement.
On average, overseas bidding companies encountered negative abnormal returns
in every month following the bid announcement175 . In particular, large (and highly
significant) negative abnormal returns were observed for month t+5. The post-event
cumulative abnormal returns (t+1, t+5) amounted to -4.77% with the index model
(significant at the 90% level), -4.75% with the capital asset pricing model (significant
at the 90% level) and -9.79% with the market model (significant at the 99% level).
Thus, as was the case in the study by Conn and Connell (1990), overseas bidding
companies were found to have experienced abnormal losses over the period following
the bid announcement. However, the level of the negative cumulative abnormal
returns obtained in this study are much higher than those reported by Conn and
Connell. It thus appear that cross-border bidders into the UK over the 1986 to 1991
period performed worse than did US companies acquiring in the UK over the 1971-
1980 period. As discussed in section 6.5.4, the cause of these negative abnormal
returns during the period following the bid announcement (post announcement drift)
174	 With regard to domestic US acquisitions, Jensen and Ruback (1983) obtained results indicating that US
bidders gained, or did at least not lose from takeover activity.
175	 The only exception was the small positive abnormal return during t+3 for CAPM.
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is not yet fully known.
Over the total analysis period all models indicate negative abnormal returns
(although statistically significant only for the index model and the market model).
Cross-border acquisitions into the UK thus appears to have resulted in small initial
gains at the time of the bid announcement, which were more than offset by negative
abnormal returns during the period following the bid.
	
8.3.2.	 National Variations
As indicated in Table 6.2, the sample of 71 cross-border bidders consisted of
bidding companies based in 14 different countries. In the same way as cross-border
targets (discussed in section 7.2.2), the bidding companies have been classified,
according to their nationality, into 4 groups:
a) EC companies (27 observations),
b) Non-EC European companies (11 observations),
c) US companies (17 observations), and
d) Companies based in the rest of the world (16 observations).
The average index model CARs, split according to the nationality-based sub-
groups of cross-border bidders, are given in Table 8.2. The second part of the table
looks at the differences in mean CARs for the various groups. The results indicate
that there were significant differences in the cumulative abnormal returns to overseas
bidding companies based in different regions.
The performance of the EC and US based bidders were generally very similar,
and close to the overall sample means. Bidding companies based in non-EC
European countries, however, performed significantly worse than bidders based in
other regions, particularly during the post-event period, during which shareholders of
non-EC European companies encountered significant mean abnormal losses of
-16.15% These results are surprisingly robust, considering the small sample (11) of
non-EC European bidders.
While bidding companies based in Europe and the US earned negative cumulative
abnormal returns from their acquisitions into the UK, companies located elsewhere in
the world experienced positive abnormal returns (although not statistically significant)
during all event windows. These 16 bidding companies were, however, based in 4
widely different countries, and one should therefore be careful in attributing these
results to national variations 176. The influence of national differences warrants
further research, but would require a larger sample than is available in this study.
Table 8.2.
Average Index Model Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Overseas
Bidding Companies in Cross-Border Acquisitions into the United
Kingdom by Nationality of the Bidding Company (1986 - 1991)
For information on model specification, see Table 7.1. The second part of the table contains an analysis
of the differences in mean cumulative abnormal returns. Cell reference = column heading less row heading.
Thus, the first cell (0.1036) refers to CAR of bidding companies based in the EC, less CAR to bidding
companies based in non-EC member countries.
Event window All EC Non-EC
European
US Rest of
the world
-
(t-8, t+5) -0.0534* -0.0682* -0.1719* -0.0534 0.0532
(-1.60) (-1.32) (-1.40) (-0.92) (1.17)
(t-8, t-2) -0.0100 -0.0249 0.0006 -0.0425 0.0424
(-0.52) (-0.83) (0.01) (-1.04) (1.05)
(t-1, t) 0.0044 -0.0018 -0.0109 0.0197 0.0089
(0.39) (-0.09) (-0.43) (0.88) (0.38)
(t+1, t+5) -0.0477— -0.0416 -0.1615— -0.0307 0.0020
(-2.23) (-1.29) (-2.11) (-0.84) (0.06)
176 The sample of 16 companies from the "rest of the world" consisted of 4 from Australia, 4 from Canada, 5
from Japan, and 3 from New Zealand. It is interesting to note that the overall positive abnormal returns for
this group of companies was attributable exclusively to the Japanese bidders (mean CAR for Australian,
Canadian, and New Zealand based companies was marginally negative). Indeed, the mean CAR (t-8, t+5)
for the 5 Japanese bidders amounted to +22.01% which, despite the small sample size, is significant at the
95% level. The superior performance of Japanese bidders observed appears to be consistent with the
positive abnormal returns to Japanese bidders acquiring in the US, as observed by Pettway et a/. (1993)
and Kang (1993).
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Table 8.2. (Continued).
Event
window
EC Non-EC
European
US
Non-EC (t-8, t+5) 0.0.1036
European (0.78)
(t-8, t-2) -0.0255
(-0.47)
(t-1, t) 0.0091
(0.29)
(t+1, t+5) 0.1200*
(1.45)
US (t-8, t+5) -0.0148 -0.1184
(-0.19) (-0.87)
(t-8, t-2) 0.0176 0.0431
(0.35) (0.71)
(t-1, t) -0.0215 -0.0307
(-0.73) (0.91)
(t+1, t+5) -0.0109 -0.1309*
(-0.22) (-1.55)
Rest of the (t-8, t+5) -0.1215- -0.2251* -0.1066*
world (-1.76) (-1.72) (-1.45)
(t-8, t-2) -0.0673* -0.0418 -0.0849*
(-1.33) (-0.69) (-1.47)
(t-1, t) -0.0107 -0.0198 0.0109
(-0.35) (-0.58) (0.34)
(t+1, t+5) -0.0453 -0.1635 -0.0326
(-0.96) (-1.97) (-0.67)
t-statistics are given in brackets. *, **, *** and **** indicates that the null hypothesis or cumulative abnormal
returns (or differences in cumulative abnormal returns) equal to zero has been rejected at the 80, 90, 95 or
99 percent level of significance respectively.
8.3.3.	 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Overseas
Bidding Companies in Cross-Border Acquisitions Into the UK
The average index model cumulative abnormal returns to overseas bidding
companies during the total analysis period (t-8, t+5), amounted to -5.34%. This
section contains an analysis of the cross-sectional variation in cumulative abnormal
returns.
As evident from Table 8.3, some of the regressions were relatively successful at
explaining the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns, with a maximum adjusted
R2 of 15.0%. The most significant explanatory variables relate to the size of the target
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and bidding firms. Firstly, bidding companies performed better in relatively large
acquisitions. The impact of relative size is consistent with previous findings by e.g.,
Feils (1993) and Markides and Ittner (1994). Secondly, large bidders appears to have
performed significantly better than smaller ones. These two effects were highly
significant, and together help explain 14.1% of the cross-sectional variation in
abnormal returns. The cross-sectional analysis of the pre-bid period (t-8, t-2) abnormal
returns is given in Table 8.4, while Tables 8.5 and 8.6 contain the results for the bid
period and the post-bid period, respectively. With regard to the two size effects, while
the impact of size and relative size was positive during all sub-periods, the results
were, rather surprisingly, particularly strong during the period prior to the bid
announcement. If the size of the target relative to the size of the bidder is of
importance, one would expect the impact of this variable to be more pronounced
during, and after the period of the bid announcement. It is not known whether the
significant results for the relative size variable during the pre-bid period was associated
with the forthcoming bid announcements, or was attributable to some other, as yet
unknown, factor.
With regard to the impact of company size, the results are opposite to what one
would expect if a general size-related stock market anomaly (as discussed in section
6.5.2) was present. It may be that larger bidders were better at implementing cross-
border acquisitions than smaller ones (as indicated by their superior post-bid
performance). However, such an interpretation of the size-effect may be questionable,
as large bidders were found to have performed significantly better than smaller ones
during the pre-bid period as well. It may thus be that an inverse size effect was
present in the overseas markets during the period of study. A complete understanding
of the impact of company size still eludes us, and warrants further analysis.
As indicated in Table 8.3, and consistent with e.g., Cakici et al. (1996), the level
of abnormal losses to overseas bidders were higher in competitive than in single-
bidder contests, although the variable was only significant in the final regression in
which all 7 explanatory variables were included. As one would expect (and as evident
from Table 8.6), the under-performance of bidders in competitive offers predominately
took place during the period following the bid announcement, once the competitive
nature of the bid became apparent.
Overseas bidders performed better in cash offers compared to bids where no cash
alternative was available. While the impact of the method of payment appears to have
been large, the variable was generally only marginally significant, due to the very small
number (3) of bids in which cash was not available.
As one would expect, considering the large gains to shareholders of target
companies in cross-border acquisitions, overseas bidding companies (as indicated in
Table 8.5) performed better during the bid period (t-1, t) where they already held a
stake in the target prior to launching the bid. However, the impact of the pre-bid stake
was not found to be significant over the total analysis period.
The outcome of the bid appears to have had little impact on the level of abnormal
returns to the overseas bidders. Similarly, while UK target companies in cross-border
acquisitions were found (in Section 7.3.2) to have gained more where the terms of the
offer were increased, bid revision does not appear to have had a significant impact on
the level of abnormal returns to the overseas bidders.
8.4.	 UK Bidding Companies in Domestic UK Acquisitions 
8.4.1.	 Abnormal returns to domestic bidding companies
The average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns to the 414 UK
companiesm which bid for listed UK companies during the 1986-1991 period, are
given in Table 8.7, while the cumulative abnormal returns are depicted in Figure 8.2.
The diagram clearly highlights the importance of the choice of event study
methodology. As was the case with e.g., Franks and Harris (1989) and Parkinson and
177	 As discussed in Chapter 6, the sample size of 414 refers to the index model. Due to data limitations, capital
asset pricing model and market model samples were restricted to 361.
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Dobbins (1993), market model results were significantly poorer than those observed
using either the capital asset pricing model or the index model. The large difference
in cumulative abnormal returns between the market model and the other two models,
Table 8.7.
Average Abnormal Returns to Bidding Companies in Domestic
Acquisitions in the United Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
For information on model specifications, see Table 7.1.
Index Model Capital Asset Market Model
Period Pricing Model
t-8 0.0093** 0.0093
(1.91) (1.75) (-0.24)
t-7 0.0045 0.0019 -0.0078
(0.97) (0.37) (-1.23)
t-6 0.0073 0.0084* -0.0014
(1.26) (1.30) (0.30)
t-5 0.0123-* 0.0108- 0.0018
(2.75) (2.17) (0.43)
t-4 0.0108- 0.0141**** 0.0044
(2.25) (2.88) (0.15)
t-3 0.0120**** 0.0120- 0.0028
(2.85) (2.63) (0.27)
t-2 0.0112- 0.0132
(2.60) (2.72) (0.23)
t-1 0.0131 0.0087
(2.77) (3.34) (1.00)
t -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0111-
(-0.35) (-0.38) (-2.56)
t+1 -0.0024 -0.0033 -0.0127-
(-0.56) (-0.68) (-2.66)
t+2 -0.0071- -0.0064* -0.0157***
(-1.82) (-1.52) (-2.57)
t+3 -0.0000 0.0019 -0.0084
(-0.01) (0.33) (-0.99)
t+4 0.0097*** 0.0100- -0.0000
(2.04) (1.86) (0.43)
t+5 -0.0109- -0.0089* -0.0184-
(-2.14) (-1.59) (-2.57)
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Table 8.7 (continued).
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Index Model Capital Asset Market Model
Period Pricing Model
t-8, t-7 0.0139 -0.0085
(2.17) (1.59) (-0.70)
t-8, t-6 0.0212.- 0.0196-* -0.0098
(2.59) (2.14) (-0.40)
t-8, t-5 0.0334- 0.0304
(3.58) (2.88) (-0.13)
t-8, t-4 O.0043 -0.0036
(4.42) (4.01) (-0.05)
t-8, t-3 0.0562.- 0.0564.- -0.0007
(5.05) (4.50) (0.06)
t-8, t-2 0.0675.- 0.0697
(5.72) (5.17) (0.15)
t-8, t-1 0.0805- 0.0873.- 0.0121
(6.26) (5.92) (0.49)
t-8, t 0.0787- 0.0851**** 0.0095
(5.58) (5.30) (-0.39)
t-8, t+1 0.0763- 0.0818
(5.22) (4.92) (-1.21)
t-8, t+2 0.0692- 0.0754- -0.0274-
(4.39) (4.26) (-1.93)
t-8, t+3 0.0691- 0.0773- -0.0358-
(4.12) (4.17) (-2.13)
t-8, t+4 0.0788- 0.0873- -0.0358-
(4.58) (4.66) (-1.93)
t-8, t+5 0.0679 -0.0542.-
(3.60) (3.86) (-2.55)
t-statistics (PateII z-scores for the market model) are given in brackets. *, **, *** and **** indicates that the
null hypothesis of abnormal return/cumulative abnormal return equal to zero has been rejected at the 80,
90, 99 or 99 percent level of significance respectively. Following Strong (1992) and Kumar, Sen and Shome
(1992), the Patell Standardised Residual (PSR) Test (Patell (1976)) has been applied for the MM. The
simple t-test (Strong (1992), pp. 544-545) has been applied for the IM.
is due to the high market model constant term. It appears that domestic UK bidders
substantially outperformed the market during the parameter estimation period, resulting
in high a values'. Thus, despite using a long (60 month) parameter estimation
178	 As discussed in Section 6.5.1, high a values may be attributable to thin trading rather than to superior share
price performance.
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MONTH (RELATIVE TO BID ANNOUNCEMENT)
Figure 8.2.
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Bidding Companies in
Domestic Acquisitions in the United Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
Average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to domestic UK companies making takeover bids for UK listed
companies (1986-1991). For information on model specifications, see Table 7.2.
period, the high alpha values suggest that the market model parameters may not have
been estimated during a period of 'normal' share returns, as assumed by the market
model. This would be consistent with e.g. Firth (1980), Franks and Harris (1989),
Limmack (1991), and Kennedy and Limmack (1996), who all found UK bidders to have
launched their bids after "...extended periods of superior performance..." (Kennedy and
Limmack, (1996), p. 277). In addition, Jensen (1986a) (in his free cash-flow theory)
argued that exceptionally good pre-bid performance may be a contributing motive for
launching acquisitions. The mean monthly a value of 0.010072 observed in this study
(compared to the expected a value of 0.00044 based on the capital asset pricing
model) implies that domestic UK bidders, with the market model, are expected to earn
a rate of return of 11.56% per annum in addition to the rate of return required to
compensate shareholders for the company's level of systematic risk. This accounts
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for the large difference in CARs between the index model and the market model.
Over the pre-bid period UK bidders significantly outperformed the market, as
reflected by the index model CAR (t-8, t-1) of +8.05%, significant at the 99% level. As
judged by the insignificant market model abnormal returns, the pre-bid performance
of domestic bidders was equivalent to that observed during the previous five year
parameter estimation period. However, all models indicate a substantial change in the
share returns at the time of the bid announcement, with negative abnormal returns for
all test models (significant at the 95% level with the market model) during the month
of the offer being made. This is in contrast to the small positive abnormal returns
observed for the overseas bidders during this month. Over the five months following
the bid announcement, the index model and the capital asset pricing model suggest
small negative abnormal returns for domestic bidders, while the market model report
large, and highly significant, abnormal losses.
The CAR for the total analysis period (t-8, t+5) ranged from a highly significant
gain of +6.79% with the index model and +7.84% with the capital asset pricing model,
to a significant loss of -5.42% with the market mode1 179. Thus, the results indicate
that during the pre-bid period, domestic UK bidders continued to outperform the
market, as they had done during the previous five year period. However, the bid
announcement had a significant negative impact on shareholder returns, ending the
extended period of outperformance. Over the post-bid period, share returns were
similar to those observed for the stock market as a whole, but substantially lower than
that observed for the bidders during the pre-bid period.
8.4.2.	 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Domestic
Bidding Companies in Domestic UK Acquisitions
The cross-sectional analysis of the total analysis period (t-8, t+5) index model
179 The large difference between those observed using the market model and those obtained using the other
two models, is due to the large market model a values. As these a values (as well as the generally low ifi
values) indicate parameter estimation problems (see section 6.5.1), it is believed that the index model may
provide the most suitable benchmark against which to evaluate bidding company returns.
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cumulative abnormal returns of +6.79% is given in Table 8.8. While the regressions
generally explained a relatively small fraction of the cross-sectional variation in
abnormal returns (maximum adjusted R2 of 3.1%), some of the regressions, and
several of the variables, were found to be highly statistically significant. The most
important explanatory variable relates to the method of payment. Bidding companies
offering a full cash alternative performed significantly better than other bidders.
Indeed, as indicated by regression 4, UK bidding companies not offering cash, on
average, encountered marginal abnormal losses during the period of study. These
results are consistent with the information asymmetry arguments advocated by e.g.,
Myers and Majluf (1984), Hansen (1987), Amihud et al. (1990), and Bhagat and
Hirshleifer (1993), and the empirical evidence as reported by e.g., Tra ylos (1987),
Franks et al. (1988), Franks and Harris (1989) and Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) for
the US, and Limmack and McGregor (1992) for the UK.
While large overseas bidders performed better than smaller ones, the reverse was
true for domestic UK bidders. Over the total event window, large bidding companies
gained significantly less than smaller ones. Looking at the cumulative abnormal
returns for the various sub-periods (as reported in Table 8.9, 8.10, and 8.11), it is
apparent that small bidders significantly outperformed larger ones during the period
up to the bid announcement, while large predators performed significantly better than
smaller ones over the period following the acquisition. The pre-bid results may be
consistent with a general size effect (as discussed in Section 6.5.2), but with larger
companies handling the acquisitions better than smaller predators. However, the
detailed analysis required to fully understand the impact of company size on
acquisition returns is beyond the scope of this thesis.
A rather surprising finding is that UK bidding companies performed better when
the terms of the offer were increased. As revealed in Table 8.10, this effect was
particularly strong during the bid period (t-1, t). While one would expect target
company shareholders to gain more in revised bids, it is less clear why an increase
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in the offer price should also benefit bidders. Pre-bid stakes appears to have had a
positive impact on the fortunes of the bidders during the period following the bid
announcement, although no such positive impact of pre-bid stakes was observed
during the event period.
Bidding companies gained more during the event period (Table 8.10) the larger
the size of the target relative to the size of the bidder. However, during the period
following the bid announcement, large acquisitions resulted in poorer performance of
bidders, possibly due to the greater difficulties of integrating a large target into the
acquiring firms organisation. Finally, the outcome of the bid and the existence of
competition in pursuing the target appears to have had little impact on the fortunes of
the UK bidders.
8.5.	 Comparative Analysis of Bidding Companies in Cross-Border and 
Domestic Acquisitions 
8.5.1. Differential Abnormal Returns to Bidding Company Shareholders in
Cross-Border and Domestic Acquisitions (Bidding Company 'Cross-
Border Effect')
In this section, the results from the analysis of differences in mean abnormal
returns to the 71 overseas bidding companies and the 414 domestic UK bidding
companies, are discussed. The differences in abnormal returns (calculated as the
mean abnormal returns to overseas predators less the abnormal returns to the
domestic bidders), known as the bidding company 'cross-border effect', are given in
Table 8.12, and depicted in Figure 8.3.
As discussed in the previous sections, the market model at times provided
conflicting results to those obtained using either the index model or the capital asset
pricing model with regard to whether bidders experienced gains or losses at the time
of the takeover bids. However, as evident from Figure 8.3, when looking at the
difference in abnormal returns to bidders in cross-border and domestic acquisitions,
the three test models provided surprisingly consistent results.
Over the pre-bid period from t-8 to t-1, domestic UK predators significantly
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outperformed the market, while overseas bidders experienced insignificant (market
model) abnormal losses. Consequently, over the period prior to the month of the bid
Table 8.12.
Differences in Average Abnormal Returns to Bidding Companies
in Cross-Border and Domestic Acquisitions in the United
Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
For information on model specifications, see Table 7.1. The table shows the percentage point bidding
company 'cross-border effect' (abnormal return to bidding company shareholders in cross-border acquisitions
into the UK less abnormal returns to domestic UK bidding companies).
Index Model Capital Asset Market Model
Period Pricing Model
t-8 -0.0204- -0.0039 -0.0048
(-1.70) (-0.26) (-0.36)
t-7 0.0017 -0.0063 0.0011
(0.19) (-0.55) (0.10)
t-6 0.0090 0.0072 0.0079
(0.88) (0.69) (0.69)
t-5 -0.0138* -0.0134 -0.0100
(-1.40) (-1.10) (-0.75)
t-4 -0.0179** -0.0264- -0.0280***
(-1.80) (-2.25) (-2.12)
t-3 -0.0139** -0.0044 -0.0052
(-1.74) (-0.46) (-0.51)
t-2 -0.0223- -0.0183* -0.0208*
(-2.27) (-1.58) (-1.63)
-
t-1 -0.0167 0.0242 *** -0.0213-
(469) (-2.29) (-1.96)
t 0.0099 0.0166* 0.0134
(0.98) (1.53) (1.14)
t+1 -0.0008 -0.0079 -0.0035
(-0.08) (-0.66) (-0.28)
t+2 -0.0003 0.0024 0.0035
(-0.03) (0.23) (0.33)
t+3 -0.0042 0.0037 0.0056
(-0.38) (0.31) (0.41)
t+4 -0.0181 -0.0108 -0.0153
(-1.59) (-1.01) (-1.18)
t+5 -0.0136 -0.0282** -0.0330....
(-1.03) (-1.78) (-1.98)
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Figure 8.3.
Differences in the Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns to
Bidding Companies in Cross-Border and Domestic Acquisitions
in the United Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
Average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to listed overseas bidding companies who bid for listed
companies in the UK, less the CAR to listed UK companies who bid for listed UK companies. For
information on model specifications, see table 7.1.
domestic bidders lost. The bidding company cross-border effect during this month was
thus positive, at +0.99 percentage points for the index model, +1.66 percentage points
with CAPM (significant at the 80% level) and +1.34 percentage points for the market
model.
However, over the five Month period following the bid, overseas bidders performed
substantially worse than did domestic bidders. The negative cross-border effect was
particularly large during the final two months of the event window. Indeed, during
month t+5, overseas bidders were (with the CAPM and MM) found to have performed
significantly worse than domestic bidders.
As evident from the above discussion, the magnitude and direction of the bidding
company cross-border effect is highly dependent on the event window chosen. While
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overseas bidders performed better than domestic bidders during the month of the bid
announcement, the reverse was true for both the pre- and post-bid periods. Over the
total analysis period from t-8 to t+5, overseas bidders underperformed, with cumulative
abnormal returns in excess of 11 percentage points lower than observed for domestic
UK bidders.
8.5.2.	 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Bidding Company 'Cross-Border Effect'
Over the 14 month event window from t-8 to t+5, domestic bidding companies, on
average, obtained index model cumulative abnormal returns 12.13 percentage points
higher than those observed for the average overseas bidding company. In this
section, cross-sectional regressions are analysed in order to ascertain whether the
apparent negative bidding company cross-border effect is attributable to different bid
characteristics, or whether the cross-border effect is a 'true' nationality effect.
As revealed in Table 8.13, several of the explanatory variables were found to be
highly statistically significant. However, despite some of the regressions, and the
nationality and payment effects in particular, being found to be highly statistically
significant, the adjusted R2 of the regressions were generally fairly low.
As was the case for target company shareholders (as reported in Table 7.11), the
method of payment proved to be the most significant factor in explaining the cross-
sectional variations in bidding company cumulative abnormal returns. As one would
expect from the literature, bidders generally performed significantly better in cash than
in security exchange offers, particularly during the period following the bid
announcement (as reported in Table 8.16). However, despite a higher proportion of
cross-border than domestic bids including full cash alternatives, the overall bidding
company cross-border effect was not attributable to differences in the method of
payment. Indeed, the most important finding of the regressions is that regardless of
what other variables are included in the analysis, the negative bidding company cross
border effect was found to be highly statistically significant, and to exceed 10
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percentage points in every regression. Consequently, the finding that overseas
bidders, on average, performed significantly worse than domestic bidders over the total
analysis period appears to be a true nationality effect, rather than attributable to the
method of payment, or any other attribute of the bid controlled for in this study.
The cross-sectional analysis of the pre-bid period cumulative abnormal returns is
provided in Table 8.14, while the regressions for the bid and post-bid periods are
reported in Table 8.15 and 8.16, respectively. As discussed in the previous section,
and as evident from the highly significant negative 'Nationality' coefficients in Table
8.14, overseas bidders performed significantly worse than domestic bidders during the
pre-bid period.
During the bid period (t-1, t), as reported in Table 8.15, the cross-border effect
was indistinguishable from zero. However, over the post-bid (t+1, t+5) period, the
negative bidding company cross-border effect, as reported in Table 8.16, was
generally significant, especially once the method of payment and the company size
was controlled for.
The cross-sectional analysis reveals that the highly significant differences in pre-
and post-bid, as well as total analysis period, average cumulative abnormal returns to
overseas and domestic predators can not be fully attributed to differences in bid
characteristics. Consequently, cross-border acquisitions into the UK during the 1986-
1991 period were, on average, significantly more detrimental to bidding company
shareholder wealth than were domestic UK acquisitions during the same time period.
8.6.	 Conclusion 
This chapter contains an analysis of the level of abnormal returns to bidding
company shareholders in domestic and cross-border acquisitions into the UK during
the 1986 to 1991 period. The analysis revealed that the level of abnormal returns to
bidding company shareholders is highly dependent on the test model and event
window applied. Due to the high mean market model a values, the level of abnormal
returns using the market model are substantially lower than those observed using
either the index model or the capital asset pricing model. The problems associated
with the market model parameters may cause the market model to be too stringent a
benchmark against which to evaluate bidding company retums 180. However,
regardless of which test model is applied, the results indicate that bidding company
shareholders in both domestic and cross-border acquisitions, on average, encounter
negative abnormal returns during the five month period following the bid
announcement. Studies based on short event windows are thus unlikely to capture
the whole wealth effect associated with takeover activity.
The negative abnormal returns to bidding company shareholders were significantly
worse in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions, indicating a negative bidding
company cross-border (which exceeded 11 percentage points with all three test
models). Cross-sectional analysis revealed that bidding company returns were higher
in cash than in equity financed transactions, although the variable was not significant
in cross-border acquisitions, due to the small number of such transactions not
including a full cash alternative. The negative target company cross-border effect
remained highly significant even when the characteristics of the bid were controlled for.
The negative post-bid abnormal returns, which were particularly large in cross-border
acquisitions, raise questions regarding the merit of such transactions.
180 Due to the parameter estimation problems associated with the market model (and to a lesser extent the
capital asset pricing model) and due to the less stringent data requirements of the index model, the index
model will be applied for the analysis of joint abnormal returns, contained in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 9
ANALYSIS OF THE COMBINED WEALTH EFFECTS
FOR TARGET AND BIDDING COMPANIES'
SHAREHOLDERS IN CROSS-BORDER AND
DOMESTIC ACQUISITIONS
9.1.	 Summary 
This chapter contains an analysis of the joint abnormal returns to pairs of target
and bidding company shareholders in 55 cross-border and 356 domestic acquisitions.
During the pre-bid period (t-8, t-2) the share price performance of the overseas
bidders was generally very similar to that of the stock market indices in their respective
home markets, while their UK target companies tended to perform poorly (except for
the last month, t-2). When combined, the overall abnormal returns during this pre-bid
period, while positive for most months, tended to be relatively small. Of more
significance, however, the results also indicate that during the bid period (t-1, t),
significant positive abnormal returns were encountered. Thus, while overseas bidders
lost due to their acquisitions (and the acquisitions thus resulted in a transfer of wealth
from bidders to targets), the acquisitions also appears to have created significant
shareholder wealth. The total joint index model cumulative abnormal returns over the
period from t-8 to t+1 amounted to +5.19% (significant at the 95% level). However,
large national variations are observed, with cross-border acquisitions into the UK by
bidders based in other EC countries resulting, on average, in small overall losses in
wealth. The cross-sectional analysis revealed that cross-border acquisitions in which
there was no cash alternative resulted in large overall losses, while the presence of
pre-bid stakes had a significant positive impact on the level of overall abnormal
returns.
In domestic UK acquisitions, significant positive joint abnormal returns are
observed during months t-2, t-1 and t. Over the whole event window from t-8 to t+1,
the total joint cumulative abnormal returns amounted to +8.08%, significant at the 99%
level. Cross-sectional analysis revealed that the abnormal returns were higher in cash
than in equity financed acquisitions and, rather surprisingly, in competitive and revised
bids. Overall percentage gains were also higher where the joint market values of the
target and bidding companies was low.
While the overall gains were higher in domestic than in cross-border acquisitions,
the negative overall (t-8, ti-1) cross-border effect of 2.89 percentage points was not
statistically significant. The negative cross-border effect remain insignificant when the
characteristics of the bid is controlled for.
9.2.	 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the abnormal returns to target and bidding company
shareholders have been analysed separately. The question remains, however,
whether takeovers in the UK during the 1986-1991 period overall were creating
additional shareholder wealth. This is the issue assessed in this chapter. This
analysis is based on the joint abnormal returns to pairs of targets and bidding
companies in cross-border and domestic acquisitions. When analysing the joint
abnormal returns to pairs of targets and bidders, it is important to take into account the
generally different market values of the bidders and targets (see Table 6.5).
Consequently, the abnormal returns for each target and bidder pair is calculated as:
[ (CAR Bidder * MVBidder) + (CAR Target * MVTarget)] (MVBidder MVTarget)
where MV is the pre-bid market value of the company. The average abnormal returns
have been calculated as the equally weighted mean of the abnormal returns to each
pair of target and bidding companies.
In the previous chapters, three different test models were applied; the capital asset
pricing model, the market model, and the index model. As discussed in section 6.5.1,
the market model parameters, particularly for bidding companies, may be biased due
to the particularly strong share price performance of the bidders during the parameter
estimation period. As a result, unlike what one would expect if this period was a time
of 'normal' returns, estimating the market model parameters over this period produced
average a values substantially above (143)R 1. Due to these problems with the
estimation of market model a values, this model may be an inappropriate benchmark
against which to evaluate the share performance of companies engaged in takeover
activity. As discussed in the previous chapter, the level of abnormal return estimates
obtained using either the capital asset pricing model or the index model were generally
fairly similar. However, although the main problems with regard to the market model
relates to the calculation of the intercept, it is a possibility that the strong performance
of bidders during the parameter estimation period will also have influenced the capital
asset pricing model 13 estimates. (The mean 13 values are below 1 for all groups of
companies with both the market model and the capital asset pricing model). The index
model also has the added advantage of having less stringent data requirements than
either of the other two models. Thus, a larger number of companies can be analysed
with the index model compared to either the capital asset pricing model or the market
model. Consequently, this study of joint abnormal returns to pairs of targets and
bidders, is restricted to an analysis of index model abnormal returns.
9.3.	 UK Target Companies and Overseas Bidding Companies in Cross-
Border Acquisitions Into the UK 
9.3.1.	 Joint Abnormal Returns to Target and Bidding Companies in Cross-
Border Acquisitions
The joint abnormal returns to the 55 pairs of target and bidding companies in
cross-border acquisitions for which data was available, are given in Table 9.1, while
the cumulative abnormal returns are depicted in Figure 9.1.
During the time period eight months prior the month of the bid announcement (t-8),
pairs of companies which were subsequently engaged in cross-border acquisitions
significantly underperformed relative to the stock market index. However, except for
month t-3 (where again significant abnormal losses were encountered by
shareholders), positive abnormal returns were observed for each of the remaining eight
Table 9.1.
Average Abnormal Returns to Pairs of Target and Bidding
Companies in Cross-Border Acquisitions into the United
Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
For information on model specification, see Table 7.1. The abnormal return to each pair of target and bidder
is weighted according to their respective pre-bid market values as:
[ (CAR Bidder * MVBidder)	 (CARTarget * MVTarge)] (MVBidder	 MVTanget)
The mean abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns, as reported in the table, is the equally
weighted mean of the abnormal return to each of the 55 pairs of targets and bidders in cross-border
acquisitions.
Index Model
Period
Abnormal Returns Cumulative Abnormal
Returns
t-8 -0.0168-
(-1.76)
t-7 0.0136- -0.0032
(1.82) (-0.27)
t-6 0.0134* 0.0102
(1.35) (0.62)
t-5 0.0002 0.0103
(0.02) (0.53)
t-4 0.0046 0.0149
(0.59) (0.72)
t-3 -0.0093* 0.0056
(-1.31) (0.27)
t-2 0.0017 0.0074
(0.15) (0.34)
t-1 0.0169- 0.0243
(1.66) (1.19)
..
t 0.0245*** 0.0488*
(2.59) (2.26)
t+1 0.0006 0.0519***
(0.07) (1.99)
t-statistics are given in brackets. *, **, *** and **** indicates that the null hypothesis of abnorma
return/cumulative abnormal return equal to zero has been rejected at the 80, 90, 99 or 99 percent level of
significance respectively, using the simple t-test (Strong (1992), pp. 544-545).
months during the ten month event window from t-8 to t+1 181 . In particular, large
(and highly significant) gains were observed for the two month period t-1 and t. During
181 Although data is available for bidders for the longer event window up until t+5, the joint abnormal returns
are restricted to the event window from t-8 to t+1, due to the limited data available for target companies
following the bid announcement.
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Figure 9.1.
Average Joint Index Model Cumulative Abnormal Returns to
Overseas Bidding Companies and UK Target Companies in
Cross-Border Acquisitions into the United Kingdom (1986-1991)
Average joint cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to pairs of listed UK target companies who received
takeover bids from overseas bidding companies and the overseas bidding companies.
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these two months, the average overall gain to pairs of targets and bidders in cross-
border acquisitions into the UK amounted to +4.14 percent of their joint pre-bid market
values.
In Chapter 8, it was revealed that overseas bidders, on average, lost as a result
of their acquisitions into the UK, especially over the period following the bid
announcement. However, over the analysis period from t-8 to t+1, the joint index
model cumulative abnormal returns to the overseas bidders and their UK targets
amounted to +5.19%, significant at the 95% level. The results thus clearly indicate
that while the acquisitions resulted in a transfer of wealth from bidders to targets, the
gains to target company shareholders significantly exceeded the losses to bidders,
even when controlling for the different size of the targets and bidders. Thus, as
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evident from the joint cumulative abnormal returns for the time period from eight
months prior to, to one month after the month of the bid announcement, cross-border
acquisitions into the UK during the 1986-1991 period, on average created significant
shareholder wealth, although the gains to target company shareholders exceeded the
total wealth created, thus frequently causing bidding company shareholders to
experience significant loss of wealth.
9.3.2.	 National Variations
In this section, the differences in total cumulative abnormal returns to pairs of
target and bidding company shareholders in cross-border acquisitions, is analysed
according to the nationality of the bidders. The results contained in Table 9.2 indicate
that there were significant differences in the level of total joint abnormal returns,
depending on the region in which the bidding company was incorporated.
While most cross-border acquisitions resulted in positive joint cumulative abnormal
returns, acquisitions by companies based in other EC member states resulted in
insignificant negative abnormal returns for the total analysis period, although significant
positive abnormal returns were observed for the shorter (t-1, t) event period. While the
abnormal returns to EC bidders were only marginally lower than the average
cumulative abnormal returns to overseas bidders (as discussed in section 8.3.2), the
gains to UK targets were low in acquisitions by EC based firms (section 7.3.2).
Acquisitions by EC companies does thus not appear to have created any overall
shareholder wealth. These results would be consistent with a theory that the overall
creation of wealth in cross-border acquisitions into the UK during the 1986-1991 period
was associated with the entry of companies outside the Single European Market
gaining entry to the Single European Market 182 . The gains to target company
shareholders in such acquisitions were generally very large, and vastly exceeded the
182	 In order to test such a theory, data on any operations in the European Community by overseas bidders prior
to the acquisition would be required. Unfortunately, no reliable source for such data was available.
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Table 9.2.
Average Index Model Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Matched
Pairs of Overseas Bidding Companies and UK Target Companies
in Cross-Border Acquisitions into the United Kingdom by
Nationality of the Bidding Company (1986 - 1991)
For information on model specification, see Table 7.1. The second part of the table contains an analysis
of the differences in mean cumulative abnormal returns. Cell reference = column heading less row heading.
Thus, the first cell (-0.0315) refers to CAR of bidding companies based in the EC, less CAR to bidding
companies based in non-EC member countries.
Event window All EC Non-EC
European
US Rest of
the world
(t-8, t+1) 0.0519*** -0.0057 0.0258 0.0633* 0.1155***
(1.99) (-0.11) (0.31) (1.60) (2.91)
(t-8, t-2) 0.0074 -0.0237 0.0204 -0.0004 0.0453
(0.34) (-0.72) (0.35) (-0.01) (0.99)
(t-1, t) 0.0415*- 0.0390* 0.0064 0.0685- 0.0500***
(3.07) (1.40) (0.28) (2.35) (2.17)
Event
window
EC Non-EC
European
US
Non-EC (t-8, t+1) -0.0315
European (-0.33)
(t-8, t-2) -0.0441
(-0.66)
(t-1, t) 0.0326
(0.91)
US (t-8, t+1) -0.0690 -0.0375
(-1.08) (-0.41)
(t-8, t-2) -0.0233 0.0208
(-0.41) (0.28)
(t-1, t) -0.0295 0.0621 *
(-0.78) (-1.76)
Rest of the (t-8, t+1) -0.1212** -0.0897 -0.0522
world (-1.89) (-0.98) (-0.93)
(t-8, t-2) -0.0690 -0.0249 -0.0457
(-1.23) (-0.34) (-0.71)
(t-1, t) -0.0110 -0.0436* 0.0185
(-0.30) (-1.35) (0.52)
t-statistics are given in brackets. *, **, *** and **** indicates that the null hypothesis or cumulative abnormal
returns (or differences in cumulative abnormal returns) equal to zero has been rejected at the 80, 90, 95 or
99 percent level of significance respectively.
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losses to the overseas bidders.
The wealth created in acquisitions by European companies based outside the EC
were low, due to the large losses incurred by the overseas bidders in such
transactions. As indicated in Chapters 7 and 8, both target and bidding company
shareholders obtained superior returns in acquisitions by predators based outside
Europe or the US. This is indeed also reflected in the joint abnormal returns, as
reported in Table 9.2.
While the positive average joint CAR for the overall sample indicates that the
cross-border acquisitions into the UK during the 1986-1991 period overall resulted in
an increase in shareholders' wealth, the positive wealth effect was predominately
attributable to acquisitions by bidding companies located outside of Europe183.
9.3.3.	 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Joint Cumulative Abnormal Returns to
Target and Bidding Companies in Cross-Border Acquisitions
The cross-sectional analysis of the total analysis period (t-8, t+1) joint index model
cumulative abnormal return of +5.19% observed in cross-border acquisitions, is
contained in Table 9.3. The regressions proved to be successful at explaining large
proportions of the cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns. Several of the
regressions were highly significant, and the maximum adjusted R 2 was 27.3%.
The most significant explanatory variable of joint abnormal returns, proved to be
the method of payment. This variable, in isolation, explains 19.5% of the variation in
the level of cumulative abnormal returns between pairs of targets and bidders involved
in cross-border acquisitions into the UK during the 1986 to 1991 period. In addition,
regression 4 clearly indicates that the 3 cross-border acquisitions not including a full
cash alternative resulted in large and highly significant negative joint abnormal returns.
The total joint abnormal returns also proved to be significantly higher where the
183 With regard to the cross-border acquisitions into the UK by bidders based in the United States, the
percentage joint cumulative abnormal returns observed in this study are substantially higher than those
reported by Franks et al. (1991) of +3.9°/0 for domestic US acquisitions. The difference may, however, be
due to the short 11 day event window applied by Franks et al.
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bidder held a stake in the target company prior to the bid announcement, compared
to where no such pre-bid stake was present. Interestingly, while highly significant for
pairs of targets and bidders in transnational acquisitions, this variable (as discussed
in Chapters 7 and 8) was not significant for either cross-border targets or overseas
bidders in isolation. (It should be noted, however, that due to data limitations, the
samples of target and bidding companies analysed in this chapter are somewhat
smaller than the samples analysed in Chapters 7 and 8).
The overall gains were also somewhat larger where the market value of the target
was large relative to that of the bidder, and where the overall (joint) market values of
the bidder and target was high. As revealed in Table 8.4 in the previous chapter,
these size-effects were of particular importance for the abnormal returns to bidding
company shareholders, but had little impact on the fortunes of shareholders of target
companies.
The cross-sectional analysis of the pre-bid (t-8, t-2) and bid period (t-1, t)
cumulative abnormal returns, are contained in Tables 9.4 and 9.5, respectively.
Several of the regressions succeeded in explaining large parts of the cross-sectional
variation in pre-bid share performance. The results indicate that companies in bids
where there was a full cash alternative, performed significantly better than other
companies during the pre-bid period'.
During the pre-bid period, pairs of targets and bidders with high joint market
values performed better than smaller companies. This result (contradictory to a
general stock market size effect) was accounted for by the generally strong
performance of large overseas bidders during the period prior to making the offer.
Rather surprisingly, targets and bidders in bids which turned out to be competitive,
performed worse during the pre-bid period than did other companies engaged in
takeover activity. However, during the bid period itself (t-1, t), the competitive nature
184	 While positive, this variable was not (as reported in Tables 7.4 and 8.5) significant for the larger samples
of either targets or bidders analysed in isolation.
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of the bid had a positive impact on the joint abnormal returns to targets and bidders
in cross-border acquisitions into the UK. The companies also performed better in
failed bids. This was due to overseas bidders, on average, performing (generally
marginally) worse in successful than in failed bids.
The method of payment had, as expected, a highly significant impact on the
cumulative abnormal returns during the bid period, with both targets and bidders
performing better in cash than in security exchange offers. The joint bid period
cumulative abnormal returns were also superior where the bidding company held a
stake in the target prior to the bid announcement. As discussed in Chapter 8, this was
due to the gain on the stake in the target by overseas bidders.
The final variable with significant explanatory power of the bid period cross-
sectional variation in abnormal returns, was the relative size of the bidder and target.
The overall gains (due to the superior returns to bidders) were higher where the target
company was large relative to the market value of the bidder.
9.4.	 UK Target Companies and Domestic Bidding Companies in Domestic 
UK Acquisitions 
9.4.1.	 Joint Abnormal Returns to Target and Bidding Companies in Domestic
Acquisitions
While data was available for 414 domestic bidders and 568 domestic targets, data
was only available for 356 pairs of target and bidding companies in domestic
acquisitions. The average monthly joint index model abnormal returns are given in
Table 9.6, while the cumulative abnormal returns are depicted in Figure 9.2.
During the period from eight to three months prior to the month of the bid
announcement, the joint abnormal returns were insignificant. However, from t-2
onwards, large and statistically significant gains accrued to companies involved in
domestic UK acquisitions during the 1986 to 1991 period. Highly significant abnormal
returns were observed for months t-2 to t, amounting to +7.03% (with the index model)
for these three months. Over the total analysis period from t-8 to t+1, joint cumulative
Table 9.6.
Average Abnormal Returns to Pairs of Target and Bidding
Companies in Domestic Acquisitions into the United Kingdom
(1986 - 1991)
For information on model specifications, see Table 7.1.
Index Model
Period
Abnormal Returns Cumulative Abnormal
Returns
t-8 0.0019
(0.46)
t-7 -0.0017 0.0002
(-0.40) (0.04)
t-6 0.0020 0.0023
(0.51) (0.34)
t-5 0.0056* 0.0079
(1.44) (1.01)
t-4 -0.0006 0.0073
(-0.13) (0.81)
t-3 -0.0000 0.0073
(-0.01) (0.67)
t-2 0.0090-* 0.0163*
(2.25) (1.33)
t-1 0.0137*-* 0.0300*-
(2.95) (2.40)
t 0.0476**** 0.0776—•
(8.22) (5.65)
t+1 -0.0001 0.0808--
(-0.02) (5.47)
t-statistics are given in brackets. *, **, *** and **** indicates that the null hypothesis of abnorma
return/cumulative abnormal return equal to zero has been rejected at the 80, 90, 99 or 99 percent level of
significance respectively, using the simple t-test (Strong (1992), pp. 544-545).
abnormal returns to targets and bidders in domestic acquisitions amounted to +8.08%,
significant at the 99% level.
These large positive joint cumulative abnormal returns contradict the findings of
Firth (1979 and 1980) who found the value of losses to bidders to exceed the gains
to targets and Linnmack (1991) who found acquisitions overall to have been
approximately a zero-sum game, with losses to bidders matching the gains to targets.
The large positive joint cumulative abnormal returns observed in this study are,
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Figure 9.2.
Average Joint Index Model Cumulative Abnormal Returns to UK
Bidding Companies and UK Target Companies in Domestic
Acquisitions in the United Kingdom (1986-1991)
Average joint cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to pairs of listed UK target companies who received
takeover bids from domestic bidding companies and the UK bidding companies.
-7	 -6	 -5	 -4	 -3	 -2	 -1	 0	 1
MONTH (RELATIVE TO BID ANNOUNCEMENT)
however, similar to those of Franks and Harris (1989), who found both target and
bidding companies' shareholders to have gained from domestic UK acquisitions.
It is worth noting, however, that the results in this study, particularly with regard
to the bidders (as discussed in Chapter 8), are highly dependent on the methodology
applied. The index model abnormal returns, as used in this chapter, are substantially
higher than those obtained using the market model. Different event windows also
produce different results. Care is therefore required when comparing results obtained
in different studies. For example, the overall losses observed by Firth (1979 and
1980) were obtained using the market model, while the results reported by Limmack
(1991) involved the application of the market model with a and /3 obtained from London
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Business School Risk Measurement Service185. Franks and Harris (1989), however,
reported their results using the index model. The difference between the positive joint
cumulative abnormal returns as reported Franks and Harris (1989) and in this study,
and the negative or neutral combined abnormal returns as obtained by Firth (1979 and
1980) and Limmack (1991) may, at least in part, be attributable to the different
methodologies applied.
9.4.2.	 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Joint Cumulative Abnormal Returns to
Target and Bidding Companies in Domestic Acquisitions
This section contains the cross-sectional analysis of the total joint index model
cumulative abnormal returns to targets and bidders in domestic UK acquisitions. The
CAR over the total event window (t-8 to t+1) of +8.08%, is analysed in Table 9.7. The
explanatory power of these regressions is generally low, (maximum adjusted R 2 of
3.3%), although some of the regressions and several of the variables were found to
be highly significant.
Over the total analysis period, targets and bidders in domestic acquisitions, as in
cross-border acquisitions, performed significantly better where the offer included a full
cash alternative. The overall gains were also higher in revised and competitive bids.
As discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, competitive bids had a significant positive impact
on target shareholders' returns, while domestic bidders performed, rather surprisingly,
better in revised bids.
While companies involved in cross-border acquisitions were found to have
performed better where their joint market values were high, the reverse was true for
domestic acquisitions, where smaller companies were found to have performed
significantly better than larger ones. The relative size of the targets and bidders did
not, however, help explain the cross-sectional variation in joint cumulative abnormal
returns to targets and bidders in domestic UK acquisitions.
185	 These parameters are adjusted for thin trading (see section 6.5.1).
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The cross-sectional analysis of the pre-bid (t-8, t-2) and bid period (t-1, t)
cumulative abnormal returns are contained in Tables 9.8 and 9.9, respectively. As in
cross-border acquisitions, UK companies in cash acquisitions performed better than
other targets and bidders in domestic acquisitions during the period prior to the bid
announcement.
Due to the high returns during the pre-bid period for targets in competitive
bids', this variable had a positive impact on the joint abnormal returns during the
period from t-8 to t-2. During the bid period (t-1, t), joint abnormal returns were
significantly higher in cash than in equity offers. Total gains were also higher in
revised offers. As was the case for the total analysis period (t-8, t+1), pairs of
companies with low overall market values performed significantly better than larger
companies.
9.5.	 Comparative Analysis of Joint Abnormal Returns in Cross-Border and
Domestic Acquisitions 
9.5.1. Differential Joint Abnormal Returns to Target and Bidding Company
Shareholders in Cross-Border and Domestic Acquisitions (Total 'Cross-
Border Effect')
In this section, the difference in average joint cumulative abnormal returns to
targets and bidders in 55 cross-border and 356 domestic acquisitions, is analysed.
The difference in the average abnormal returns (the total cross-border effect) are given
in Table 9.10, while the differences in cumulative abnormal returns to companies
engaged in cross-border and domestic acquisitions, are depicted in Figure 9.3.
During month t-8, companies subsequently engaged in domestic UK acquisitions
performed significantly better than companies subsequently involved in cross-border
acquisitions. However, during the following month (t-7), the reverse was true. During
the remaining months prior to the bid, the difference in abnormal returns to companies
186	 As discussed in Chapter 7, this may be due to the other takeover bid having been announced prior to the
takeover bid being analysed.
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Table 9.10.
Differences in Average Abnormal Returns to Pairs of Target and
Bidding Companies in Cross-Border and Domestic Acquisitions
in the United Kingdom (1986 - 1991)
For information on model specifications, see Table 7.1. The table shows overall 'cross-border effect'
(abnormal returns to pairs of target and bidding company shareholders in cross-border acquisitions into the
UK, less abnormal returns to pairs of target and bidding company shareholders in domestic UK acquisitions).
Index Model
Period
Abnormal Returns Cumulative Abnormal
Returns
t-8 -0.0188-
(-1.79)
t-7 0.0153.. -0.0034
(1.79) (-0.26)
t-6 0.0114 0.0079
(1.06) (0.45)
t-5 -0.0055 0.0024
(-0.54) (0.12)
t-4 0.0051 0.0076
(0.57) (0.33)
t-3 -0.0092 -0.0017
(-1.09) (-0.07)
t-2 -0.0073 -0.0089
(-0.60) (-0.36)
t-1 0.0032 -0.0057
(0.29) (-0.24)
t -0.0231— -0.0288
(-2.08) (-1.11)
t+1 0.0007 -0.0289
(0.07) (-0.96)
t-statistics are given in brackets. *, **, *** and **** indicates that the null hypothesis of abnormal
return/cumulative abnormal return equal to zero has been rejected at the 80, 90, 95 or 99 percent level of
significance respectively. The level of statistical significance has been calculated using a t-test for
differences in means (Weis and Hassett (1986), pp. 422-426).
in domestic and cross-border acquisitions were insignificant.
During the month of the bid announcement, joint abnormal returns to companies
in domestic acquisitions were significantly higher than those observed for cross-border
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-8	 -7	 -6	 -5	 -4	 -3	 -2	 -1	 0	 1
MONTH (RELATIVE TO BID ANNOUNCEMENT)
Figure 9.3.
Differences in the Average Joint Index Model Cumulative
Abnormal Returns to Pairs of Target and Bidding Companies in
Cross-Border and Domestic Acquisitions in the United Kingdom
(1986-1991)
Average joint cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to pairs of overseas bidding companies and listed UK
target companies in cross-border acquisitions, less the CAR to bidders and targets in domestic UK
acquisitions.
acquisitions'. Over the total analysis period from t-8 to t+1, the overall cumulative
abnormal returns to targets and bidders was 2.89 percentage points higher in domestic
than in cross-border acquisitions. For acquisitions in the UK during the 1986 to 1991
period, target company shareholders gained more in cross-border than in domestic
acquisitions during the ten month event window (t-8, t+1). This, however, was more
than offset by the inferior performance of overseas bidders, relative to that of domestic
bidders, thus leading to higher wealth creation in national UK than in transnational
acquisitions. The negative overall cross-border effect was not, however, statistically
187 This result is rather surprising, given that UK target companies gained marginally more in domestic than in
cross-border acquisitions, and that domestic bidders lost while cross-border bidders gained during month
t. The difference in results between these joint abnormal returns and the returns to targets and bidders
separately (as reported in Chapters 7 and 8) may, in part, be due to the different sample sizes.
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significant.
9.5.2.	 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Total 'Cross-Border Effect'
The cross-sectional analysis of the difference in total joint index model cumulative
abnormal returns to pairs of target and bidding companies involved in respectively
cross-border and domestic acquisitions (total cross-border effect) of -2.89 percentage
points, is contained in Table 9.11.
The variables included in the regressions, while at times significant, were generally
only successful at explaining a small amount of the cross-sectional variation in total
joint cumulative abnormal returns. The maximum adjusted R 2 (when all the 8
explanatory variables are analysed together) is low, at 3.1%.
The negative cross-border effect (as captured by the 'Nationality' variable)
remained statistically insignificant even when the characteristics of the bids were
controlled. One exception was regression 8, where the method of payment and the
existence of competition in the bidding process were controlled for. In this case, the
negative cross-border effect was significant at the 80% level of significance. However,
the cross-border effect was no longer significant once other explanatory variables were
added to the regressions.
The overall gains were significantly higher in bids where a full cash alternative was
available, compared to where only securities were offered. This is hardly surprising,
given that the abnormal returns to all four groups of shareholders (targets and bidders
in both cross-border and domestic acquisitions) were found to be positively influenced
by the presence of a cash alternative in the offer.
Overall gains were also significantly higher in revised bids. This variable, while
appearing to have a positive impact on all groups of shareholders was (as revealed
in Table 8.8 in the previous chapter) only significant for domestic bidders. Marginally
higher abnormal returns were also associated with competitive bids, due to the
superior performance of domestic targets in such offers (see Table 7.9).
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Joint company size appears to have had a significantly negative impact on the
overall joint abnormal returns. This variable appears to have been driven by domestic
acquisitions, where both bidders and targets performed better where their combined
market value was low (Table 8.8 and 7.7). However, with regard to cross-border
acquisitions, Table 8.4 reveals that large overseas bidders, on average, performed
better than smaller ones.
The cross-sectional analysis of the joint cross-border effect during the pre-bid
period (t-8, t-2) and the bid period (t-1, t), are contained in Tables 9.12 and 9.13,
respectively. During the pre-bid period, the only significant explanatory variable of the
cross-sectional variation in abnormal returns, was the method of payment.
During the bid period, the cross-border effect was negative, and marginally
significant (at the 80% level) in 3 of the 13 regressions. However, better explanations
of the cross-sectional variation in joint abnormal returns are provided by the method
of payment (with higher joint returns in cash bids), whether or not the bid was revised
(with higher gains in revised bids) and the total market value of the bidders and targets
(with smaller pairs performing significantly better than larger ones).
9.6.	 Conclusion 
This chapter contains a discussion of the joint abnormal returns to pairs of target
and bidding company shareholders in both cross-border and domestic acquisitions into
the UK during the 1986 to 1991 period. Due to the parameter estimation problems
associated with the market model and (to a lesser extent) the capital asset pricing
model, the analysis in this chapter is based on the index model abnormal returns.
While overseas bidding companies, on average, experienced negative abnormal
returns, these losses were more than offset by the large gains to target company
shareholders. Over the time period from t-8 to t+1, joint index model cumulative
at returns in cross-border acquisitions amounted to +5.19%. These results
,ast that cross-border acquisitions created significant shareholder wealth, although
there was also a transfer of wealth from bidding to target company shareholders. It
is worth bearing in mind, however, that the overseas bidding companies (as discussed
in Chapter 8) appears to have lost significantly during the period following the bid
announcement, especially during month t+5. Due to limited post-bid data available for
targets, these joint abnormal returns are restricted to the event window up until t+1.
They do therefore not capture the full loss which appears to have accrued to overseas
bidders as a result of their cross-border acquisitions into the UK.
In domestic UK acquisitions, both target and bidding company shareholders
experienced positive index model abnormal returns over the ten month period from t-8
to t+1. When combined, the joint cumulative abnormal returns amounted to +8.08%.
Thus, while UK target company shareholders gained more in cross-border than in
domestic acquisitions (as discussed in Chapter 7), this positive target company cross-
border effect was more than offset by the negative bidding company cross-border
effect caused by the poor share price performance of the overseas bidding companies
(as discussed in Chapter 8). Overall there was thus a negative joint cross-border
effect, of 2.89 percentage points. This cross-border effect was not, however,
statistically significant. Cross-sectional analysis revealed that abnormal returns to
target and bidding company shareholders in both cross-border and domestic
acquisitions were particularly large in offers where there was a full cash alternative.
CHAPTER 10
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
10.1.	 Summary 
This chapter contains concluding remarks and a discussion of the main empirical
findings obtained in this thesis, and how these results relate to the 21 hypotheses
tested in this study. (The hypotheses are discussed in Chapter 5, while the empirical
evidence is discussed in Chapters 7, 8 and 9).
Acquisitions in the UK during the 1986 to 1991 period resulted in large gains to
target company shareholders. These gains were higher in cross-border than in
domestic acquisitions, thus confirming that a target company 'cross-border effect' was
present in the UK during this time period. The cross-sectional analysis suggests,
however, that there is no overall target company cross-border effect once the
characteristics of the bid (in particular, the method of payment) is controlled for.
The level of abnormal returns to bidders varied significantly depending on the
model specification, with the market model indicating significantly lower abnormal
returns than either the index model or the capital asset pricing model. The index
model abnormal returns indicate that shareholders of overseas bidding companies
gained somewhat during the month of the bid announcement, but experienced
negative abnormal returns over the following 5 months. Domestic bidders performed
exceptionally well prior to the bid announcement, but underperformed relative to the
market from the bid announcement month onwards. Thus, the acquisition does appear
to have had a negative impact on bidding company returns, although more so in cross-
border than in domestic acquisitions, thus indicating a negative bidding company
'cross-border effect'. Analysis of joint abnormal returns to target and bidding company
shareholders, revealed that the value of the abnormal returns to target company
shareholders substantially exceed the losses observed by bidding company
shareholders in both cross-border and domestic acquisitions. The overall gains were
higher in domestic than in cross-border acquisitions. It thus appears that acquisitions
create significant overall shareholder wealth, although the gains to target company
shareholders exceed the total wealth created. The large gains to targets result in
losses to bidding company shareholders, particularly in cross-border acquisitions.
10.2.	 Introduction 
During the late 1980s, the United Kingdom witnessed a major increase in
acquisitions. A significant feature of this takeover boom, was the high (and rising)
importance of cross-border acquisitions of UK companies. Despite the significant
scale of cross-border acquisitions into the UK, this is an area which has so far
received little attention in the existing empirical finance literature. This thesis aims to
fill this gap, by analysing the impact of domestic and cross-border takeover bids for
listed UK companies on the wealth of shareholder of both target and bidding
companies, as well as the overall wealth effects to pairs of bidders and targets.
The study is based on an analysis of takeover bids announced on or after 1
January 1986, and for which the bid outcome was known by 31 December 1991. A
total of 756 domestic and 208 cross-border bids were identified for this 6 year period.
Although analysis was attempted for almost all of these bids'', analysis of a census
proved not to be possible, due to data limitations. The study centres around the level
of share returns to shareholders of 1,196 companies, consisting of 71 overseas
bidding companies and 143 UK target companies in cross-border acquisitions, as well
as 414 domestic UK bidding companies and 568 UK targets in domestic UK
acquisitions. (Data was available for both the target and bidding company
shareholders in 50 of the cross-border acquisitions and 356 of the domestic UK
acquisitions).
188 As discussed in Chapter 6, partial takeover bids, bids for investment trusts, bids for water companies, joint
bids and second bids by the same bidding company for the same target company within a 12 month period,
were excluded from the analysis.
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Previous studies (e.g., Franks and Harris (1989), Limmack (1991)), have indicated
that the choice of event study methodology may have an impact on the level of
estimated abnormal returns (which is a measure of shareholder wealth effects).
Consequently, in this study, 3 different test models are applied. These are the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM), the market model (MM), and the index model (IM)189.
CAPM and MM parameters are estimated using monthly data for the time period from
month t-68 to month t-9, where t refers to the month of the bid announcement.
Previous research (e.g., Franks et al. (1977)) has indicated that share prices
(particularly of target companies) start rising several months prior to the bid
announcement. Research has also indicated that abnormal returns may accrue to
bidding company shareholders during an extended period following the bid
announcement (e.g., Franks and Harris (1989) and Limmack (1991)). Thus, in order
to capture the full wealth effect from acquisitions, long event windows are required.
(There is a trade-off, however, as long event windows exacerbate the difficulties
relating to data availability and imprecise parameter estimation. This is discussed
further in Chapter 6). Consequently, fairly long event-windows are applied in this
study, with cumulative abnormal returns, using all models, estimated for target
company shareholders over a ten month period from t-8 to t+1, and for bidding
company shareholders over a fourteen month period from t-8 to t+5 190 .
In the existing literature, several explanations have been offered as to why the
level of abnormal returns to target and/or bidding company shareholders may be
systematically different in domestic and cross-border acquisitions. These theories (as
discussed in Chapter 2) relate to product market imperfections, government
intervention and regulatory policies (in particular with regard to market access and
taxation), capital market imperfections (regarding exchange rates and price/earnings
189	 For all three models, market returns are (as discussed in Chapter 6) calculated as the change in level of the
stock market index in the company's home market.
190	 The event windows are different for bidding and target companies due to the limited return data generally
available for target company shareholders following the bid announcement.
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ratios), segmented takeover markets and international risk diversification. While these
factors provide possible motives for cross-border acquisitions, empirical testing of
these factors is subject to limitations, as the factors are generally not mutually
exclusive, and causation can generally not be established. Consequently, the main
aim of this thesis is to determine the level of abnormal returns to shareholders from
cross-border and domestic acquisitions and, in particular, to establish whether there
are differences in the levels of abnormal returns associated with cross-border and
domestic acquisitions ('cross-border effects'). This thesis does not attempt to
empirically test the various theories put forward in the literature as possible causes of
such cross-border effects'.
Chapter 3 contains a review of key literature on domestic acquisitions, with regard
to the methodology adopted and the results obtained, while a discussion of the
literature on cross-border acquisitions is contained in Chapter 4. The existing literature
overwhelmingly confirm that target company shareholders gain significantly in both
cross-border and domestic acquisitions. Previous research, predominately relating to
the US market, has indicated that target company shareholders tend to gain more
when the predator company is based abroad (see Table 4.2). This has become
known as the target company 'cross-border effect'. No analysis appear to have been
undertaken, prior to this one, to establish whether a similar target company cross-
border effect has been present in the UK.
The evidence with regard to the level of abnormal returns to bidding company
shareholders in either domestic or cross-border acquisitions is mixed, with some
studies reporting large gains and other studies reporting large losses (see Tables 3.1
and 4.1). This thesis include an analysis of the level of abnormal returns to cross-
border and domestic bidders, as well as an analysis of the differences in the level of
abnormal returns to shareholders of overseas and UK bidders. In addition, the joint
191 However, as discussed below, bid specific factors which may have an impact on the level of abnormal
returns (such as the outcome of the bid, whether the bid was competitive, or revised, the method of
payment, the presence of toeholds, the relative size of the target and bidding companies, as well as the size
of the company being analysed) are controlled for when analysing the cross-border effects.
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abnormal returns to pairs of target and bidding company shareholders in both cross-
border and domestic acquisitions are analysed.
The 21 hypotheses tested in this study are discussed in Chapter 5, while the
methodology applied (and the methodological difficulties encountered, such as
parameter estimation and 'thin' trading, stock market size effects, and difficulties in
estimating the abnormal returns to bidding company shareholders) is discussed in
Chapter 6. As mentioned above, previous literature, predominately based on the US
market, has established that target company shareholders generally gain more from
cross-border than from domestic acquisitions. This thesis aims to test whether a
similar target company cross-border effect was present in the UK during the 1986 to
1991 period. In addition, the study aims to establish whether bidding company
shareholders gained or lost as a result of the takeover bids, and whether these
abnormal returns were different in cross-border and domestic acquisitions. The thesis
also aims to establish whether the takeover bids overall were value creating, by
analysing the joint abnormal returns to target and bidding company shareholders.
Previous research has indicated that the characteristics of the bid may have an impact
on the level of the abnormal returns. Consequently, a number of variables are
controlled for in the cross-sectional analysis. These variables are; whether the bid was
cross-border or domestic (nationality), whether the bid was successful or failed
(outcome), whether there were more than one company bidding for the target company
(competitive), whether the terms of the offer were improved (revised), whether or not
the offer included a full cash alternative (pay), whether or not the bidding company
held shares in the target company prior to bid announcement (stake), the relative size
(as measured by the pre-bid market value of equity) of the target and bidding
companies and finally, the size of the company being analysed.
10.3.	 Findings and Conclusions 
The empirical results obtained in this thesis are discussed in three chapters;
Chapter 7 (target company shareholders), Chapter 8 (bidding company shareholders)
and Chapter 9 (joint abnormal returns to target and bidding company shareholders).
The main findings of the thesis, and how this relates to the 21 hypotheses, are
discussed below.
The first hypothesis relate to whether shareholders of UK target companies gain
from takeover bids by overseas companies:
Hypothesis 1 - Cross-Border Target Companies 
HocT	 No abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of target
companies in cross-border acquisitions into the UK.
H i cT Significant abnormal returns (positive or negative) accrued to
shareholders of target companies in cross-border acquisitions
into the UK.
The empirical evidence for the UK during the 1986-1991 period (discussed in section
7.2), reject the null hypothesis. UK target companies in cross-border acquisitions, on
average, significantly underperformed prior to becoming takeover targets. However,
significant positive abnormal returns were observed from month t-2 onwards (where
t refer to the month of the bid announcement). Cumulative abnormal returns over the
event window from eight months prior to, to one month after the month of the bid (t-8,
t+1) to shareholders of UK target companies in cross-border acquisitions were highly
significant (at better than the 99% level), and amounted to +20.21% with the IM,
+25.27% with the CAPM, and +26.98% with the MM. These high gains to target
company shareholders are consistent with previous literature, as discussed in Chapter
4.
The second hypothesis tested relate to abnormal gains or losses to shareholders
of UK companies targeted in domestic acquisitions:
Hypothesis 2 - Domestic Target Companies 
HoDT	 No abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of target
companies in domestic UK acquisitions.
H i m-	Significant abnormal returns (positive or negative) accrued to
shareholders of target companies in domestic UK acquisitions.
The results obtained in this thesis (section 7.3) reject the null hypothesis. Statistically
significant (at better than the 99% level) positive average cumulative abnormal returns
of +17.71% with the IM, +19.12% with the CAPM, and +16.66% with the MM, were
earned by shareholders of listed UK companies targeted in domestic acquisitions.
As summarised in Table 4.2, the majority of the existing literature on target
companies in cross-border acquisitions, based predominately on US data, have
indicated that gains are higher in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions.
Hypothesis 3 relates to whether a similar target company cross-border effect was
present in the UK during the 1986-1991 period:
Hypothesis 3 - Target Companies 'Cross-Border Effect'
HoCT effect There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to UK
target company shareholders in domestic and cross-border
acquisitions.
H i CT effect There were significant differences in the level of abnormal
returns to UK target company shareholders in domestic and
cross-border acquisitions.
The analysis (in section 7.4) revealed that target company shareholders gained more
in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions. The difference in mean abnormal
returns to targets in cross-border and domestic acquisitions was +2.50 percentage
points with the IM, +6.15 percentage points with the CAPM, and +10.31 percentage
points with the MM. While positive, the overall target company cross-border effect was
only statistically significant (at the 90% level) with the market model. However, when
variations in the characteristics of the bids are controlled for in the cross-sectional
analysis (a discussion of the cross-sectional variables is provided below in hypotheses
15 to 21), some of the regressions indicated that the index model cross-border effect
was significant (at the 80% level). Thus, while not highly significant, there is sufficient
evidence to suggest that there was a positive target company cross-border effect in
the UK during the 1986-1991 period. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected.
The overall cumulative abnormal returns to UK target companies in cross-border
acquisitions, confirmed that significant gains accrue to the target companies in cross-
border acquisitions. There is a possibility, however, that the level of target company
abnormal returns are influenced by the nationality of the overseas bidding company,
as covered by hypothesis 4:
Hypothesis 4 - Cross-Border Target Companies - Nationality of Bidders
HoCT nat	 No differences in abnormal returns to shareholders of UK target
companies in cross-border acquisitions were associated with the
nationality of the overseas bidders.
H i CT flat Significant differences in abnormal returns to shareholders of UK
target companies in cross-border acquisitions were associated
with the nationality of the overseas bidders.
In this study, the 143 cross-border takeover bids for UK listed companies were made
by companies based in 22 different countries. Due to the small number of
observations for some countries, the bids were classified according to whether the
bidder was based in the EC, in non-EC European countries, in the US, or elsewhere.
The analysis (in section 7.2.2) revealed that gains to target shareholders in intra-EC
acquisitions, while (insignificantly) positive, were significantly lower than gains to
targets bid for by companies based outside the Community. These findings reject the
null hypothesis in favour of the alternative. The variation in abnormal returns
depending on the nationality of the bidding company are consistent with a market entry
argument, although an explicit testing of this theory was not possible.
Previous research (e.g., Franks et al. (1977)) found the share price of target
companies to rise significantly several months prior to the official bid announcement.
Biswas (1990) suggested that the possibility of bid leakage is higher in cross-border
than in domestic acquisitions. This is tested in hypothesis 5, which relate to whether
cross-border acquisitions were more or less of a surprise to the stock market than
were domestic acquisitions:
Hypothesis 5 - Timing of Target Company Bid Rumour
HoT timing There were no differences between domestic and cross-border
acquisitions with regard to the length of time prior to the bid
announcement at which target company share price rise.
H I T timing The length of time prior to the bid announcement at which target
company share price rose differed between domestic and cross-
border acquisitions.
In cross-border acquisitions, while negative abnormal returns were generally observed
for months t-8 to t-3, significant positive abnormal returns were observed as early as
two months prior to the month of the bid announcement. In domestic acquisitions,
target company returns were close to zero during month t-3, and (with the IM and MM)
significantly positive during t-2 192 . Thus, with monthly data, there is no discernible
difference between cross-border and domestic acquisitions with regard to the timing
of bid rumours. During the 1986 to 1991 period, share prices of UK target companies
tended to rise significantly two months prior to the bid announcement month in both
domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
The sixth hypothesis related to the pre-bid performance of the target companies.
Following Davis (1995), it was hypothesised that overseas bidders, due to the distance
to head office, would tend to target companies which had performed well (as
measured by their share performance), while leaving weaker targets to domestic
192 Possible causes for the pre-bid increase in the target company share price include bid speculation, insider
trading and the building of a stake in the target company by the bidding company prior to the official bid
announcement. The effect of pre-bid stakes is explored further in hypothesis 19.
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predators:
Hypothesis 6 - Pre-Bid Performance of Targets 
HoT pre-bid There were no differences in pre-bid performance between
target companies in domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
H i T pre-bid There were significant differences (positive or negative) in the
pre-bid performance of target companies in domestic and cross-
border acquisitions.
The results reject the null hypothesis. Indeed, contrary to expectations, UK target
companies bid for by overseas bidders (as discussed in section 7.4) performed worse
(significant with the index model) over the early pre-bid period (t-8, t-3).
Turning to the abnormal returns to shareholders of bidding companies, the
literature on both domestic and cross-border acquisitions (as discussed in Chapters
3 and 4) is inconclusive with regard to whether these shareholders gain or lose from
takeover activity.
The empirical evidence with regard to the level of abnormal returns to
shareholders of the overseas bidding companies (as discussed in section 8.2.1) was
tested against the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 7 - Cross-Border Bidding Companies 
HocB	 No abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of overseas
bidding companies in cross-border acquisitions into the UK.
H i cB	 Significant abnormal returns (positive or negative) accrued to
shareholders of overseas bidding companies in cross-border
acquisitions into the UK.
During the month of the bid announcement, shareholders of overseas bidding
companies gained (+0.80% with the index model, +1.43% with CAPM (significant at
the 80% level) and +0.23% with the market model). However, these shareholders
encountered large negative abnormal returns over the period following the bid
announcement. The average cumulative abnormal returns over the whole event
window (t-8, t+5) amounted to -5.34% with the index model (significant at the 80%
level), -3.55% with CAPM, and -16.46% with the market model (significant at the 99%
level). These results indicate that while the short term impact of the acquisition was
positive, overseas bidders underperformed following the bid announcement. Thus,
these cross-border acquisitions do not appear to have created wealth for the bidding
company shareholders.
The results also highlight two important methodological issues, regarding the
length of the event window and the choice of analysis model. As indicated above,
shareholders of overseas bidding companies experienced significant negative
abnormal returns during the period following the bid announcement. As discussed in
section 6.5.4, various theories have been put forward as possible causes for such
post-announcement 'drift', such as the release of new information (e.g.,
announcements of competitive bids, bid outcome, etc), overpayment but slow share
price reaction due to inefficient markets, and model misspecification. While there may
be some merit in each of these theories, none of them can fully explain the post-bid
negative abnormal returns. Thus, the cause of the drift still eludes us. However, if
these post-bid abnormal returns are attributable to the acquisitions (and there appear
to be no compelling evidence to refute this), short event windows (as frequently used,
particularly in studies based on the US market) will not capture the whole wealth effect.
A second, related issue, regards the choice of event study model. For both cross-
border and domestic bidders (see discussion to hypothesis 9 below), market model
abnormal returns are substantially lower than those observed using either the index
model or the capital asset pricing model. This is due to the high mean a (constant)
values for bidding companies, caused (despite the long parameter estimation period)
by bidding companies performing exceptionally well during the parameter estimation
period. The a terms imply that over the event window from t-8 to t+5, cross-border
and domestic bidders are, on average, expected to earn a rate of return of 11.48%
and 13.48%, respectively, in addition to the rate of return commensurate with the
company's level of systematic risk. Overseas bidding companies were not able to
maintain this excess performance during the period following the bid, and as indicated
by the index model, also underperformed relative to the stock market index in their
home market. Due to the problems associated with the estimation of the market model
a values, as well as the mean market model and capital asset pricing model 13 values
being substantially below 1, it is believed that the index model provide the most
appropriate benchmark against which to evaluate the returns to bidding company
shareholders.
As discussed above under hypothesis 3, the nationality of the cross-border bidder
had a significant impact on the level of abnormal returns to target company
shareholders. Hypothesis 8, discussed next, relates to whether the level of abnormal
returns to shareholders of cross-border bidders varied with the nationality of the
bidding company:
Hypothesis 8 - Nationality of Cross-Border Bidding Companies 
Hoce nat No differences in abnormal returns to overseas bidding
companies in cross-border acquisitions into the UK were
associated with the nationality of the bidder.
Hi CB nat Significant differences in abnormal returns to overseas bidding
companies in cross-border acquisitions into the UK were
associated with the nationality of the bidder.
The level of abnormal returns to shareholders of overseas bidders varied
significantly depending on the region in which the bidding company was incorporated
(as discussed in section 8.2.2), thus rejecting the null hypothesis. The level of total
abnormal returns (for event window t-8, t+5) to US bidding companies averaged
exactly the same as the overall index model sample mean of -5.34% (not statistically
significant). However, the performance of overseas companies based in European
countries which were not part of the European Community 193 was substantially lower,
at -17.19% (significant at the 80% level), although the difference in mean was not
statistically significant. Bidding companies based outside of Europe or the US on
average gained +5.32%, although this was not statistically significant.
While shareholders of overseas bidding companies, on average, lost as a result
of the cross-border acquisitions of UK companies, the results regarding the level of
abnormal returns to shareholders of domestic bidders, as discussed next, are more
ambiguous.
Hypothesis 9 - Domestic Bidding Companies 
Ho pe	 No abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of bidding
companies in domestic UK acquisitions.
H i DB	 Significant abnormal returns (positive or negative) accrued to
shareholders of bidding companies in domestic UK acquisitions.
The level of abnormal returns to shareholders of domestic bidding companies are
(as discussed in section 8.3.1) highly dependent on which test model is used. As
explained above, the substantial difference in results were due to the high market
model a values. Over the period up until the bid announcement, domestic bidding
companies outperformed the market, as they had done during the parameter
estimation period. Cumulative abnormal returns from t-8 to t-1 amounted to +8.05%
with the index model (significant at the 99% level), +8.73% with CAPM (also significant
at the 99% level) and +1.21% with the market model. At the time of the bid
announcement, there was, however, a substantial deterioration in the average share
performance of the domestic bidders. During the bid announcement month,
shareholders in domestic bidders lost according to all three models (-0.19% with the
index model, -0.22% with CAPM and -1.11% with the market model (significant at the
99% level)). Over the post-bid period, domestic bidders in general continued to
193 The membership of the European Community (European Union) in this study is taken to be the 12 countries
which were members during the period of study. Sweden, Austria and Finland joined the EU after the period
in question, and has in this study thus been classified as non-EU countries.
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underperform, with mean post-bid (t+1, t+5) cumulative abnormal returns amounting
to -1.07% with the index model, -0.67% with CAPM and -5.52% with the market model
(significant at the 99% level). Thus, while domestic bidders performed well prior to the
bid announcement, abnormal losses were incurred at, and subsequent to, the time of
the bid announcement. The overall CAR, taking into account both the pre-bid and
post-bid abnormal returns (t-8, t+5) amounted to +6.79% with the index model and
+7.84% with the capital asset pricing model (both significant at the 99% level) and
-5.42% with the market model (significant at the 95% level).
As discussed under hypothesis 4, it was established that UK target company
shareholders encountered higher abnormal returns in cross-border than in domestic
acquisitions. The extent to which differences in shareholder returns between cross-
border and domestic acquisitions also apply to bidding companies (bidding company
cross-border effects), was analysed next:
Hypothesis 10 - Bidding Companies 'Cross-Border Effect'
HoCB effect No differences in abnormal returns to overseas and UK bidding
companies in cross-border and domestic acquisitions were
present.
H i CB effect Abnormal returns to overseas bidding companies in cross-border
acquisitions and UK bidding companies in domestic acquisitions
were significantly different.
While the three different test models produced different results with regard to the
level of abnormal returns to shareholders of bidding companies, the models provide
surprisingly consistent results with regard to the difference in the level of abnormal
returns to cross-border and domestic bidders. With all three models, overseas bidders
performed better during the bid month than domestic bidders, with the cross-border
effect for this month amounting to +0.99% with the index model, +1.66% with CAPM
(significant at the 80% level) and +1.34% with the market model. However, both prior
to and subsequent to the bid announcement, shareholders of overseas bidders
obtained substantially lower abnormal returns than did shareholders of domestic UK
bidding companies. Over the total analysis period from t-8 to t+5, the difference in the
mean total cumulative abnormal returns to cross-border and domestic bidders (bidding
company cross-border effect) amounted to -12.13% with the index model (significant
at the 99% level), -11.39% with CAPM (significant at the 95% level) and -11.04% with
the market model (significant at the 90% level). Thus, the high abnormal returns to
shareholders of UK target companies in cross-border acquisitions relative to those
observed for domestic targets, appear to have been caused by overpayment, with
overseas bidders performing significantly worse than domestic UK bidders.
The empirical evidence discussed so far relate to the extent to which bidding or
target company shareholders gain from either cross-border or domestic acquisitions.
The following four hypotheses relate to whether the acquisitions overall created
shareholder wealth. These hypotheses are tested (as discussed in Chapter 9) by
analysing the percentage index model joint abnormal returns to shareholders of pairs
of target and bidding companies'.
Firstly, the joint abnormal returns to shareholders in 50 pairs of target and bidding
companies engaged in cross-border acquisitions was analysed:
Hypothesis 11 - Cross-Border Acquisitions 
Hoc No joint abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of overseas
bidding and domestic UK target companies in cross-border
acquisitions into the UK.
c Significant joint abnormal returns (positive or negative) accrued
to shareholders of overseas bidding and domestic UK target
companies in cross-border acquisitions into the UK.
As discussed under hypotheses 1 and 7 above, while shareholders of UK targets
gained significantly in cross-border acquisitions, the overseas bidding companies
194	 Due to bidding companies generally being substantially larger than target firms, the cumulative abnormal
returns for each pair has been weighted according to the pre-bid market values of the target and bidding
companies as follows: [ (CAR Bidder * MVBickle)	 (CARTaroe, * MVTarget)] ( MVEhdder	 MVTarget).
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underperformed during the period surrounding the bid. The overall joint wealth effect
indicate that, while resulting in a transfer of wealth from bidding to target company
shareholders, cross-border acquisitions also created significant shareholder wealth.
Highly positive joint abnormal returns were observed for months t-1 and t (of +1.69°/0
and +2.45%, respectively), and the total index model abnormal returns (t-8, t+1)
amounted to +5.19%, significant at the 95% level.
As discussed above (under hypotheses 3 and 8), the nationality of the overseas
bidding company appear to have had a significant impact on the level of abnormal
returns to shareholders of both targets and bidders. The effect on the joint abnormal
returns of the nationality of the overseas bidding companies was analysed next:
Hypothesis 12 - Nationality of Bidder in Cross-Border Acquisitions
HoC nat	 No differences in joint abnormal returns to shareholders of
overseas bidding and domestic UK target companies in cross-
border acquisitions into the UK were associated with the
nationality of the overseas bidder.
H i C nat Significant differences in joint abnormal returns to shareholders
of overseas bidding and domestic UK target companies in cross-
border acquisitions into the UK were associated with the
nationality of the overseas bidder.
The empirical evidence (as summarised in Table 9.4 in the previous chapter)
reveal strong differences in joint cumulative abnormal returns depending on the
nationality of the overseas bidding company, thus rejecting the null hypothesis. The
total abnormal returns (t-8, t+1) were marginally negative in cross-border acquisitions
by companies based in other EC states, while acquisitions by bidders based in other
European countries also resulted in low (although positive) joint abnormal returns.
Acquisitions by US bidders resulted in large overall gains (+6.33%, significant at the
80% level), while acquisitions by companies based outside of Europe or the US
resulted in significant overall gains (+11.55%, significant at the 95% level). The cause
of such large variations in overall abnormal returns depending on the nationality of the
cross-border bidding company, is an area which warrants further research.
The overall abnormal returns to 356 pairs of target and bidding company
shareholders in domestic acquisitions were similarly analysed in order to establish the
total wealth effect of domestic acquisitions in the UK during the 1986-1991 period.
Hypothesis 13 - Domestic Acquisitions 
Hop	 No joint abnormal returns accrued to shareholders of bidding
and target companies in domestic acquisitions into the UK.
Hi D Significant joint abnormal returns (positive or negative) accrued
to shareholders of bidding and target companies in domestic
acquisitions into the UK.
As discussed in section 9.3.1, significant positive index model joint abnormal
returns in domestic acquisitions were observed as early as two months prior to the
month of the bid announcement, with abnormal returns for month t-2 amounting to
+0.9% (significant at the 95% level). Further highly significant gains were observed
for months t-1 and t, of +1.37% and +4.76%, respectively (both significant at the 99%
level). Thus, while bidding company shareholders lost during the month of the bid
announcement, these losses were more than offset by the substantial gains to target
company shareholders. Over the whole analysis period (t-8, t+1), joint abnormal
returns to pairs of target and bidding company shareholders amounted to +8.08%,
significant at the 99% level. Thus, based on the index model abnormal returns,
domestic acquisitions, on average, appear to have created significant shareholder
wealth.
As discussed above (under hypotheses 4 and 10), the research has revealed a
positive target company cross-border effect and a negative bidding company cross-
border effect. Next was analysed the difference in the joint abnormal returns to target
and bidding company shareholders in cross-border and domestic acquisitions (the total
joint cross-border effect). The null and the alternative hypotheses are as follows:
1Hypothesis 14 - Total Joint 'Cross-Border Effect'
HoC effect No differences in joint abnormal returns to pairs of target and
bidding companies were observed between domestic and cross-
border acquisitions.
H i c effect Abnormal returns to pairs of target and bidding companies were
significantly different in domestic and cross-border acquisitions.
While target company shareholders gained more in cross-border than in domestic
acquisitions, the positive target company cross-border effect was more than offset by
the poor performance of the overseas bidding companies. Over the total analysis
period (t-8, t+1), the average index model cumulative abnormal returns to pairs of
target and bidding company shareholders was 2.89 percentage points lower in cross-
border than in domestic acquisitions, thus indicating a negative cross-border effect.
Although the overall negative cross-border effect was not statistically significant, a few
of the regressions in the cross-sectional analysis (where the different bid
characteristics were controlled for), the negative cross-border effect was found to be
marginally significant (at the 80% level). There is thus some evidence to suggest that,
despite the positive target company cross-border effect, overall joint abnormal returns
to targets and bidders were lower in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions.
Cross-sectional analysis is undertaken in order to control for the characteristics
of the individual bids. As discussed in Chapter 5, the literature suggests several
factors which may have an impact on the level of abnormal returns. The variables
analysed in this study are the outcome of the bid, the existence of competition in the
bid, whether the terms of the offer were revised, the method of payment, the presence
of pre-bid stakes, the relative size of the target and bidding companies and the size
of the company analysed'''. In the cross-sectional analysis, the cumulative
abnormal returns are analysed for the whole event period (from t-8 to t+1 for targets
195 In the discussion below, the statistical significance levels reported refer to the highest level of significance
for the explanatory variable in the cross-sectional regressions. A total of 13 different regressions were used,
and the level of significance may have been lower in some of the regressions.
- 343 -
and from t-8 to t+5 for bidders, where t refers to the month of the bid announcement),
as well as for the pre-bid period (t-8, t-2), the bid period (t-1, t), and the post-bid period
(t+1, t+5) 196
With regard to whether the success or failure of the bid had an impact on the level
of abnormal returns, the null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 15 - Bid Outcome 
Ho outcome There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) in successful and failed
acquisitions.
F1 1 outcome Abnormal returns were significantly different to companies
(target, bidding and joint) in successful and failed acquisitions.
Over the whole event period (from t-8 to t+1), target company shareholders in
domestic acquisitions gained significantly (at the 95% level) more in successful than
in failed bids. Whether the bid succeeded or failed does not, however, appear to have
had a significant impact on the level of abnormal returns to target company
shareholders in cross-border acquisitions.
With regard to bidding company shareholders, domestic bidders performed better
(at the 80% level of significance) over the whole event period window (t-8, t+5) in
failed than in successful bids. Overseas bidders performed better during the bid
period (t-1, t) in failed than in successful bids, although the reverse was true during the
post-bid period (t+1, t+5). Over the whole event period (t-8, t+5), the outcome of the
bid had no significant impact on the level of abnormal returns to overseas bidders.
Overall, the empirical results thus reject the null hypothesis, in favour of the
alternative, as shareholders of domestic targets gain more and shareholders of
domestic bidders gain (over the event period from t-8 to t+1) less in successful than
in failed bids.
196 Due to limited data being available for target companies after the period of the bid announcement, the total
analysis period fro target companies is shorter than that for bidding companies. Analysis of post-bid returns
(t+1, t+5) was thus only possible for bidding companies.
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The next hypothesis tested relate to the existence of competition in the bid:
Hypothesis 16 - Competition in Bid
Ho competitive There were no differences in the level of abnormal
returns to companies (target, bidding and joint) in single
bidder and multiple bidder (competitive) acquisitions.
H 1 competitive Abnormal returns were significantly different to
companies (target, bidding and joint) in single bidder and
multiple bidder (competitive) acquisitions.
The empirical evidence obtained in this thesis reject the null hypothesis with
regard to the abnormal returns to shareholders of domestic target and overseas
bidding companies. Target company shareholders in domestic acquisitions gained
significantly more (at the 99% level of significance) in competitive than in single-bidder
offers. Overseas bidding company shareholders, however, encountered significantly
(at the 90% level of significance) lower abnormal returns in competitive than in
uncompetitive bids. The number of bidders was, rather surprisingly, not found to have
had a significant impact on the level of abnormal returns to shareholders of either
domestic bidders or target companies subject to cross-border acquisitions.
The next variable analysed relate to whether or not the revision of bid terms had
a significant impact on shareholders wealth. The hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 17 - Revision of Bid Terms 
Ho revision There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) in revised and unrevised
offers.
H 1 revision Abnormal returns were significantly different to companies
(target, bidding and joint) in revised and unrevised offers.
In this study, shareholders of target companies subject to domestic takeover bids
were found to have gained more in revised bids during the bid period (t-1, t), even
though some of the bid revisions took place after the month of the bid announcement.
rThe empirical evidence thus reject the null hypothesis. However, the variable had no
significant impact on the overall event period (t-8, t+1) abnormal returns. Similarly,
revision of bid terms had no significant impact on target company returns in cross-
border acquisitions. However, when analysing all target companies together, the
overall (t-8, t+1) abnormal returns were found to be significantly higher (at the 90%
level) in revised than in unrevised bids. Bid revision thus appears to have had some
positive impact on target company returns.
Domestic bidders performed significantly better (at the 95% level) in revised bids,
while the level of abnormal returns to overseas bidders was not significantly affected
by whether or not the bid was revised.
Hypothesis 18 relate to the method of payment, and proved to be the single most
important explanatory variable in the cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns. The
null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 18 - Method of Payment
Ho pay There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) depending on whether or
not the offer includes a full cash alternative
H 1 pay Abnormal returns were significantly different to companies
(target, bidding and joint) depending on whether the offer
includes a full cash alternative.
The method of payment was found to have had a major impact on the level of
abnormal returns to all categories of companies. In domestic acquisitions, both targets
and bidders obtained significantly higher abnormal returns (significant at the 99% level)
where the offer included a full cash alternative, compared to where no such cash offer
was available. Cash offers also resulted in higher abnormal returns to targets and
bidders in cross-border acquisitions, although the level of significance was lower (at
the 80% and 95% level, respectively), due to the small number of cross-border
acquisitions not involving cash payment.
Walkling and Edminster (1985) predicted that target company returns would be
lower and bidding company returns higher, where the bidding company held shares
in the target prior to the bid announcement. This was tested next, with the null and
alternative hypotheses as follows:
Hypothesis 19 - Pre-Bid Stake 
Ho stake There were no differences in the level of abnormal returns to
companies (target, bidding and joint) depending on whether or
not the bidder held a pre-bid stake in the target.
H I stake Abnormal returns were significantly different to companies
(target, bidding and joint) depending on whether or not the
bidder held a pre-bid stake in the target.
Consistent with Walkling and Edminster's expectations, domestic targets gained
somewhat less (at the 80% level of significance) during the bid period (t-1, t) where
the bidder held a toehold in the target. However, shareholders in domestic target
companies in which the bidder held shares at the time of the bid announcement,
performed significantly better during the pre-bid period (t-8, t-2) than did the other
target companies. Overall (t-8, t+1), the presence of pre-bid stakes had a positive
impact on the abnormal returns to target company shareholders in domestic
acquisitions, although only significant at the 80% level of significance. The presence
of pre-bid stakes does not appear to have had a significant impact on the level of
abnormal returns to target company shareholders in cross-border acquisitions.
Overseas bidders gained more (at the 90% level) during the bid-period if they held
a pre-bid toehold in the target, although the effect was not significant for the overall
event window (t-8, t+5). Domestic bidders performed overall better (at the 80% level
of significance) where they held a pre-bid stake.
Hypothesis 20 relate to the difference in pre-bid market values of the target and
bidding companies:
Hypothesis 20 - Relative Size of Targets and Bidders
Ho rel size The level of abnormal returns to companies (target, bidding and
joint) were unaffected by the relative size of the target and
bidding companies.
H 1 rel size The level of abnormal returns to companies (target, bidding and
joint) varied significantly depending on the relative size of the
target and bidding companies.
The empirical results indicate that acquisitions of relatively large target companies
(relative to the size of the bidder) had a positive impact (significant at the 95% level)
on bidding company shareholder returns in cross-border acquisitions into the UK
during the 1986-1991 period in comparison to relatively small acquisitions. This finding
is consistent with the observations made by Feils (1993) for cross-border acquisitions,
and Asquith et al. (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and Peterson and Peterson
(1991) for domestic acquisitions in the US. UK bidders in domestic acquisitions
performed better during the bid-period (t-1, t) in relatively large acquisitions. However,
during the post-bid period (t+1, t+5), UK bidders engaged in such large acquisitions
performed worse than companies buying relatively small targets. Thus, overall (t-8,
t+5), the relative size of the target and bidding companies had no significant impact
on the level of abnormal returns to shareholders of UK bidding companies engaged
in domestic acquisitions. The relative size of the targets and bidders does not appear
to have had any significant impact on the level of abnormal returns to target company
shareholders in either domestic or cross-border acquisitions.
The final variable controlled for relate to the size of the company. Several studies
(as discussed in section 6.5.2) have found companies with low market capitalisations
to outperform larger ones. This has become known as the 'size effect'. In order to
control for a possible size effect, the impact of company size on abnormal returns has
been analysed. The hypotheses relating to this variable are as follows:
Hypothesis 21 - Size of Company
Ho size The level of abnormal returns to companies (target, bidding and
joint) were unaffected by their size (as measured by pre-bid
market value)
H size1 The level of abnormal returns to companies (target, bidding and
joint) varied significantly depending on their size (as measured
by pre-bid market value).
The results with regard to the impact of company size are mixed. Shareholders
of small domestic bidding companies obtained significantly (at the 95% level) higher
cumulative abnormal returns for the whole event window (t-8, t+5) than did
shareholders in larger bidders. (However, large domestic bidders outperformed
smaller ones during the post-bid (t+1, t+5) period). In cross-border acquisitions, large
bidders performed significantly better (at the 99% level) than smaller cross-border
bidders.
With regard to target company shareholders, their percentage abnormal returns
in domestic acquisitions were significantly higher (at the 95% level) the lower the pre-
bid market value of the target company. In cross-border acquisitions, target
shareholder returns during the bid period (t-1, t) were also higher for small targets,
although large companies performed better than smaller ones during the period prior
to being the subject of a cross-border takeover bid. Overall (t-8, t+1), company size
had no significant impact on target company shareholder returns in cross-border
acquisitions. Overall, there is thus some evidence to reject the null hypothesis,
although the size effect does not appear to apply to all categories of companies.
Takeover activity in the UK during the 1986 to 1991 period resulted in large gains
to shareholders of listed UK target companies. These gains were particularly large in
cross-border acquisitions. The positive target company cross-border effect was similar
to that observed in previous literature regarding the US market. The cause of the
target company cross-border effect is not yet fully known, although it appears to be
associated with the nationality of the cross-border bidding company. In addition, the
target company cross-border effect is no longer present once the method of payment
is controlled for. The cause of the cross-border effects, and the impact of country-
specific factors, are areas which warrant further research.
While target company shareholders gained significantly from acquisitions,
shareholders of bidding companies on average lost, in particular during the months
following the bid announcement. While one should be careful not to infer ex ante
motives from ex post results, the negative (post-bid) abnormal returns to bidding
company shareholders in domestic and even more so in cross-border acquisitions,
raise questions regarding the merit of these transactions. Based on share return data,
it appears that bidding companies (and in particular, overseas bidders) paid too high
a price for the target companies. While the acquisitions overall created significant
shareholder wealth, the gains to target company shareholders exceeded this total gain,
thus leading to a deterioration of wealth for the average bidding company shareholder.
Further research is required to establish why acquisitions take place despite the poor
returns on average incurred by bidding company shareholders.
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APPENDIX C
CORRELATION MATRICES FOR THE
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES IN THE CROSS-
SECTIONAL ANALYSIS
Table C.1
UK Target Companies in Cross-Border Acquisitions
Variables as defined in Table 7.3.
IOutcome Comp. Revised Pay Stake Rei Size
Competitive 0.494
Revised 0.185 0.300
Pay -0.085 0.096 -0.020
Stake 0.095 -0.154 0.084 0.010
Rel Size 0.307 -0.065 -0.048 -0.702 -0.118
Size 0.230 0.165 0.194 -0.158 0.181 0.020
Table C.2
UK Target Companies in Domestic Acquisitions
Variables as defined in Table 7.7.
IOutcome Comp. Revised Pay Stake Rel Size
Competitive 0.391
Revised 0.099 0.198
Pay -0.095 0.039 0.068
Stake -0.047 -0.037 0.088 0.081
Rel Size 0.113 -0.014 -0.015 -0.082 -0.030
Size 0.172 0.117 0.156 -0.100 0.066 0.163
Table C.3
UK Target Companies in Cross-Border and Domestic
Acquisitions (Target Company Cross-Border Effect)
Variables as defined in Table 7.11.
Natio-
nality
Outcome Comp. Revised Pay Stake Rel
Size
Outcome 0.012
Comp. 0.078 0.414
Revised 0.033 0.118 0.225
Pay 0.279 -0.083 0.062 0.064
Stake 0.169 -0.012 -0.053 0.091 0.113
Rel Size 0.117 0.117 -0.024 -0.023 -0.091 -0.038
Size 0.122 0.183 0.134 0.165 -0.063 0.111 0.059
Table C.4
Overseas Bidding Companies in Cross-Border Acquisitions
Variables as defined in Table 8.3.
1 Outcome Comp. Revised Pay Stake Rel Size
Competitive 0.343
Revised -0.042 0.383
Pay -0.092 0.104 0.075
Stake -0.005 -0.137 -0.034 0.180
Rel Size 0.307 -0.065 -0.053 -0.702 -0.118
Size -0.155 0.029 0.031 0.326 0.028 -0.637
Table C.5
Domestic UK Bidding Companies in Domestic Acquisitions
Variables as defined in Table 8.8.
IOutcome Comp. Revised Pay Stake Rel Size
Competitive 0.364
Revised 0.122 0.198
Pay -0.082 -0.010 0.054
Stake -0.004 -0.003 0.107 0.038
Rel Size 0.117 -0.017 -0.016 -0.086 -0.032
Size -0.038 -0.012 0.009 0.214 0.094 -0.142
Table C.6
Bidding Companies in Cross-Border and Domestic UK
Acquisitions (Bidding Company Cross-Border Effect)
Variables as defined in Table 8.13.
Natio-
nality
Outcome Comp. Revised Pay Stake Rel
Size
Outcome -0.038
Comp. 0.062 0.356
Revised -0.033 0.102 0.223
Pay 0.223 -0.088 0.014 0.045
Stake 0.133 -0.009 -0.019 0.080 0.077
Rel Size 0.117 0.119 -0.024 -0.024 -0.092 -0.038
Size 0.337 -0.065 0.016 0.000 0.276 0.122 -0.223
Table C.7
UK Target Companies and Overseas Bidding Companies in
Cross-Border Acquisitions (Cross-Border Acquisitions)
Variables as defined in Table 9.3.
IOutcome Comp. Revised Pay Stake Rel Size
Competitive 0.330
Revised -0.050 0.413
Pay -0.164 0.097 0.076
Stake 0.003 -0.240 -0.018 0.153
Rel Size 0.307 -0.065 -0.053 -0.702 -0.118
Size -0.089 0.092 0.008 0.343 0.029 -0.290
Table C.8
UK Target Companies and Domestic Bidding Companies in
Domestic UK Acquisitions (Domestic Acquisitions)
Variables as defined in Table 9.7.
IOutcome Comp. Revised Pay Stake Rel Size
Competitive 0.361
Revised 0.111 0.196
Pay -0.100 0.009 0.064
Stake -0.002 -0.008 0.114 0.034
Rel Size 0.116 -0.017 -0.015 -0.085 -0.030
Size 0.010 0.045 0.010 0.171 0.105 0.032
Table C.9
Target and Bidding Companies in Cross-Border and Domestic
Acquisitions (Total Cross-Border Effect)
Variables as defined in Table 9.11.
Natio-
nality
Outcome Comp. Revised Pay Stake Rel
Size
Outcome -0.035
Comp. 0.061 0.352
Revised -0.015 0.092 0.226
Pay 0.240 -0.107 0.029 0.057
Stake 0.106 -0.005 -0.040 0.092 0.064
Rel Size 0.117 0.119 -0.024 -0.023 -0.092 -0.038
Size 0.359 -0.017 0.016 0.000 0.244 0.130 -0.036
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